John Adams

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PENSÉES

SUR LA

RÉVOLUTION

DE

L'AMÉRIQUE-UNIE,

extraites de l'Ouvrage *Anglois*, intitulé

MÉMOIRE, *adreſſé aux Souverains de l'*EUROPE, *ſur l'état préſent des affaires de l'*ANCIEN *&* *du* NOUVEAU-MONDE.

Th. Pownall

Ad hunc diem flumina ac terras, & coelum quodammodo ipſum, clauſerant Romani. — Quomodo lucem diemque omnibus hominibus, ita omnes terras fortibus viris natura aperuit. — Sincerus & integer & ſervitutis oblitus populus aut ex æquo agetis, aut aliis imperitabitis.

Tencteri apud TACIT. *Hiſt* Lib. V.

Se trouvent à AMSTERDAM chez *Harreveld*, *Changuion*, *Vlam* & *J. A. Crajenſchot*; ROTTERDAM *Bennet* & *Hake*, *D. Vis*, *Bronkhorſt*; LA HAYE *J. van Cleef*; LEYDE *Luchtmans*, *Murray*, *Luzac* & *van Damme*; UTRECHT *Wild*, *Spruyt*; GRONINGUE *Huiſing*; LEEUWARDEN *Cabais*; MIDDELBOURG *J. Abrahams*; ARNHEM *Nyhof*; MASTRICHT *Du Four* & *Roux*; BRUXELLES *Boubers* &c. &c.

[1781]

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PRÉFACE DE L'EDITEUR.

Une Société d'Amis de l'Humanité *a invité récemment, dans les Feuilles publiques, les Académies & Sociétés dans tous les divers Etats de l'Europe à proposer un Prix pour celui qui répondra le mieux à cette Question:* L'Indépendance de l'*Amérique* est-elle à desirer; & les suites en seront-elles avantageuses ou nuisibles pour le Commerce de l'*Europe*? *Si le Problème a été proposé de bonne-foi, sans avoir préjugé la Question & déterminé quelle doit être la Réponse, cette* Société d'Amis de l'Humanité *en trouvera la solution la plus satisfaisante dans la Brochure, que je lui offre. Elle me fut communiquée il y a déjà quelque tems par un de mes Amis, qui m'en de-*

manda mon ſentiment. Je lui prédis, que peut-être en quelques endroits elle prêteroit le flanc à la Critique : Mais, malgré les imperfections qu'elle peut avoir, je lui en conſeillai la publication comme d'un morceau très-propre à éclairer l'Europe ſur ſes vrais intérêts, relativement à la Révolution Américaine, & à diſſiper les préjugés, qui faſcinent les yeux d'une partie du Public, particulièrement ceux d'un grand nombre de mes Compatriotes.

Effectivement, à une époque où cette Révolution ſe captive l'attention de l'ancien & du nouveau Monde, & en tient l'attente en ſuſpens, un Spectateur impartial, conduit uniquement par l'intérêt général de l'Humanité, ne peut manquer d'obſerver dans une portion très-conſidérable de ſes Contemporains un certain penchant en faveur de la Grande-Brétagne, digne que le Philoſophe en recherche les cauſes & que le Philanthrope les déplore.

Je ſens parfaitement, que de les développer toutes

tes ce seroit une tâche peut-être moins difficile, que dangereuse & desagréable: L'Histoire de tous les siècles nous apprend, que les passions humaines décident ordinairement des intérêts des Peuples, comme elles règlent la conduite des Particuliers: Elles le font sans doute encore aujourd'hui: Et ce seroit un dessein peu prudent de vouloir retracer dans un Ecrit public celles de ces causes, qui prennent leur source dans les vices *ou les* foiblesses du cœur, *dans l'ambition, l'adulation, la bassesse, l'avidité, la soif des richesses, l'indifférence sur les moyens de s'avancer, le mépris des principes, l'esprit de parti &c. Bornons-nous donc à dire un mot des causes de cette partialité aveugle, qui naissent uniquement d'une* erreur de l'esprit.

Depuis l'usurpation de Cromwel, l'Angleterre n'a jamais perdu de vuë le projet de dominer sur les Mers: Cette Domination doit la rendre l'Arbitre souverain des autres Nations policées de l'Europe, le Contrôleur-suprème de leurs progrès dans le Commerce & de leur accroissement en Territoire,

la Maîtreſſe, en un mot, de leurs deſtins. Par ſes ſuccès dans la Guerre de 1756. *elle étoit enfin parvenuë à ce grand objet de ſes deſirs : Les efforts étonnans qu'elle a faits pour réduire ſes Colonies révoltées ; les reſſources immenſes qu'elle a déployées ; la conduite hautaine qu'elle tient au milieu de ſa plus accablante détreſſe ; l'audace avec laquelle elle inſulte tous les Pavillons & brave les Nations neutres, ſes Alliés même, dans leurs propres Ports ; tout fait voir à quel dégré de puiſſance elle étoit montée, & ce que l'Indépendance des autres Peuples ſeroit devenuë, ſi l'Angleterre avoit ſçu conſerver cette maſſe de forces, qu'un coup imprévu de la Providence a deſunies. S'il étoit poſſible, qu'elle réuſsît jamais à conſolider la rupture ; ſi les Colonies de l'Amérique, capables de réſiſter ſeules pendant trois ans à toutes les Forces Britanniques, rentroient un jour ſous l'obéiſſance de leur Mère-Patrie, la Liberté du Continent Européen ne ſeroit plus que précaire, le Commerce ſubiroit le joug de la Reine des Mers. — Et, mal-*

malgré cette perſpective certaine, malgré ces vérités prouvées par l'expérience, le vœu ſecret d'une grande portion de ce Continent eſt en faveur d'un triomphe, qui le doit jetter dans les fers.

Pour réſoudre ce Problème en Politique & non en Philoſophe, je ne ſuis pas le premier (1), *qui crois devoir remonter au Règne de* Louïs XIV. *juſtement ſurnommé* le Grand, *ſi la* grandeur *conſiſte en* boufiſſure. *Gouverné par l'amour de la vaine gloire, dévoré de l'ambition d'être le plus grand Roi de l'Univers, nourri par ſes vils Flatteurs dans des principes deſtructeurs du repos de l'Europe, il excita une jalouſie univerſelle contre ſa puiſſance; jalouſie que la Politique de Guillaume ſçut entretenir avec adreſſe, & qui jetta des racines ſi profon-*

(1) *L'Auteur des* Obſervations impartiales d'un vrai Hollandois *a déjà dit Chap. 2. pag.* 19. Enfin Louïs XIV. Monarque qui n'avoit d'autre objet que ſa gloire & de talens que pour le malheur de ſes Sujets & des Peuples voiſins, briſa les noeuds de cette heureuſe harmonie.

fondes, qu'au bout d'un Siècle la France en reſſent encore les funeſtes effets: Ce fut lui qui, tourmenté par la ſoif des conquêtes, viola le premier cette union naturelle, *qui avoit ſubſiſté juſqu'alors entre deux Nations, liées par des intérêts réciproques: Ce fut lui qui jetta la Hollande entre les bras de ſa propre Rivale, & qui la contraignit à prêter ſes forces pour l'aggrandiſſement d'un Peuple, qui lui avoit fait éprouver encore ſi récemment l'excès de ſa haine & de ſon envie. Sans* Louïs XIV. *l'Angleterre ne ſeroit jamais devenuë dans la bouche du Vulgaire Hollandois l'*Alliée naturelle de la République. *Malheureuſement cette idée, que l'ambition de* Louïs XIV. *avoit établie, s'eſt conſolidée davantage par l'imprudence des Miniſtres de* Louïs XV. *& c'eſt la France elle-même, qui, ſans le vouloir, a ajouté au ſyſtême politique des Provinces-Unies ce poids, qui l'entraine depuis un ſiècle vers la Puiſſance, ſon ennemie.*

Les tems ont changé; mais l'opinion reſte: Et la ré-

révolution momentanée, que l'Alliance des Maisons de Bourbon & d'Autriche causa dans les liaisons politiques de l'Europe, si l'on en analyse les effets, paroît même avoir opéré à son préjudice. Dans la partie de l'Allemagne, où la France alla prodiguer des Trésors & des Hommes, qu'elle eût employés bien plus utilement à défendre ses propres Possessions, l'idée d'un François conquérant, *c'est-à-dire, d'un* François haïssable, *ne s'est pas effacée de l'esprit du Peuple: Et c'est aux Ministres, instruits du secret des Cabinets, à décider si dans la contestation présente les vœux & les démarches du Parti de l'*Empire, *avec lequel elle fit alors cause commune, sont bien sincèrement en sa faveur.*

Enfin le Règne de Louïs XVI. *a amené une nouvelle époque: Un Monarque, ennemi de la fausse gloire, a écouté la voix de la Vérité, qui lui a dit, qu'*un Souverain est plus grand en perfectionnant le bonheur de ses Peuples qu'en éternisant son Nom par des Victoires. *Les Fau-*

teurs de la prépondérance Angloiſe tâchent en vain de perſuader au Public, " *que l'objet de la Fran-*
„ *ce dans la préſente Guerre n'eſt point* la liberté
„ de la Navigation & le bien général de l'Hu-
„ manité ; *que ſon but eſt de ravir à la Grande-*
„ *Brétagne la ſupériorité ſur les Mers, pour l'ex-*
„ *ercer elle-même* (2)." *Malgré la hardieſſe de leurs*

(2) *C'eſt ce qu'on avance entre autres dans une Lettre à l'Editeur du* Lloyds-Evening-Poſt, *traduite dans quelques-uns des Papiers publics, comme une Diſſertation ſur la Queſtion*, concernant les avantages de l'Indépendance Américaine pour l'Europe. *Cette Diſſertation, à laquelle la Queſtion, propoſée peu de jours auparavant, paroît proprement avoir ſervi de véhicule, a pour principal but de démontrer, que,* " *ſi la Grande-Brétagne* VEUT BIEN *reconnoître formellement l'Indépendance de ſes Colonies*
„ *d'Amérique, les autres Souverains de l'Europe*
„ *ſont* RAISONNABLEMENT *tenus d'accorder*
„ *une Liberté égale à leurs Colonies reſpectives.*" *Quand je vois les plumes Angloiſes ſoutenir cette thèſe, ou plutôt quand je vois le Miniſtère Britannique, deſeſpérant, malgré ſes pompeuſes Relations, de faire rentrer les* lâches Rebelles *ſous le joug, ſe rabattre au-*

leurs assertions, il leur est difficile d'étouffer le témoignage des faits: Osent-ils nier, que dès-à-présent les Forces Navales de la Maison de Lourbon soient égales, sinon supérieures, dans les Mers de l'ancien & du nouveau Monde, à celles de la Grande-Brétagne? Osent-ils nier, que cette dernière, épuisée d'Hommes & d'Argent, soit incapable de sou-

aujourd'hui sur l'offre de VOULOIR BIEN *reconnoître une Indépendance, qu'il n'est plus en son pouvoir de détruire, mais accrocher cette* BONTÉ *à la condition* RAISONNABLE, *que la France, l'Espagne, le Portugal, la Hollande, le Danemarc soient tenus d'*émanciper *aussi leurs Colonies, je crois entendre le Renard de la Fable:*

Que nous sert cette queuë? il faut qu'on se la coupe:
Si l'on me croit, chacun s'y résoudra.

Effectivement ne faut-il pas prendre le monde pour dupe, lorsqu'on essaye de lui persuader, que les cas se ressemblent? D'un côté l'on trouve des Colonies, jouïssant déjà par le fait *d'une Indépendance qu'il n'est plus au* bon vouloir *de la Mère-Patrie de leur accorder ou refuser; d'autre part des Colonies parfaitement*

ſoutenir longtems les efforts, qu'elle a dû faire pour élever ſa Marine au point où nous la voyons depuis deux ans ? C'eſt néanmoins dans cette conjoncture même, où la France & l'Eſpagne, prêtes à cueillir le fruit de leur ambition, ſi elle étoit telle qu'on la repréſente, montrent le plus ſincère empreſſement de concourir à l'acceptation d'un Code

ment ſoumiſes à leurs Maîtres Européens : D'un côté, un Peuple parvenu presque au plus haut dégré de civiliſation, *nombreux, laborieux, éclairé, capable de ſe défendre lui-même & de pourvoir à ſa ſubſiſtance ; d'autre part, des Colons, qui ſont dans un beſoin continuel de leur Mère-Patrie, ici peu nombreux, là foibles, lâches, ignorants, ſuperſtitieux, croupiſſant dans la pareſſe, & prêts à ſe ſoumettre au premier Uſurpateur : D'un côté, des Conſtitutions déjà formées, des Gouvernements établis, des Loix en vigueur ; d'autre part, une Anarchie complette, ſi la Mère-Patrie ne tient les rênes de l'Adminiſtration. —— Telle eſt la parité des cas, que les Partiſans Anglois s'efforcent d'aſſimiler. Mais eſt-il abſurdité, qu'ils ne ſoient en poſſeſſion de ſoutenir ?*

de maritime, qui doit assurer pour les tems à venir la liberté des Mers par des règles fixes & invariables, sous la garantie de tous les Peuples Navigateurs. L'Angleterre seule s'y refuse: Non aliis imperium pelagi — sed mihi sorte datum; *c'est son principe favori: Et, à en croire ses Adhérents,* la Mer doit avoir un Maître; & de tous les Maîtres l'Anglois est le plus doux. — *Mais, quel que soit le nombre de ceux qui aiment mieux se tromper volontairement que d'abandonner de vieux préjugés, ils n'ont pu en imposer à la partie éclairée & impartiale de nos Contemporains. L'Auguste* CATHERINE, *déjà admirée à tant d'autres titres, a démêlé les vrais intérêts de la grande République Européenne; &, raffermie par les conseils du sage* PANIN, *elle a préféré ces intérêts aux caresses suspectes d'une Puissance, qui ne la flattoit que pour la rendre l'instrument de sa propre grandeur. Déjà les véritables Amis de l'Humanité osent espérer de voir éclorre, par ses soins généreux, du sein même de la fermentation*

pré-

préſente, *un ſyſtème d'égalité entre les Membres de cette grande République*, *plus durable & moins compliqué que la prétenduë balance*, *qui depuis plus d'un Siècle a tenu l'Europe dans une agitation continuelle. Déjà ils oſent préſager*, *que la Neutralité armée*, *guidée par Cathérine &* Guſtave, *dira aux Nations belligérantes:* Remettez l'épée dans le fourreau; reconnoiſſez la Liberté univerſelle des Mers; gardez chacune ce que vous poſſédez par le fait aujourd'hui; & que la première cauſe de vos Combats ceſſe: Que l'*Amérique-Unie* ſoit libre & indépendante; & qu'elle prenne ſa place parmi les Puiſſances du Monde policé!

Mais, *outre cette prévention en faveur de la Grande-Brétagne par haine pour ſa Rivale*, *il eſt une autre objection*, *que ſes Partiſans font valoir pour autoriſer leur deſir de voir rentrer l'Amérique ſous le joug.* " *Si les* Etats-Unis, *di-*
„ *ſent-ils*, *parviennent à ſe rendre indépendans*,
„ *l'Europe trouvera bientôt en eux des Rivaux*
„ *dan-*

„ *dangereux : Les Productions de l'Amérique-*
„ *Septentrionale étant les mêmes que celles de l'an-*
„ *cien Monde, celui-ci se ressentira bien-tôt d'u-*
„ *ne concurrence dans le débit de ces Articles,*
„ *dont le prix baissera à tous les Marchés.*" *L'on peut accorder la supposition, sans convenir de la conséquence; & je m'assure, que tout Lecteur impartial, & capable d'embrasser dans ses idées la combinaison des intérêts communs de l'Humanité, avouera, avec l'Auteur du Mémoire dont je publie l'Extrait, que, dans ce cas même,* "*loin que*
„ *la Liberté, qui sera accordée à l'Amérique-U-*
„ *nie, puisse devenir contraire au Commerce de*
„ *l'ancien Monde, on en verra résulter le bonheur*
„ *général, & les Souverains de l'Europe trouver*
„ *leur puissance à la source, où les Peuples auront*
„ *trouvé leur bonheur.*"

Il n'est pas nécessaire, que j'insiste ici sur un raisonnement, que l'Auteur a développé dans toute sa force : Il en a touché, mais plus legèrement, un second, non moins fondé sur la vérité : C'est que,

que, pour les Articles même que l'Amérique-Septentrionale produit comme l'Europe, ſa concurrence ne ſera pas à craindre pendant deux ou trois ſiècles & peut-être plus longtems. Trois millions d'Hommes, aïant derrière eux de vaſtes & fertiles Contrées à défricher, ne s'appliqueront pas de longtems aux Manufactures en grand : Les objets de première néceſſité pourront y être fabriqués pour la conſommation intérieure ; mais ceux d'aiſance & de luxe, qui font une branche principale du Commerce de l'Europe, en ſeront importés dans l'Amérique auſſi longtems que celle-ci aura des terres à peupler. L'exportation de l'ancien Monde augmentera même à meſure que la population s'accroîtra dans le nouveau par la Liberté, qu'il aura acquiſe. Tous les Américains conviennent unanimément, que, durant pluſieurs centaines d'années à venir, leurs poſſeſſions conſiſteront uniquement en Terres ; que l'Agriculture ſera la ſource de leurs richeſſes & le principal objet de leurs travaux ; qu'ils ne s'appliqueront qu'à la culture des matières

res cruës, néceſſaires pour les Fabriques de l'Europe; qu'ils payeront à celle ci la main-d'œuvre des productions de leur propre ſol; en un mot, que leur Patrie ne figurera comme Nation manufacturière & commerçante que lorsque l'immenſe étenduë de Terres, qui y reſtent à cultiver, ſera remplie d'Habitans; ce qui, en calculant même l'accroiſſement de la population ſur le pié le plus favorable, ne pourroit avoir lieu dans dix ou douze générations.

Un troiſième argument, que j'oppoſe à l'objection de la prétenduë rivalité en Commerce, c'eſt la fauſſeté même de l'aſſertion, du moins dans l'étenduë qu'on lui donne. Eſt il vrai, que les Productions propres à l'Amérique-Septentrionale ſoient les mêmes que celles de l'ancien Monde? L'Indigo, le Coton, le Riz, le Tabac, les Bois de teinture, le Rum, objets principaux de l'exportation des Colonies Méridionales, ſont-elles des Productions de l'Europe? L'Europe eſt elle à portée d'entrer en concurrence avec les Provinces au

Nord de la Virginie pour l'approvisionnement des Antilles & de l'Amérique-Méridionale en Grains, Viandes salées, Poisson &c? N'a-t-elle pas plutôt un intérêt visible de s'assurer dans cette partie du Monde un Magasin pour la subsistance de ses Colonies, en y encourageant la culture des Provisions de bouche & toutes les parties de l'Economie rurale? Quant aux Munitions Navales, qui font l'exportation la plus riche de la Russie & de la Suède, l'on sçait, que c'est uniquement à force de Primes que la Grande-Brétagne a excité les Américains à la culture du Lin & du Chanvre, afin de pouvoir se passer à cet égard des Nations Septentrionales de l'Europe; & que c'est dans la même vuë que par Acte de la 2me année de George II. *elle a assigné des Prix à l'exportation de la Poix & du Goudron, de la Térébenthine, des Máts, Vergues, & Beauprés de la Nouvelle-Angleterre. Sans ces encouragemens momentanés l'Amérique ne se seroit pas attachée à des Productions, qui n'entroient point dans l'ancienne sphère de ses échan-*

ges,

ges. *Aujourd'hui même elle n'en a peut-être pas suffisamment pour son propre usage ; & elle continuera longtems à importer de l'Etranger des gros Cordages, des Toiles à voile, du Fer en barre &c. Si l'Auteur du Mémoire Anglois a donné quelque part prise sur lui, c'est sans doute lorsqu'il a trop suivi son imagination ardente, en exaggérant les progrès rapides, que l'Amérique fera dans le Commerce d'exportation & de fret, du moins pour ce qui regarde les Productions du Nord : L'Océan Atlantique est un trajet trop long, trop difficile, pour qu'elle puisse porter aisément aux marchés de l'Europe de grosses quantités de ces Articles : Elle fournit d'autres Marchandises d'un moindre volume, d'un plus grand prix intrinsèque, d'un transport plus facile, par conséquent d'un bénéfice plus considérable ; &, aussi longtems qu'elle pourra les échanger avec avantage, elle n'aspirera point à déposséder les Européens d'un Commerce, pour lequel ils sont beaucoup mieux situés.*

Mais, pour ne laisser aucune retraite aux faus-

ſes craintes des Adhérents de l'Angleterre, ſuppoſons pour un moment, que l'Amérique-Septentrionale devienne un jour une Rivale dangereuſe pour le Commerce de l'Europe : Le ſeroit-elle moins reſtant ſoumiſe à l'Empire Britannique ? C'eſt un fait inconteſtable, que notre Auteur a avancé d'après des dénombremens authentiques, que la population des Etats-Unis a été doublée, triplée même dans un eſpace de quarante à cinquante ans. Ou l'Angleterre avoit formé le projet d'arrêter ces progrès par la rigueur de ſon gouvernement, (ce que certainement ſes Partiſans n'avouëront point ;) ou ſon Empire toujours croiſſant ſur le Continent du nouveau Monde, réuni à ſes Conquêtes exceſſives dans l'Inde, à ſes Poſſeſſions anciennes & nouvelles aux Antilles, & au Siège de ſa puiſſance en Europe, auroit à la fin formé un Coloſſe de pouvoir, qui auroit écraſé, dès qu'il l'eût voulu, tous les autres Peuples civiliſés. A moins donc de préſumer, que par amour pour l'égalité, (*amour que les Corps politiques n'eurent jamais à l'égard*

l'un

l'un de l'autre,) *l'Angleterre n'auroit pas profité de ſes avantages, l'Amérique, aſſujettie à ſa domination, ne ſeroit pas moins devenuë la Rivale en fait de Commerce de la Ruſſie, de la Suède, de la Hollande: Liée d'ailleurs à la Couronne Britannique par les relations les plus étroites, elle auroit pris part à toutes ſes Guerres; &, dès que l'ambition ou la jalouſie de la Cour de Londres eût menacé quelque Puiſſance, l'Amérique l'auroit aidée à aſſouvir ſes paſſions. Séparée aujourd'hui des intrigues Européennes autant par ſes propres intérêts que par la diſtance des lieux, elle n'influëra point dans nos querelles: La Paix ſera ſon ſyſtème: Au ſein de la tranquillité elle cultivera les Arts & les Sciences utiles: Elle offrira une retraite sûre & agréable aux infortunés, que les funeſtes effets du luxe & de la corruption des mœurs auront forcés à l'émigration: Elle ſervira d'aſyle à la Liberté, prête à s'enfuir pour toujours de l'Europe: Et en convenant avec notre Auteur, que* la Providence elle-même a conduit la criſe préſente d'une manière

nière si marquée, qu'elle semble sommer les Souverains de l'Europe d'y co-opérer avec elle, *l'en appliquera à la République naissante ces mots, que le vertueux* THOMSON *put écrire, sous le Règne du Whiggisme, à l'honneur de sa Patrie:*

A State, alone, where LIBERTY should live,
In these late times, this evening of Mankind,
When *Athens*, *Rome*, and *Carthage* are no more,
The world almost in slavish sloth dissolved.

PEN-

PENSÉES
SUR LA
RÉVOLUTION
DE
L'AMÉRIQUE-UNIE,

extraites de l'Ouvrage *Anglois*, intitulé

MÉMOIRE, *adressé aux Souverains de l'*EUROPE, *sur l'état présent des affaires de l'*ANCIEN *&* *du* NOUVEAU-MONDE.

Il a paru en Angleterre une Brochure intitulée: *Mémoire adressé aux Souverains de l'Europe sur l'état présent des affaires de l'ancien & du nouveau Monde.* On l'attribuë à Mr. POWNALL, Lieutenant-Gouverneur de New-Jersey, il y a environ 30. ans, depuis Gouverneur de la Baye de Massachusett, & aujourd'hui Membre de la Chambre des Communes en Angleterre. Cet Ecrit fourmille d'expressions recherchées & de phrases inintelligibles; mais il est rempli de raisonnemens si justes & de connoissances si exactes sur l'état de l'Amérique qu'il mérite d'être mis à la portée de tout le monde: C'est aussi le voeu de l'Auteur, ainsi qu'il s'en explique dans son propre Ouvrage.

Le Mémoire commence par une observation extrêmement frappante. L'Auteur remarque, " qu'il „ s'est formé à la fin de la dernière Guerre un nou- „ veau Système de Politique & de Commerce, qui „ semble s'exécuter aujourd'hui." Il fixe à cette époque *le moment, où toutes les Puissances de l'Europe ont tourné leurs vuës du côté du Commerce.* Il observe, " que jusqu'alors l'Angleterre en avoit été le „ centre; qu'avec un Gouvernement plus sage elle „ auroit pu continuër de l'être & donner le ton à la „ Politique de l'Univers, tandis que ses imprudences repétées ont renversé l'ordre des choses & lui „ ont fait perdre non-seulement les droits qu'elle „ sembloit avoir à un Empire presqu'universel, mais „ encore sa propre puissance sur les diverses parties, qui composent son Gouvernement & qu'elle voit aujourd'hui lui échapper les unes après „ les autres, ensorte qu'elle est menacée de se „ trouver reduite de nouveau aux seules limites de „ son Isle. "

Dans le nouvel ordre des choses, l'Angleterre, pour avoir trop appésanti son joug sur les Peuples de l'Amérique, les a forcés de le secouër enfin & de former eux-mêmes un Gouvernement indépendant: Ils ont dissipé les Forces, qui ont été employées contre eux: Ils sont devenus les Alliés de la France & de l'Espagne: Ils se sont assurés des liaisons avec les autres Puissances de l'Europe. Fondé sur la nature, le Gouvernement des *Etats-Unis* tend dans ses mouvemens accélérés à devenir un des plus grands

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& des plus puiſſants Empires: Il prend ſa place au milieu des Nations de la Terre: *Video ſolem orientem in Occidente.* Ainſi que dans l'ordre de la Nature une nouvelle Planète du premier rang influeroit dans ſon cours ſur l'orbite des autres Planètes, de même dans l'ordre Politique le nouveau Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, offrant aux Puiſſances de l'Europe de nouveaux objets d'intérêt, en doit faire changer la balance; il eſt *de droit* & *de fait* une Puiſſance indépendante. —— Quelques raiſonnemens qu'on faſſe, quelques Traités que l'on puiſſe conclure, quelques Guerres que l'on entreprenne, le droit & le fait demeureront intacts. Autant vaudroit-il combattre ou disputer pour l'Empire de la Lune: Elle eſt à tous, & ce qu'elle réflêchit de lumière eſt utile pour tous. L'Indépendance de l'Amérique eſt aujourd'hui certaine: Libre dans l'uſage de ſes forces, elle ſçait ce qu'elle peut & ne négligera aucun des moyens qui ſont en elle pour s'affermir ſur ſes propres fondemens: Elle fera changer de face le Syſtême politique des diverſes Puiſſances.

Si les Souverains de l'Europe veulent conſidérer la poſition actuelle des Etats de l'Amérique & en faire la règle de leur conduite, on ſauvera la vie à des milliers d'Hommes, on fera des heureux en plus grand nombre, & l'on donnera la Paix à l'Univers. En adoptant des principes contraires, la Terre ſe couvre de ſang; & la Guerre, après avoir épuiſé l'Angleterre & l'Amérique, entrainant bien-tôt toutes les autres Puiſſances, cauſera un embraſement

général. Semblable à la Guerre de 30. ans dans le XVIIme Siècle, le terme de celle-ci ſera de voir tous les intérêts ſe rapprocher, & toutes les parties ſe rendre au nouveau Syſtème, qui règne aujourd'hui. Avec un tel eſpoir pourquoi courir aux armes & n'en point venir tout-d'un-coup à un Congrès de toutes les Nations? Au moment où la paix ſe conclut, l'avantage des conditions n'eſt jamais proportionné aux ſuccès qu'on peut avoir eus les armes à la main. Tout y eſt dicté par l'intervention de Puiſſances, que la Guerre n'a point écraſées & qui ne ſont aménées que par l'eſprit de l'intrigue & de la jalouſie, pour faire perdre dans la Négociation à des Puiſſances fatiguées ce que le ſort des Armes pourroit ajouter à leur Empire.

Les Anglois ſe ſont fait un ſyſtème prématuré: Ils devoient avant tout s'aſſurer de l'attachement de leurs Colonies; mais l'Amérique y entroit pour la partie principale, & c'eſt par elle que les Partiſans de l'Autorité Royale ont voulu commencer la réforme du Gouvernement Britannique: Ils prévoyoient que ce ſeroit l'occaſion d'une Guerre; mais il étoit utile pour leur ſyſtème que les Américains en vinſſent à prendre les armes; &, ne doutant point que la conquête n'en fût facile, ils y devoient trouver le droit de leur donner telle Conſtitution que l'on jugeroit à propos, ainſi qu'on l'avoit fait dans le Canada: Mais ce qu'ils ne prévoyoient point, ce ſont les ſuites de cette même Guerre, l'Alliance contractée

ctée avec la France, avec l'Espagne, & peut-être l'intervention de l'Univers entier.

Aucune Puissance, aucun Politique quelque éclairé qu'il fût, n'a jugé l'effet, que cette Révolution alloit produire dans le Système général de l'Europe; &, quel que puisse être le principe qui a commencé la Guerre de l'Angleterre & de la Maison de Bourbon, quelque issuë qu'elle puisse avoir, quelque tems qu'elle puisse durer pour leur destruction commune, un point déjà très-certain c'est que les Américains, indépendamment de tous les Traités qu'elles feroient entre elles, seront toujours un *Etat libre*. Au moment où l'Angleterre & la Maison de Bourbon, épuisées toutes deux, en viendront à prendre des arrangemens, on verra intervenir les autres Puissances de l'Europe pour y faire reconnoître, ainsi que leur intérêt l'exige, l'Indépendance de l'Amérique, la Souveraineté des Etats-Unis, & la liberté du Commerce dans les Terres de leurs Empires respectifs.

Pour faire voir comment la Guerre actuelle aura nécessairement cette issuë, l'Auteur du *Mémoire* jette un coup d'oeil rapide sur l'Europe & l'Amérique: Il annonce les effets, qui naîtront de l'Indépendance, dont l'Amérique est assurée, tant dans la Politique que dans le Commerce: Enfin il montre, comment avec des vuës sages & des intentions pures on peut faire sortir de la crise actuelle, à l'avantage de tous les Peuples du Monde, un état de Paix, de Liberté

& de bonheur le plus univerſel, qui puiſſe jamais être vu ſur la terre: Il compare enſuite l'Europe & l'Amérique en étenduë, en reſſources quant au ſol, & en caractère quant aux Habitans.

Lorsque l'on compare la grandeur des Etats, on s'appéſantit trop ſur l'étenduë du territoire & ſur la fertilité du ſol. La véritable grandeur eſt celle qui eſt fondée ſur une étenduë de domination ſuſceptible par ſes liaiſons & par ſes communications de former un tout reſpectable. Les trois autres Parties du Monde, l'Europe, l'Aſie, & l'Afrique ſont naturellement ſéparées l'une de l'autre: Les Romains les ont autrefois réunies ſous leur domination; ce fut l'effet d'un effort ſurnaturel: Les y retenir eût été au-deſſus des forces humaines; & bien-tôt elles ſe ſont ſéparées de nouveau. Ce n'eſt pas ſeulement leur poſition locale, qui forme une barrière de l'une à l'autre; leurs Habitans ſont eux-mêmes d'eſpèces différentes. La Nature a mis de ſemblables limites entre l'Amérique-Méridionale & ſa partie Septentrionale: Celle-ci eſt entièrement poſſédée par des Hommes d'une origine commune, ſource d'une Société immenſe ſuſceptible d'une ſeule domination. L'Europe n'a pas une ſeule partie, où l'on puiſſe trouver pour lien un intérêt auſſi grand, auſſi uniforme; & dans un Pays auſſi vaſte une communication auſſi peu interrompuë: L'Europe eſt habitée par des Nations différentes, qui ont chacune leur Souverain & une Forme de Gouvernement, qui leur eſt propre: Perpétuellement désunies entre elles, ce qu'elles ont

de communication eſt ſans ceſſe interrompu : Les liaiſons deviennent difficiles par terre comme par mer ; & enfin d'une Nation à une autre on trouve des Peuples différents. Au contraire on voit régner dans l'Amérique-Septentrionale cette union, qui eſt le fondement d'une véritable grandeur. La nature des Côtes & des Vents y rend la communication continuelle par mer : L'intérieur jouït du même avantage ; toutes ſes Rivières ſont navigables, en ſorte que toutes les parties ſe correſpondent & commercent entre elles. Un ſol auſſi étendu & ſous un ciel auſſi varié produit tout ce que la Nature peut fournir aux beſoins, au luxe, aux Arts : On y trouve tous les objets, qui ſont la matière du Commerce des Peuples de l'Europe, & qu'ils ne ſe procurent qu'avec les peines inſéparables du défaut de communication & d'un partage de Gouvernement auſſi faux qu'artificiel. Dans l'Amérique la communication eſt entière : La Navigation n'y eſt point contrariée : Tout Commerce y eſt libre, univerſel. Ce ſont bien des avantages à la fois & une ſeule Nation les réunit. Les Bois de conſtruction, le Chanvre, le Poiſſon, les Viandes ſalées ſont la richeſſe de ſes Provinces Septentrionales : Celles du Midi récoltent le Tabac, le Riz, le Coton, la Soye, l'Indigo, la Réſine, le Goudron, les Fruits & peut-être même le Vin. Dans les Provinces du milieu on cultive les Grains : On a les Farines & les objets de Manufacture. Ainſi la Société eſt abondamment approviſionnée. Rien ne manque au Gouvernement pour

unir ſes parties & former un tout parfaitement exact.

Selon le Lord Verulam, la Civiliſation des Peuples eſt, après l'accord & la communication des diverſes parties d'un Gouvernement, ce qui contribuë le plus à ſa grandeur & à ſon accroiſſement: Or la Civiliſation de l'Amérique-Septentrionale ne le cède en rien à celle de l'Europe, ſi même elle ne lui eſt pas ſupérieure. L'Architecture, la Peinture, la Sculpture, la Poëſie, la Muſique; en un mot les Beaux-Arts n'y ſont pas, il eſt vrai, pouſſés auſſi loin qu'en Europe; mais les Arts & les Sciences vraiment néceſſaires, l'Agriculture, les Manufactures, le Gouvernement, le Commerce & la Guerre y ſont généralement mieux entendus qu'en quelque partie que ce puiſſe être de l'Europe. Ce ſont-là les ſeuls objets qui doivent entrer en conſidération, lorsqu'il s'agit de comparer la Civiliſation des Peuples; & à cet égard l'Amérique eſt infiniment plus éloignée de la barbarie, que ne le peut être l'Europe elle-même. Sortie après les Siècles barbares de l'oppreſſion, ſous laquelle les Uſurpateurs du Nord l'avoient fait gémir, celle-ci eſt tombée au pouvoir des Prêtres, qui la plongèrent dans de nouvelles ténèbres en lui annonçant la *lumière*, & entre les mains des Seigneurs Féodaux, qui ne firent que changer le genre de ſon Eſclavage, ſous le prétexte de lui rendre la *Liberté*. Quelles *lumières!* quelle *Liberté!* L'ignorance étoit plus précieuſe que ne le pouvoit être cette ſcience; &, quant à la protection qui lui fut donnée, elle reſſembloit au ſoin que l'on

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prend d'un Troupeau, dont on ne veut que la graiſſe & la toiſon. Le Peuple ſerf, pour ainſi dire, dans ſes connoiſſances, comme il l'étoit ſur ſes terres, ne pouvoit pas en tirer ce qu'elles auroient eu de profitable. Telle fut donc dans ſon origine la Civiliſation en Europe.

Le premier pas à faire pour la Civiliſation, c'eſt l'Agriculture : Elle fournit aux beſoins d'une Société naiſſante. Les ſoins, qui ſuivent, ont pour objet le vêtement, le couvert, & la fabrique des outils les plus néceſſaires: Il s'établit déjà un échange de travaux; le tems forme bien-tôt des Ouvriers & des Manufacturiers; &, quand les beſoins de la Société ſe trouvent remplis, il s'établit un ſuperflu, qui s'échange encore contre les articles de commodités & de jouïſſances, que le Pays ne produit point.

L'eſprit militaire, qui ſuivit les Conquérans dans leurs émigrations du Nord, en a diviſé les Habitans en deux claſſes l'une de Guerriers, l'autre d'Eſclaves: La culture des terres étoit le partage de ceux-ci, non qu'ils en fuſſent les Propriétaires, mais parce que leur condition les tenoit attachés ſervilement à la glèbe: C'étoient des Hommes dégradés, des Troupeaux en un mot, qui étoient eux-mêmes dans la propriété d'un Maître: Leur raiſon, leur travail, leur tems, tout leur devenoit indifférent: Incapables de faire le moindre progrès, ils étoient ſans motifs pour y aſpirer. Auſſi l'Agriculture en cette partie du Monde eſt-elle reſtée longtems dans le même état de langueur: Elle ſemble vouloir aujourd'hui

dans plusieurs Cantons de l'Europe faire quelques pas vers la perfection; mais ils sont si lents que de plus d'un Siècle on ne peut en attendre aucun succès. L'Angleterre cependant peut en être exceptée; encore le Payſan y eſt-il écraſé.

Les travaux en Laine, en Fer, en Cuir, en Pierre, devenus des occupations abjectes, étoient abandonnés aux Eſclaves. Subordonnés à l'ignorance de leurs Maîtres, gênés par la biſarrerie de leurs Loix, c'étoient des Artiſans ſans induſtrie; tout leur étoit interdit jusqu'aux leçons de l'expérience, la ſource du progrès de tous les Arts. Auſſi les vit-on reſter pendant pluſieurs Siècles dans leur premier état de barbarie.

La Ligue Anſéatique avoit appris aux Souverains ce que le Commerce & les Arts peuvent donner de puiſſance: Après ſa désunion ils invitèrent leurs Sujets à s'y livrer & les Artiſtes étrangers à s'établir chez eux. Alors la Civiliſation prit un eſſor, qui ne dura qu'un inſtant. La Politique des Souverains, mettant des entraves aux Manufactures, les étouffa dans leur berceau: Voulant leur montrer plus de faveur, tous les Impôts furent reportés ſur les productions de la terre; & l'Agriculture fut à ſon tour opprimée. A cette Politique il s'en joignit une autre également deſtructive: Des Règlemens parurent pour aſſujettir les divers articles de Manufacture à des droits multipliés; il y en avoit pour la ſortie des mains de l'Ouvrier, pour le transport, pour la vente, pour le retour, ſoit qu'il fût en argent, ſoit qu'il fût en Marchandiſes. Le but de cette Politique

que étoit de mettre dans les Coffres du Souverain tout ce que l'Ouvrier auroit fait de profits, & ne lui laiſſer que ſa ſubſiſtance : Tous les encouragemens étoient pour la vente ; il n'y en avoit point pour acheter : Le voeu des Gouvernemens étoit pour l'exportation des Marchandiſes, comptant ſur une importation conſidérable d'Argent dont ils devoient s'approprier la plus forte partie. De-là les objets dont le Commerce eſt en quelque ſorte reſervé au Souverain ; de-là les Monopoles, les Priviléges excluſifs, & de Nation à Nation l'interdiction des Pêches, des idées de balance dans le Commerce, des reſtrictions & des défenſes reſpectives dans les importations & les exportations ; enfin, dans le payement des droits ou des impôts, des diſtinctions de Marchandiſes étrangères & de Marchandiſes nationales. — S'interdiſant ainſi toute communication entre eux, les Souverains ont été forcés d'envoyer au loin former des Etabliſſemens ; de-là les Colonies qu'on peut appeller des Fermes étrangères : La Métropole y fait un bénéfice excluſif. — De-là les plus extravagantes idées, que l'avarice & l'ambition aient jamais fait naître ; l'envie de ſe faire de l'Océan un Domaine & d'en prétendre la poſſeſſion & l'Empire. Ainſi la Civiliſation a été en Europe reculée ; ainſi les Gouvernemens ſe ſont éloignés de la perfection, à laquelle ils aſpirent. Ainſi s'eſt éteint le flambeau du génie. Inſtruits par de nouvelles révolutions, ceux qui donnent des loix à l'Europe pourront ſe ſentir portés un jour à la réforme

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des Réglemens qui la tiennent captive, & lui rendre une Liberté, qui ne peut être que favorable à leur domination.

En Amérique l'Homme est libre: Quiconque le desire est naturalisé; toutes les professions lui sont ouvertes; il peut donner carrière à ses talens; jouïssant de tous ses droits il est le maître de ses pensées; on lui laisse l'usage de sa raison; son tems, ses talens lui appartiennent: L'Homme y est à lui-même; quand il exerce son industrie, c'est sur sa propriété; lui seul en recueille les fruits. Qu'on laisse au génie la liberté d'employer tous ses ressorts, & à tout Homme généralement l'entier exercice de ses facultés, on en voit résulter une application infatigable: Tout est en action; tout est vivifié; l'esprit s'aiguise; l'ame s'éléve. La connoissance, qu'il a fallu prendre des affaires pour la conduite de la vie dans un Pays libre, a donné aux Peuples de l'Amérique un goût de recherche, qui en forme le caractère distinctif: Cette impatience d'apprendre devient un ridicule selon les objets, auxquels elle se porte; mais appliquée aux affaires soit du Gouvernement soit du Commerce, c'est de toutes les qualités la plus précieuse qu'un Peuple puisse avoir. Partageant les goûts de l'Europe, ils ne sont occupés que de découvertes savantes; leur vie entière n'est qu'un cours d'expériences: Du Continent qu'ils habitent ils observent dans l'Europe jusqu'où l'esprit humain peut atteindre; & semblables à de jeunes aiglons, qui suivent le vol de leur mère, ils font le premier essai de leurs ailes; déjà ils ont pris leur essor.

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En Europe on a nul égard pour le ſens d'un malheureux; mais le ſens d'un malheureux n'eſt ni le ſavoir ni les connoiſſances, qui ſe puiſent dans les Livres: Il eſt l'avantage infiniment plus précieux de celui auquel la nature a donné d'excellents organes: L'obſervation & l'expérience, voilà ſes maîtres. En Amérique on priſe les lumières & non l'Homme: Le malheureux comme un autre y trouve ſon prix; & de tous les Pays l'Amérique eſt le ſeul où il puiſſe ne pas être ſuivi de ſa miſère. Le Cultivateur y raiſonne non ſur ce qui ſe dit, mais ſur ce qu'il voit & ce qu'il ſent; toute méthode lui convient; il ſçait qu'il peut recourir à l'expérience; il le fait & nul ne lui enlève l'honneur de la découverte; il tâte le ſol, juge le climat, demande à l'un & à l'autre ce qu'il croit pouvoir en obtenir de plus avantageux. C'eſt ainſi qu'on s'y eſt aviſé d'un nombre infini de cultures, qu'aucune Nation n'avoit ni entrepriſes ni ſoupçonnées. Les Habitans de l'Amérique n'ont pas ſeulement en abondance ce que leur propre conſommation exige; ils ont un ſuperflu, dont ils approviſionnent les Iſles de l'Amérique-Septentrionale. L'Europe elle-même en a profité pour beaucoup d'articles; elle en a tiré du Poiſſon, du Froment, des Farines, du Riz, du Tabac, de l'Indigo, des Bois de conſtruction, & en un mot pour ſa Marine des objets de toutes eſpèces: On s'occupe aujourd'hui de la récolte des Olives, des Oranges & des Vins.

Dans les premiers inſtans d'une Société naiſſante l'Ha-

l'Habitant eſt Cultivateur: Voilà le premier pas de la *Civiliſation:* Tout entier à la terre, il ſemble que ſes idées ne puiſſent pas s'élever au-deſſus de ſa ſurface; il ne ſçait encore que manier la bêche & conduire la charruë: Mais ſon eſprit n'en développe pas moins toutes ſes facultés; il s'élève à meſure que ſes connoiſſances ſe déployent; & bien-tôt on voit des Guerriers, des Politiques, des Philoſophes ſortir du fond de leurs retraites agreſtes, ainſi que la tige s'elève du ſein de la terre, auquel le germe en fut confié. Au point où en ſont venus les Américains, le premier pas eſt fait; ils excellent déjà dans la fabrique des Outils & la compoſition des Machines: Privés du ſecours qu'ils devoient trouver dans ces inſtrumens de leurs travaux, ils ont été livrés à leurs propres reſſources, à l'expérience; & eux-mêmes les ont faits & forgés. Une culture différente demande des changemens dans les Outils, qui s'y employent: L'eſprit eſt devenu inventif; & il s'eſt fait dans le Nouveau-Monde plus d'inſtrumens & de machines d'un genre nouveau qu'il ne s'en fit jamais dans l'Ancien dans un même eſpace de tems.

L'Amérique ne s'eſt adonnée ni aux Arts ſecondaires, ni aux Manufactures, parce qu'elle a trouvé ſur ſon ſol des productions, dont l'échange lui procure, à meilleur compte qu'elle ne pourroit les faire, tous les objets que les Arts & les Manufactures fourniſſent. Ce n'eſt cependant pas qu'ils y ſoient totalement négligés. Ce qu'on y donne de

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travail ne pourroit pas suffire pour l'exportation; les momens, que la terre ne demande point, sont consacrés aux Ouvrages de première necessité, que le Pays consomme. — Quand les Campagnes auront autant de Cultivateurs qu'elles en exigent, & que la classe des Ouvriers se sentira trop nombreuse, alors, comme il n'y a point de Loix pour assigner à un Homme une profession plutôt que telle autre, pour lui ôter le choix de l'endroit où il lui plaira de l'exercer, pour fixer le prix de son travail & mettre des bornes à l'étenduë de ses entreprises, on verra les Manufactures s'établir, se perfectionner, & se répandre avec une rapidité inconcevable. Les Américains s'attachent peu à établir chez eux des Manufactures, parce que les ressources naturelles du Pays leur donnent un superflu, qui devient la matière de leurs échanges. Le Poisson, le Froment, la Farine, le Riz, le Tabac, l'Indigo, les Bestiaux, les Viandes salées sont des objets qu'ils trouvent sur leur sol, & qui entrent dans leur Commerce tant avec l'Europe qu'avec l'Afrique & les Isles de l'Amérique.

Ce qu'ils ont d'habileté dans les Arts qui tiennent à l'Agriculture, ils l'ont également dans la conduite de leur Commerce & dans la construction des Vaisseaux. Leurs Chantiers ne sont pas seulement occupés pour leurs propres Navigateurs; ils le sont encore pour ceux des Isles de l'Amérique. Avant la Guerre, l'Angleterre prenoit chez eux la plus grande partie de ses Vaisseaux; & bien-tôt l'Europe

rope entière s'y en procurera à bien meilleur compte qu'elle ne le peut faire en quelque endroit que ce soit. C'est par de tels progrès que leur Commerce s'est accrû au milieu des entraves que la Grande-Brétagne avoit eu soin de lui donner, qu'il a acquis de l'activité, & que les Américains eux-mêmes sont devenus une Puissance considérable.

On objectera peut-être le desavantage, que l'Amérique a toujours eu dans la balance de son Commerce; son Or & son Argent ont toujours passé dans des mains étrangères; &, privé du secours de ces Métaux précieux, son Commerce nécessairement borné dans ses progrès semble ne pouvoir point devenir de longtems une source abondante de richesses. La réponse est simple: L'Amérique opprimée & gênée par mille entraves a trouvé l'opulence dans ses cultures, s'est procuré un Commerce étendu, & s'est fait une Marine considérable. C'est donc une erreur que de vouloir juger la balance générale des profits d'une Nation par le sort d'un seul article, les Métaux; ils vont toujours à ceux qui les mettent au plus haut prix; &, si par une circonstance imprévuë un peuple, qui ne fait circuler chez lui que l'Or & l'Argent, vient à en avoir un besoin subit, le voilà dans la nécessité d'en donner ce plus haut prix: Alors sans doute l'importation d'Argent, qui se fait chez lui, est à son egard la preuve d'une balance desavantageuse, tandis que l'exportation de ce même Argent est la preuve d'un avantage réel

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le pays qui le lui a fourni. Examinant avec réflexion les diverſes importations & exportations qui ſe ſont des Métaux, l'Angleterre pourroit à bien des égards avoir le desavantage de la balance; elle ſeroit toute en faveur des Nations, qui attirent chez elles ce que l'Angleterre recevroit d'Argent. L'importation, qui ſe fait des Métaux en Angleterre, ſera ou le montant des ſoldes de compte finis, ou l'effet du tranſport qui s'en fait comme d'un article de commerce en compte-courant. Dans l'un ou dans l'autre cas, l'importation ne pourra pas être la preuve d'une balance avantageuſe: Profitant de la nature de ſon gouvernement & de l'étenduë de ſon commerce, l'Angleterre a établi chez elle un Papier-monnoye, dont le crédit lui fait trouver à point nommé les ſommes, qu'elle juge à propos de ſe procurer: Si cette reſſource lui manquoit dans ſes beſoins d'argent, alors il faudroit qu'elle attirât les Métaux chez elle par les grands bénéfices qu'elle y accorderoit: Alors l'importation en deviendroit conſidérable. La donnera-t-on pour une preuve de l'avantage de ſa balance? Que le crédit de ce Papier-monnoye ſoit l'effet d'une balance conſtamment avantageuſe, au lieu d'être un établiſſement fait par la ſeule autorité du Gouvernement, alors le Peuple, qui jouït de cet avantage, peut mettre en réſerve ſon Or & ſon Argent & même en faire dans ſon commerce un article d'exportation. Voilà donc ici une balance conſtamment avantageuſe & cependant une exportation d'Argent. Enfin qu'il ſurvien-

vienne une augmentation de valeur dans le Numéraire (& l'Angleterre en a eu un exemple dans le renouvellement de ſes Monnoyes, qui procura des bénéfices ſur les anciennes aux Etrangers, qui les lui importoient) alors il ſe fera une nouvelle importation de Métaux. Il entrera beaucoup d'Or, beaucoup d'Argent par les mêmes raiſons qui les auront fait ſortir : Ils rentreront non comme la ſolde des comptes, mais comme des articles, ſur lesquels le bénéfice eſt aſſuré pour celui qui les envoye: Et de fait, à l'epoque du renouvellement des Monnoyes, on a fait paſſer en Angleterre pour des ſommes immenſes de ces Monnoyes anciennes: Certes on ne prit pas cette importation pour un avantage ſubit dans la balance de ſon Commerce. En appréciant le Commerce d'un Peuple par la fauſſe maxime de l'importation des Métaux, on a toujours ſuppoſé le desavantage du côté des Américains : Cependant la verité eſt, que leur Gouvernement, profitant du crédit que la Nation recevoit de ſes progrès ſucceſſifs & de l'amélioration de ſon Commerce, a eu la politique d'établir pour des ſommes conſidérables de Papier-monnoye; que ſon immenſe quantité ſoit propre à le faire tomber, cela ſe peut; mais les premières conſéquences n'en ſont pas moins juſtes parce qu'il a eu ſon effet.

Les Américains ont donc pu épargner leur Or & leur Argent tout auſſi bien que les Anglois; & je ſuis informé, que l'Amérique a en caiſſe plus de trois Millions de Livres Sterling en Eſpèces, qui ſeront em-

employées auſſi-tôt que le Papier-monnoye ſera tombé. Ainſi ce qui a pu être exporté d'Or & d'Argent n'eſt pas une preuve que la balance ſoit contre eux ; ils avoient beſoin pour l'Agriculture, le Commerce & la Guerre, non du ſecours de ces Métaux, mais d'un nombre infini d'Articles qu'ils ſe procuroient par l'échange de leur Or & de leur Argent, après en avoir réſervé ce que la politique du Gouvernement faiſoit juger néceſſaire. Ainſi ces exportations, dont on ſe fait un argument pour prouver la foibleſſe de l'Amérique & ſa ruine prochaine, prouvent au contraire les progrès conſidérables de ſa puiſſance. Tandis que l'Angleterre démontre les inconvéniens d'un Papier-monnoye en Amérique, elle devroit prévoir pour elle-même les ſuites, auxquelles ſon propre Papier-monnoye l'expoſe.

En jugeant l'Amérique dans ſon Agriculture, ſes Arts & ſon Commerce, par les principes de Civiliſation, qui conviennent à un territoire immenſe, dont la communication eſt généralement libre, on ſera convaincu du dégré d'aggrandiſſement, auquel elle eſt parvenue. L'Europe n'a jamais fourni d'exemples de progrès auſſi rapides.

L'Auteur compare enſuite la Population de l'Amérique avec celle de l'Europe. Dans l'Amérique on regarde comme un bonheur d'avoir des Enfants ; ils ſont la richeſſe & la force de leurs Parens : En Europe ils leur ſont à charge. Ses obſervations ſur l'accroiſſement du Genre humain & la Population

des différents Etats en expliquent la cauſe; & ſes raiſonnemens ſont confirmés par des exemples pris de l'accroiſſement actuel.

La Baye de Maſſachuſett avoit en 1722, 94000. Habitans; en 1742. 164.000; en 1757. après les ravages de la Guerre & de la Petite-Vérole, 164,484; en 1761. 216,000; en 1765. 255,500; en 1771. 292,000; en 1773. 300,000.

Le Connecticut en 1756. avoit 129,994. Habitans: Les Etrangers ne ſont point venus groſſir ce nombre; les Guerres l'ont d'abord diminué, enſuite les émigrations qui ſe ſont faites vers le Couchant & pour d'autres Provinces: Cependant 18. ans après la Population y étoit presque doublée: En 1774. on y comptoit 257,356. Habitans. New-York avoit en 1756. 96,776. Habitans; en 1771. 168,007; en 1774. 182,251. Dans la Virginie il y en avoit en 1756. 173,316; en 1764. 200,000. en 1774. 300,000. Dans la Caroline-Méridionale en 1750. 64,000; en 1770. 115,000; à Rhode-Iſland en 1738. 15,000. en 1748. 28,439.

Comme il n'y a jamais eu de Milice ni de Rôle authentique dans la Penſylvanie, il n'a pas été poſſible d'en avoir la Population exacte. On y a conduit pendant longtems beaucoup d'Irlandois & d'Etrangers: La plûpart ſe ſont établis dans d'autres Provinces: Cependant l'accroiſſement de ſa Population a été dans la même proportion que celles de Virginie & de la Baye de Maſſachuſett. La Ville de Philadelphie s'eſt accruë très-promtement.

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En 1749. elle avoit 2,076. Maisons ; en 1753. 2,300 ; en 1760. 2,969 ; en 1769. 4.474 ; de 1749. à 1753. elle a eu depuis 16. jusqu'à 18000. Habitans, & de 1760. à 1769. depuis 31,318. jusqu'à 35,000.

En 1754. on a fait différentes évaluations de la Population du Continent: Les plus exaggérées l'ont fait monter à un Million & demi: Celles qui n'ont rien donné à la spéculation, & qui se sont faites d'après les Rôles, l'ont portée à un Million deux-cens cinquante-mille ames. Le dénombrement, que l'on dit en avoir été fait par le Congrès en 1774. la fait monter à 3,026,678 ; mais cette évaluation peut avoir été dictée par des vuës particulières: Un autre dénombrement, qui a été fait après deux ou trois années de Guerre, la porte à 2,810,000. ce qui feroit croire que le calcul le plus exact est celui qui porte la Population de l'année 1774. à 2,141,307. Ainsi en 20. années de tems, dont sept ont été passées en Guerre, on voit une Population d'un *Million deux-cents-cinquante mille ames* s'accroître de près d'un *Million* d'Habitans. C'est une preuve bien sensible que la Société de l'Amérique se forme avec une rapidité, dont il n'y a jamais eu d'exemples en Europe.

Le Système du Gouvernement a été dès son origine d'enrôler tous ses Sujets comme autant de Soldats ; &, sur la Population dont on vient de rendre compte, il en a formé 535,326 à l'exercice des Armes ; Ils ne forment point une classe distincte

de Citoyens & ne font point des armes leur unique profeſſion. Ils demeurent unis à la Société, dont ils affermiſſent la puiſſance. Ce Corps de Réſerve, toujours prêt pour la défenſe de l'Etat, pourra paroître ridicule aux Officiers-Généraux de l'Europe; mais l'expérience a démontré, qu'il devient par ſon union même à la Société une défenſe bien plus réelle & plus efficace pour la Nation. L'Auteur conclut avec le Chancelier Bacon, " que „ la grandeur véritable d'un Etat conſiſte dans ſa „ Population, dans la valeur des Individus qui la „ compoſent, & dans la Conſtitution militaire de „ la Société, lorſque la profeſſion des armes eſt „ celle de tous ſes Membres intéreſſés à ſa propre „ défenſe, & non pas l'occupation d'une Claſſe „ particulière de Citoyens. "

L'Amérique eſt aujourd'hui un Etat indépendant: Ses Peuples ont pris leur rang au milieu des Nations de la Terre: C'eſt un Empire, que le même eſprit de Gouvernement éclaire dans toutes ſes parties depuis le centre juſqu'aux extrémités. Chaque Citoyen y eſt en quelque ſorte Membre du Conſeil. Il en réſulte une ſoumiſſion univerſelle. Le Gouvernement eſt informé de l'état & de la ſituation des Provinces les plus éloignées; &, comme les Provinces concourent elles-mêmes à la Légiſlation, elles ſont également inſtruites des motifs du Gouvernement dans les meſures qu'il prend. En payant les Contributions, elles ſe regardent comme ceux-mêmes qui en ont établi l'Impôt. Cette opinion

nion fait la force du Gouvernement: Elle garantit le *conſenſus obedientium*, ſans lequel il n'y a point d'Empire durable. Tel eſt le Syſtème que le Gouvernement de l'Amérique s'eſt préſcrit. Ce qu'il peut avoir d'inconvénients n'a rien de rédoutable pour lui: Jeune & fort, c'eſt Hercule étouffant les ſerpents dès ſon berceau : Qu'il s'éleve; &, ſes forces croiſſant avec lui, on le verra bien-tôt dans toute ſa vigueur. La grandeur de ſa puiſſance eſt certaine : Il n'eſt point de Spéculateur, qui n'en puiſſe déjà donner le préſage. Un eſpace de mille lieuës le met à l'abri des coups de ſes Ennemis. De l'autre côté du Globe, il jouït de la Paix la plus profonde: Né de la Terre, c'eſt un Géant, qui va déployer ſes forces, & que les Puiſſances rivales de l'Europe couvent à ſa naiſſance de leurs ſoins maternels, pour lui donner le tems d'arriver au terme où il inſpirera la terreur.

C'eſt un Territoire immenſe; une communication auſſi étenduë que facile; une civiliſation, qui touche à ſa perfection; une vie active, qui ſe paſſe toute entière en entrepriſes & en expériences; de continuelles découvertes, qui enrichiſſent l'Agriculture; de nouvelles productions demandées à la Terre; un Pays, qui devient un des Greniers de l'ancien Monde, qui trouve dans ſes Pêcheries une ſource de richeſſes infiniment plus abondante que ne le peuvent être les Mines du Potoſi; le génie de l'obſervation, qui y découvre pour ſes beſoins des machines nouvelles; les Arts, les Sciences, la Lé-

giſlation, la Politique qui en inſtruiſent les Habitans; une Population, qui s'y multiplie ainſi que les grains ſur la terre; une Conſtitution militaire, qui s'y forme & qui s'y élève ainſi qu'un jeune Lion pour dévorer tout ce qui l'entoure; un Commerce étendu, l'aliment de ſa Navigation; en un mot, toutes les parties de ce Territoire immenſe, réunies ſous une même Loi pour être un ſeul Empire. Comparant l'état d'un tel Gouvernement avec celui des Puiſſances de l'Europe & même du Genre-Humain entier, on eſt en droit de conclure, que l'Amérique eſt devenuë une Puiſſance trop conſidérable pour qu'aucun Souverain de l'Europe puiſſe ſe flatter de la réduire. Affermie aujourd'hui ſur ſes propres fondemens, il eſt impoſſible de la renverſer; &, pour y penſer, il faudroit, à une diſtance de mille lieuës, plus de Troupes & d'Armées qu'on ne peut en employer contre elle. —— Qu'on interroge un Aſtronome; qu'on lui demande, ſi un Satellite, venant à acquérir aſſez de poids pour balancer l'équilibre de ſa Planète, pourroit être retenu, par quelque puiſſance que ce fût de la Nature, dans l'orbite qui lui étoit naturelle jusqu'alors; il le ſoutiendra impoſſible : Qu'on demande à un Père, ſi un Fils, arrivé à l'âge ou le corps & l'eſprit ont acquis toute leur vigueur, peut être encore tenu en tutèle, traité & corrigé comme un Enfant; il le ſoutiendra impoſſible: Et, ſi l'on interroge un Politique Européen; ſi on lui demande, quel ſera le ſort de l'Amérique-Septentrionale? lui

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qui ne ſçait que des ouï-dire, & qui a la faculté de penſer bien plus qu'il n'en a l'uſage, il répond qu'*elle ſera dépendante*. Pour le prouver, il a mille argumens: Les faits ſont ſous ſes yeux & démontrent le contraire: Peu lui importe; au lieu de chercher dans des faits exiſtants ce qui en peut être la cauſe, le Politique ſuit ſes premiers raiſonnemens, ſes préjugés, & ne s'occupe plus que d'adapter aux faits, avec la multitude, les circonſtances qu'il imagine être les plus favorables à ſon ſyſtème: Cependant la vérité prévaudra. On ne s'attachera point ici à prouver l'Indépendance de l'Amérique par de ſimples raiſonnemens: Des faits ont fourni cette preuve. Son Indépendance eſt certaine; il ne faut qu'en montrer les conſéquences. Les événemens, qui ſe préparent, n'en auront pas moins leur cours, ſoit qu'on veuille les mépriſer, ſoit qu'on ait la prudence de les faire entrer déjà dans le Syſtème de l'Europe: Celle-ci ne doit point tarder à en ſentir le contre-coup dans toutes les parties de ſon Economie politique. Le Miniſtre ne peut point dans ſes efforts empêcher que ce qui eſt déjà la ſource de ces événemens ne ſoit exiſtant: Il peut encore moins les empêcher d'accomplir leur Révolution: Embrouiller les affaires de ſa Cour, eſt tout ce qui eſt en ſon pouvoir; &, s'il conſulte ou ſon devoir ou l'intérêt de ſon Souverain, il fera dans le Syſtème politique de ſa Nation les changemens, qui ſeront néceſſaires dans le nouvel ordre des choſes.

Le premier effet de l'Indépendance de l'Amérique ſera l'influence, que ſa Puiſſance Navale lui donnera ſur le Commerce: Il éprouvera des changemens, qui s'étendront à l'état politique du Monde. La Ligue Anſéatique n'eſt pas encore oubliée, non plus que les ſuccès étonnants qu'elle dut à la poſſeſſion, dans laquelle elle étoit, des principaux objets de Commerce, & à ſa navigation qui comprenoit les principales Rivières de l'Europe. Avec d'auſſi grands avantages, elle a acquis une puiſſance capable de réſiſter & même de commander aux Souverains de la Terre. Elle étoit compoſée de Villes ſéparées les unes des autres, diſperſées dans des Etats différents, & réduites dès-lors à une union purement artificielle. Cependant ſes Forces Navales l'ont renduë dans l'Europe l'Arbitre du Commerce & de la Politique. Si l'on conſidère aujourd'hui l'état de l'Amérique-Septentrionale, on verra à ſa puiſſance des fondemens infiniment plus ſolides: L'étenduë de ſon territoire, ſes communications non interrompuës, l'abondance de ſes reſſources lui promettent un Commerce presqu'univerſel & la première Marine de l'Univers. Si la Ligue Anſéatique, qui n'étoit dans l'ordre politique qu'un Corps imaginaire, a pu s'élever à un auſſi haut dégré de puiſſance, ſans autres avantages que ceux d'un Commerce étendu & d'une Navigation conſidérable; ſi, compoſée de Villes ſéparées par la Nature & unies ſeulement par la foi des Traités, elle a pu devenir une Puiſſance formidable au-

dehors,

dehors, tenir le premier rang dans l'Europe & décider de la Guerre & de la Paix entre les autres Nations, combien la grandeur future de l'Amérique n'eſt-elle pas plus aſſurée? La Nature a mis la moitié du Globe entre elle & ſes Rivales: Les terres de ſa domination ſont diſpoſées pour la communication la plus avantageuſe, que le Commerce, une Confédération ſolide puiſſent deſirer. A meſure que les forces de la Ligue Anſéatique s'accrurent, le Danemarc, la Suède, la Pologne & la France recherchèrent ſon Alliance en lui offrant leur protection, le voile commun de l'orgueil des Souverains. L'Angleterre, qui venoit de tourner ſes vuës du côté du Commerce & qui commençoit à y faire des progrès rapides, fit auſſi des Traités avec elle. L'Amérique verra de même tous les Souverains de l'Europe rechercher ſon amitié & ſuivre l'exemple que la Maiſon de Bourbon vient de leur donner. Aſſiſe ſur une baſe auſſi ſolide & s'élevant ſous de tels auſpices, on peut déjà dire de l'Amérique ce qui a été dit de Rome: *Civitas, incredibile eſt memoratu, adeptâ libertate quantum brevi creverit.* L'Amérique eſt libre; & la première Révolution indique l'événement qu'on doit attendre.

Dans le cours de la Guerre, que l'Amérique ſoutient aujourd'hui, les Souverains de l'Europe ou du moins les Puiſſances maritimes, ſuivant l'exemple des plus conſidérables d'entre elles, s'adreſſeront aux Etats-Unis de l'Amérique pour être admiſes à leur Commerce, leur ouvrir les Ports, & convenir des conditions reſpectives. Alors l'Amérique, devenuë

l'Arbitre

l'Arbitre du Commerce, pourra être encore la Médiatrice de la Paix & donner le ton aux affaires politiques de l'Univers, ainſi que les Provinces-Unies des Pays-Bas le firent en 1647. Si l'Amérique-Septentrionale ne perd point de vuë la grandeur, à laquelle la Nature ſemble l'appeller; & ſi les Alliances, qu'elle a contractées en Europe, ne ſont pas des pièges tendus pour la faire échouër; enfin ſi l'on ne réuſſit point à lui faire ſubſtituër d'autres principes à ceux qu'elle a adoptés, elle ne fera pas un pas qu'elle n'ait conſulté ce que ſa poſition lui préſcrit. Séparée de l'Europe par des Mers immenſes, ſeule ſur un vaſte Continent, détachée de l'ancien Monde, libre dès-lors de n'en point épouſer les intérêts embrouillés, de ne point entrer dans ſes diſputes, & de mépriſer les inutiles intrigues de ſa Politique, en un mot ſans Ennemis, ſans Rivaux, & jamais dans la néceſſité de rechercher des Alliances, elle doit tenir pour première règle, qu'il eſt contraire à ſes intérêts & à la nature de ſon exiſtence d'avoir aucune liaiſon de Politique avec l'Europe: Elle doit ſe borner à des Traités de Commerce avec elle & être attentive à ne jamais entrer dans ſes querelles & dans ſes Guerres. Pour ſeconde régle, elle doit avoir ſous les yeux, que ſon plus grand intérêt eſt d'être la ſource commune des approviſionnemens de l'Europe; qu'en conſéquence ſes Ports doivent être ouverts à toutes les Nations; & enfin qu'elle doit faire tous ſes efforts pour que l'ancien Monde devienne en quelque ſorte

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le marché commun de ſes exportations. Ainſi il ſeroit contraire à ſes intérêts de former des liaiſons particulières avec quelques Puiſſances de l'Europe à l'excluſion des autres. Si l'Angleterre avoit remarqué, que ſa proſpérité étoit attachée au ſort de l'Amérique, elle y auroit abandonné ſes projets de conquête & ne ſe ſeroit occupée que d'un Traité de Commerce capable de lui aſſurer la continuité de ſa fortune. Si avec plus de modération elle vouloit encore y donner un peu d'attention, elle reconnoîtroit, que le Commerce, qu'elle y faiſoit, peut s'y continuër pour la plus grande partie & lui procurer les mêmes bénéfices, quoique les deux Pays ſuſſent auſſi indépendans l'un de l'autre que l'Eſpagne & la France le ſont entre elles: Il y a beaucoup d'articles, qu'elles ſeules peuvent ſe donner avec des avantages réciproques: La raiſon s'en trouve dans leur genre de vie & dans leurs moeurs actuelles: Une rupture entière peut y produire de grands changemens & priver l'Angleterre de cette dernière reſſource.

Le principe fondamental de l'Amérique doit être de rendre ſes Ports libres pour toutes les Nations du Monde indiſtinctement, & d'inſiſter pour la réciprocité avec celles, qu'elle admettra à ſon Commerce: Elle y parviendra, ſi, n'oubliant point les avantages de ſa poſition, elle fait de cette réciprocité la baſe de tous ſes Traités. En s'attachant ſtrictement à ce principe, ſes Habitans doivent devenir avec le tems les Pourvoyeurs du Monde entier.

A moins que les différentes Puiſſances de l'Europe ne s'ouvrent mutuellement leurs Ports, l'Amérique ſeule y viendra; & ſuivie de tous ſes avantages elle y fera les bénéfices les plus conſidérables. Du moment qu'elle a ceſſé d'appartenir à une des Puiſſances de l'Europe, ſes articles de commerce paſſeront librement dans tous les marchés de l'ancien Monde & y feront baiſſer à un taux commun le prix des articles ſemblables: Les Fourrures de l'un & l'autre Continent y entreront en concurrence par la ceſſation des ventes excluſives. La Suède a ſouvent aſpiré à l'avantage de vendre excluſivement ſes Fers & les autres objets néceſſaires à la Marine que ſon ſol fournit; & plus d'une fois l'on a mis au nombre des hoſtilités, qui ſe commettoient contre l'Angleterre, les moyens qui étoient les plus propres à lui faire refuſer ces objets; ce qui a déterminé le Gouvernement Britannique à accorder des primes pour les articles de cette eſpèce, que ſes Colonies de l'Amérique lui fourniroient. Les Sujets des Etats-Unis admis dans les marchés de l'Europe, concurremment avec la Ruſſie, y feront tomber cette eſpèce de Monopole. Les Ruſſes par la conquête de la Livonie & les progrès de leur Civiliſation y ſont encore les maîtres de cette branche importante de Commerce. L'Europe trouvera de très-grands avantages dans ſes liaiſons avec l'Amérique. Le premier effet de ſa concurrence ſera de mettre l'abondance dans ſes marchés; & l'Angleterre, qui a perdu le Monopole qu'elle faiſoit dans l'Amérique

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au moment même où elle y a perdu sa puissance, trouvera dans cette concurrence le même avantage, qu'elle pouvoit retirer d'un Monopole, qui lui coutoit très-cher en primes & en frais de protection. La construction des Vaisseaux & la Navigation ont fait tant de progrès chez les Américains, qu'ils peuvent construire & naviguer à meilleur compte que les Européens, sans en excepter les Hollandois malgré toute leur économie. L'Amérique entrera en concurrence avec la Hollande pour le frêt des Vaisseaux & l'article du Poisson dans tous les marchés de l'Europe: Le Riz & le Bled, dont les Américains auroient déjà approvisionné les marchés Européens, si l'Angleterre n'en avoit point arrêté l'exportation, feront tomber l'Agriculture en Espagne, en Portugal & peut-être même en France, si la Politique de ces Royaumes n'en fait point changer les règlemens & l'économie intérieure. Les articles, que l'Amérique a fournis seule jusqu'à présent & que l'Europe reçoit avec avidité, assurent déjà aux Américains l'avantage du Commerce pour ces objets & les mettent dans le cas de faire des assortimens plus complets & dès-lors plus avantageux. Le Poisson de rebut, la Farine, le Maïs, les Viandes salées, les Bestiaux & les Bois de construction seront transportés par des Vaisseaux Américains aux Indes-Occidentales. Les Vaisseaux de l'Amérique iront encore en Afrique chercher des Nègres, qu'ils échangeront dans les Isles à sucre contre les Melasses. Ils pourront encore se charger du transport des pro-

productions de ces même Isles. Tant d'avantages réunis leur donneront constamment la supériorité dans cette partie du Monde, si leurs entreprises de Commerce s'y renferment. Le bon marché de leurs articles, le peu de frais du transport, la vente avantageuse qu'ils feront de leurs Vaisseaux à leur arrivée en Europe, les foibles bénéfices dont leurs Marchands se contentent, feront nécessairement baisser les prix de ces mêmes articles, obligeront les Marchands Européens à se réduire sur leurs bénéfices, & occasionneront des réformes économiques dans la culture & dans le transport des articles que l'ancien Monde récolte. Pour dernier effet, la Politique que les Américains auront de rendre leurs Ports libres & de s'ouvrir les Marchés de l'Europe, l'attention qu'ils auront de garder la Neutralité dans les Guerres, l'éloignement qu'ils montreront pour tous les démêlés politiques, & la multiplicité de leurs entreprises dans les Ports où ils auront été admis, obligeront toutes les Nations de l'Europe à changer de vuës & à se faire un nouveau système de Commerce.

Mais un Peuple, maitre d'un grand Empire sur un Continent où il est seul, souffriroit-il sur ses propres confins un Monopole semblable à celui de la Compagnie de Hudson, lorsqu'on l'a vu tenter un passage Nord-Ouest pour les Grandes-Indes, dans le tems où il gémissoit encore sous l'oppression? Des Hommes, qui se sont ouvert le Commerce de la Baye de Honduras, de celle de Campêche

pêche & du Golfe du Mexique; qui ont été jusqu'aux Isles Malouines, pour la seule Pêche de la Baleine, s'arrêteront-ils au Cap-Horn? Ne doubleront-ils pas le Cap de Bonne-Espérance; & feront-ils longtems à se montrer dans la Mer du Sud & sur les Côtes de la Chine? Les Hollandois, qui n'ont aucun droit sur les Isles à épices, les y auront pour rivaux. Ces Hommes entreprenans les leur disputeront & employeront contre eux les mêmes argumens, que les Sept Provinces-Unies ont employés contre le Portugal. Ses liaisons avec l'Europe donneront à l'Amérique une célébrité, qui la fera connoître dans toutes les parties du Monde ancien: Des voyages continuels de l'un à l'autre Continent fourniront des observations sur les vents, les courants & leurs contrarietés: Les routes mieux connues seront abrégées; & chaque jour les deux Hémisphères sembleront se rapprocher: Insensiblement l'Ouvrier, le Payſan & même le Gentilhomme se familiariseront avec l'idée des voyages: On ne verra plus dans l'Amérique que les attraits, qui invitent à s'y établir; & les émigrations deviendront générales. Le moyen de s'y opposer seroit une Politique assez sage pour faire trouver dans l'Europe les mêmes douceurs, ou en Amérique une Politique assez bizarre pour y faire trouver les maux, auxquels on auroit voulu se soustraire. Les Hommes, dont l'esprit est le plus entreprenant, & dont les vuës sont les plus utiles,

ſeront les premiers à y paſſer & y ſeront ſuivis de leur fortune. Il y a longtems, que les opérations de Banque ont appris aux Hommes d'Etat, que les propriétés ſont auſſi libres que leurs maitres: Et, quant aux émigrations dont le Commerce fournit encore les moyens, il n'y auroit pour les empêcher dans les Gouvernemens de l'Europe qu'un retour abſolu à la Tyrannie Féodale, qui retînt les Hommes à la chaine, & qui interdît aux Etrangers l'approche de leurs territoires.

Ces rapports des choſes, qui font qu'elles s'attirent toutes les unes les autres, *leges & foedera rerum*, forment le nouveau Syſtème: Le Politique, qui ne ſaiſit que des chimères dans la ſublimité de ſes penſées, & l'Homme du monde, dont l'eſprit eſt aſſervi par une expérience menſongère, mille fois pire que l'ignorance, n'y croiront point ſans doute. Quel que puiſſe être un Syſtème, les Nations ne le quittent qu'avec lenteur, quand l'habitude & le tems ſemblent l'avoir affermi. Les Souverains de l'Europe, qui auront mépriſé la jeuneſſe imbécille de l'Amérique, qui auront dédaigné ſes liaiſons, qui n'auront point cru devoir unir leurs intérêts aux ſiens, verront le Syſtème de ce nouvel Empire s'établir ſur les ruines de l'ancien, en détruire toutes les maximes, en anéantir tous les Règlemens: Ils appelleront leurs Miniſtres & leur diront, " Venez donc pour maudire ce Peuple, „ parce qu'il eſt plus fort que moi;" & l'eſprit

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de vérité leur répondra, " comment maudirai-je
„ celui que Dieu n'a point maudit? Comment dé-
„ testerai-je celui que le Seigneur ne déteste point?
„ Je le verrai du haut des rochers, je le considé-
„ rerai du haut des collines: Ce Peuple habitera
„ tout seul; & il ne sera pas mis au nombre des
„ Nations." — Au contraire, les Souverains qui auront connu l'ordre des choses, qui auront formé avec elle les liaisons, si non les plus promptes, au moins les plus certaines, qui auront vu l'Amérique devenir dans son Indépendance le Marché de l'ancien Monde, qui lui auront ouvert leurs Ports, deviendront les dominateurs de l'Europe, en règleront les destins & seront comme le centre où tous les intérêts viendront aboutir. De toutes les Puissances Européennes, l'Angleterre est la seule, qui soit appellée à tous ces avantages; elle seule sympathise avec l'Amérique: Ce sont les mêmes moeurs, le même langage, les mêmes opinions, les mêmes dogmes, les mêmes usages: Tout conspire à les rapprocher. Si l'Angleterre veut prendre pour les Etats-Unis de l'Amérique les sentimens, qui leur sont dûs, elle peut encore retenir dans le Commerce & dans la Navigation l'ascendant, qui lui échappe; au lieu de l'ombre d'un grand nom, dont elle se targue aux yeux de l'Univers, elle peut acquérir une puissance, qui fera son bonheur sans exciter de haine: Il est encore en son pouvoir de prendre le premier rang au mi-

lieu des Nations de l'Europe : Livrée à tout son aveuglement, elle ne le fera point ; &, comme si elle étoit déjà abattuë sous la main d'un Dieu Vengeur, elle ne verra point les sources de son bonheur & de sa prospérité. La France, dont l'exemple sera bien-tôt suivi, s'est empressée de reconnoître dans les Etats-Unis une Puissance qu'il est impossible de leur enlever : Elle a cimenté avec eux une Alliance, dont les conditions sont parfaitement égales : Et de l'humiliation politique, à laquelle elle étoit reduite, elle s'élève à l'ascendant, que ses Vainqueurs laissent échapper. Jamais Puissance n'a montré plus de résolution & de sagesse, que l'Amérique au moment où elle a fait cette Alliance. Jamais Etat n'a montré autant d'art, de politique & d'adresse que la France en la contractant sous des conditions, qui laissent aux autres Puissances la faveur d'un Traité semblable. Peut-on supposer que les autres Etats verront le Commerce de l'Amérique, que les Anglois faisoient à l'exclusion de tous les autres Peuples, devenir libre sans le vouloir partager ? Ils le voudront certainement ; & voilà déjà un changement, qui commence à s'effectuer dans l'ancien Système.

Le Commerce général de l'Europe & de l'Amérique peut se former de deux manières : Il sera ou l'effet d'autant de Traités particuliers qu'il y aura de Nations commerçantes, ou celui d'un Traité fait avec le Congrès de toutes les Puissances mari-

ritimes, soit avant qu'elles s'engagent dans la Guerre de l'Amérique, soit au moment où on en conclura la Paix. On conviendroit d'une part de la liberté des Ports de l'Amérique, & de l'autre de la liberté des marchés en Europe. On y feroit encore les Règlemens de Commerce & de Navigation, qui conviendroient aux circonstances, & qui seroient communs à toutes les Nations indistinctement: Ils auront pour objet de prévenir les monopoles qui ont été si fréquents jusqu'à présent. Le Système du Commerce y sera changé au grand avantage de tous les Souverains. Le but de ces Règlemens ne sera pas seulement d'établir les rapports, qui existeront entre l'Amérique & l'Europe; on s'y occupera également des intérêts respectifs des Nations intervenantes, dont la position se trouvera nécessairement changée par le nouveau Système.

Les Américains se serviront dans tout leur Commerce de leurs propres Vaisseaux: A cet effet ils réclameront la liberté de l'Océan comme l'usage d'un bien commun; ils n'admettront point dans la navigation d'autres règles que celles qui seront prescrites par le Droit des Gens dans le nouvel état des choses; ils demanderont, que les Ports soient ouverts non-seulement à leurs Marchandises mais encore à leurs Vaisseaux comme étant une partie inséparable de leur Commerce: Alors affranchis de tout lien, les Américains apporteront non-seule-

ment les productions qui leur ſont propres, mais encore toutes celles qui leur ſeront communes avec l'ancien Monde: Ils exigeront la même liberté pour les articles travaillés chez eux; &, comme ils embraſſeront dans leur Commerce toutes les régions où leurs Vaiſſeaux pourront aborder, ils y prendront, outre les objets de leur propre conſommation, ceux encore qui pourront convenir à tous les Ports qu'ils fréquenteront; & pour cette raiſon ils demanderont la liberté du Commerce pour les articles étrangers ainſi que pour ceux qui leur ſeront particuliers. Quelques Etats s'y refuſeront d'abord; mais, voyant ceux qui y auront acquieſcé recevoir des avantages conſidérables du bon marché de leurs approviſionnemens & de leurs articles de Commerce, ils ſeront bien-tôt forcés d'y accéder pour leurs propres intérêts & pour conſerver leur rang dans le monde commerçant. Les Américains duſſent-ils ne point devenir les maîtres du Commerce par la manière dont ils le feront, par la conſtruction de leurs Vaiſſeaux, & par l'habileté de leurs Matelots, il n'y en aura pas moins une révolution dans l'ancien Syſtème. Les productions de l'Amérique coûtent moins au Cultivateur que celles de l'Europe; Les entrepriſes maritimes s'y exécutent auſſi à moindres fraix: Ses Habitans ſeront donc les ſeuls qui pourront fournir l'ancien Monde de leurs propres articles; ils les apporteront dans les marchés qui leur ſeront ouverts & y joindront pour aſſor-

fortimens les articles, qui leur seront communs, mais qu'ils pourront fournir avec une égale facilité; & l'avantage qu'ils y trouveront sera immense, si les Puissances de l'Europe ne conviennent point entre elles d'une liberté aussi absoluë dans leurs Ports respectifs. La manière, dont les Américains feront leur Commerce, ne sera pas utile pour eux seuls; elle sera profitable encore aux Nations, avec lesquelles ils auront des liaisons; leur activité se communiquera; on adoptera leurs procedés: La tournure particulière de leur caractère & l'impatience, qu'ils ont pour les découvertes, leur donnent cet esprit de recherche qui descend dans les plus petits détails, qui perfectionne tout, & qui en affaires forme l'habileté du Négociant, qualité qui se trouve peu en Europe: Ils apprennent tous les jours à en connoître les marchés; ils en étudient les besoins, les ressources, la manière d'y négocier, & la valeur qui y est mise à chaque objet; ils s'attachent particulièrement aux articles de manufacture & de culture propres à chaque Pays; ils veulent en connoître, mieux que ceux mêmes qui les vendent, les détails, leurs établissemens, les travaux qu'elles exigent, le prix de la main-d'œuvre, & les bénéfices qui s'y font. Avant la Guerre on a vu des Négocians de la Pensylvanie aller s'établir en Angleterre, uniquement pour être les Facteurs de l'Amérique: Aussi-tôt qu'arrivés, ils ont été aux Manufactures de Birmingham, de Wolverhampton, de Sheffield, de Liverpool, de la Province d'York & de celle de

Lancaſtre: Sur le champ ils ont ouvert un Commerce direct avec les Américains. Leur activité & leur eſprit de recherche paroîtront dans toutes les entrepriſes qu'ils formeront en Europe. *Loin que la liberté, qui leur ſera accordée, puiſſe devenir contraire au Commerce de l'ancien Monde, on en verra réſulter le bonheur général.* La concurrence devenant plus univerſelle, les bénéfices ſeront plus partagés, & l'induſtrie ſera plus encouragée dans tous les rangs. Quand le Commerce eſt tout entier entre les mains du Marchand, maître du bénéfice il veut des profits immenſes, dont il écraſe l'Acheteur: Pour les rendre plus conſidérables, il opprime l'Ouvrier, dont il fait baiſſer les ſalaires; & par une telle conduite il parvient à acquérir des richeſſes, la ſource de la vaine magnificence qu'on lui voit étaler: Le Commerce ne proſpérera jamais dans les endroits, où les Marchands ſont en quelque ſorte des Princes. Aſſurés de trouver des gains conſidérables dans le peu qu'ils vendent, ils en portent moins aux marchés. Que le Commerce ſoit libre, qu'il admette les deux Mondes dans ſa concurrence, l'abondance qui s'y trouve oblige le Marchand à réduire ſes profits; les entrepriſes ſe multiplient; l'Acheteur & l'Ouvrier ſe rapprochent; l'un met de l'épargne dans ſa dépenſe, & l'autre reçoit un ſalaire proportionné à ſes travaux; les commandes deviennent plus conſidérables; l'induſtrie eſt mieux recompenſée, les profits plus partagés;

gés ; &, la circulation devenant alors plus libre, le Commerce semble acquérir une nouvelle vie, il prend une vigueur inaltérable ; & bien-tôt il atteint à tout l'accroissement dont il est susceptible.

Si ces évènemens s'accomplissent, l'essentiel aujourd'hui n'est pas de tracer aux Marchands, quel sera alors le plan de leur conduite : Mais il importe d'avertir les Hommes-d'Etat d'être en garde contre les discours du Négociant : A l'entendre le Commerce languira, parce qu'il n'y aura plus le même luxe, le même étalage de richesses. Qu'ils portent leurs regards sur les marchés, dans les ports ; ils y verront l'abondance : Qu'ils examinent, si les matières premières, qui sont la base des Manufactures, ne se multiplient pas de jour en jour ; si l'industrie, dont une vente libre accelère les progrès, n'est pas alors & plus exercée & mieux payée ; si l'augmentation & l'encouragement des Manufacturiers ne sont point toujours accompagnés d'une aisance plus grande dans leurs Familles ; & enfin si ce n'est pas alors qu'on voit la population s'étendre avec d'autant plus de rapidité que la misère n'y apporte plus d'obstacle : Et sur-tout qu'ils ne perdent jamais de vuë combien les privilèges exclusifs sont funestes pour le Commerce : Les auteurs de l'ancien Système en ignoroient absolument les principes : Leur sagesse se réduisoit à appauvrir les Nations voisines, qui s'approvisionnoient chez eux ; & ensuite par le faux système des Impôts

ils empêchoient, que les fonds, qui étoient le fruit du travail & de l'induſtrie, ne s'accumulaſſent dans le Commerce, où ils auroient été utiles. Si les Politiques de ce Siècle veulent écouter enfin ce que la juſtice & un intérêt mieux entendu leur préſcrivent, ils laiſſeront l'activité du Commerçant ſuivre ſon propre cours; elle ſe conduit toujours aux ſources de la fortune: Quand l'Homme aura la liberté de tourner ſon induſtrie vers les objets, qui lui ſeront les plus lucratifs; quand tous les marchés lui ſeront ouverts pour en partager les bénéfices; c'eſt alors que tout ſera le plus heureuſement diſpoſé pour l'accroiſſement de la population, des richeſſes & des forces; & *l'on verra enfin les Souverains de l'Europe trouver leur puiſſance à la ſource, où les peuples auront trouvé leur bonheur.* Quand l'Indépendance de l'Amérique aura appris à tous les Souverains, combien eſt faux le ſyſtème d'avoir, à l'exemple du Gouvernement Britannique, des Colonies dans des régions éloignées pour y exercer un monopole abſolu; quand devenus ſages ils feront attention aux richeſſes, que leur offre le ſol qu'ils habitent; alors, imitant la prudente politique de la Chine, ils s'attacheront à mettre en valeur leurs terres en friche, à perfectionner leur Agriculture, à encourager leurs Manufactures, enfin à abolir les Corps & Communautés d'Ouvriers. A meſure que les traces de la barbarie s'effaceront, l'induſtrie de la Société ſaura ſe faire un ſuperflu

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pour être la matière de son Commerce avec l'Etranger. Que chaque Puissance reconnoisse l'inutilité de ses efforts pour établir par l'autorité de ses Ordonnances un Commerce, qui la mine elle-même, & qu'elle pouvoit établir avec moins de peines & plus d'avantages, en lui donnant la liberté qui en est le véritable esprit. Que les Souverains sentent enfin, que toutes les prohibitions, dont ils entendent écraser leurs Voisins, les écrasent eux-mêmes, alors on verra s'établir le seul système qui ait une base solide, celui qui livre le Commerçant à toute son activité & qui affranchit le Commerce de toutes ses entraves. Supposons qu'arrêtés dans leur Guerre, incertains dans le choix qu'ils doivent faire entre l'ancien & le nouveau Système, frappés de la necessité où l'Europe se trouve de changer toute son économie politique, & forcés enfin de se rendre à l'évidence des avantages que présente un Commerce aussi libre qu'actif, ils veuillent s'occuper de réformes ; ils considéreront d'abord comment, au milieu d'un aussi grand nombre de Puissances qui font les mêmes changemens, on pourroit établir une balance universelle ; comment au milieu de tant d'intérêts, qui se croiseront sur la terre, on pourra trouver un moyen de les réunir tous; alors, parcourant de nouveau les principes de leur ancien Système, ils y trouveront la preuve de la chûte, dont il n'est plus possible de le garantir; Ils avouëront, que le Commerce, qui

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ne connoît point d'autre reſſort que la concurrence, l'économie & l'induſtrie, a été enchainé jusqu'à préſent par les vuës particulières de la rivalité & de l'ambition ; ils reconnoitront, que le terme de ſes opérations eſt de faire une ſeule Société de toutes les Nations, en partageant avec chaque région les productions des divers climats & les richeſſes dont la Providence couvre les différentes parties de la Terre ; mais que le Commerce, traverſé dans ſes effets par le mélange des intérêts perſonnels, devient pour tous les Peuples une ſource intariſſable de Guerres, de jalouſies, & de défiances. Les Traités de Paix ne ſeront plus à leurs yeux que de ſimples Trèves ; & la Garantie, que les Puiſſances ſpectatrices donnent de leur durée, ne paroîtront pas être autre choſe qu'une occaſion de plus pour les rompre. Ils ne ſeront pas moins ſenſibles à la révolution, qui ſera ſur le point de s'opérer dans les moeurs : Les Peuples dépoſeront leurs préjugés dans la fréquentation plus générale des Hommes entre eux, & la Police du Genre Humain en deviendra plus parfaite : Les Règlemens, qui ont opprimé le Cultivateur, le Manufacturier, & le Marchand, pourront bien ne pas être abolis tout d'un coup ; la réforme ſe fera d'abord ſentir dans leurs effets les plus dangereux ; on commencera à voir l'induſtrie s'ouvrir tous les jours de nouvelles carrières ; la prudence découvrira des moyens, que l'orgueil pourra combattre, mais que

le besoin fera adopter ; l'usage qu'on en fera rendra la vente tous les jours plus facile dans les différents marchés de l'Europe ; & enfin toutes les parties du Monde seront en quelque sorte vivifiées par l'activité du Commerce. Alors seront anéantis tous les systèmes de Monopole ; &, s'il est dans l'Europe une Puissance qui veuille faire pancher de son côté la balance du Genre Humain, ses efforts n'auront point d'autre effet que d'avertir ses Voisins de la nécessité où ils sont de la ramener au niveau dont elle veut s'écarter. Le Monde commerçant a vu tour à tour s'élever au-dessus de lui l'Italie, les Pays-Bas, le Portugal, la Hollande, l'Angleterre ; la pression qu'elles y ont causée a fait sentir l'inégalité de la balance ; le soulevement a été général, & elles sont toutes tombées au moment où elles arrivoient au plus haut dégré de leur élevation. Les Souverains doivent sentir, combien ils sont intéressés à sortir enfin des entraves, qu'ils se sont tous donné par leurs restrictions, leurs prohibitions & leurs exclusions, dictées toutes par l'intention où chacun étoit d'abattre les autres. Il est démontré que la liberté qu'on accorde dans un Pays aux Ouvriers, aux Manufacturiers & aux Marchands des Nations etrangères, est le plus puissant moyen d'y encourager les Manufactures & d'y en augmenter le nombre : Une conduite contraire diminuë dans un Pays la valeur de ses productions intérieures, en haussant le prix des ar-

articles, contre lesquels il les échange & qu'on lui apporte en moindre quantité : Elle eſt encore la ſource d'un Monopole ruineux pour l'Habitant de la part de l'Ouvrier, du Manufacturier & du Marchand. Frappés de tant de conſéquences, les Souverains encourageront la population, naturaliſeront les Etrangers, & donneront aux conſciences la liberté la plus entière. Si la Nature a formé l'Homme, la Politique l'a mis en Société : Le lien, qui l'y retient, eſt l'échange qu'il fait avec ſon ſemblable de l'excédent de ſon néceſſaire, &, pour uſer des droits que la Juſtice & la Politique donnent, il faut que les Nations puiſſent, ainſi que l'Homme le fait avec ſon ſemblable, échanger entre elles l'excédent de leurs productions. La Société eſt univerſelle; elle eſt de Droit Naturel; les Guerres ſeules peuvent y donner atteinte; & alors encore ce qui tient à l'ordre général du Monde ne doit point ceſſer d'être reſpecté. *Les Loix excluſives en fait de Navigation ſont une véritable Piraterie* ; l'Océan eſt à tous, ne connoit point de premier occupant, & n'eſt point un élément, ſur lequel l'induſtrie humaine puiſſe s'exercer, de manière à y imprimer le caractère de la propriété: Et puisque la Nature l'empêche de devenir la propriété de l'Homme, il peut encore moins recevoir les loix d'un Souverain. On tiendra donc pour conſtant, que l'Océan doit être en bonne Politique auſſi libre qu'il eſt commun : *Pervium cunctis iter.*

Si

Si l'on s'apperçoit déjà que le Syſtême du Commerce commence à changer dans l'Europe, & que ce changement eſt effectivement néceſſaire en bonne Politique; ſi l'on eſt convaincu, que l'immenſe Commerce de l'Amérique-Septentrionale y entre non ſeulement pour une partie conſidérable depuis qu'elle eſt indépendante, mais qu'elle en eſt encore l'unique cauſe; ſi l'on reconnoit, que le nouvel ordre des choſes eſt l'effet *d'une criſe, que la Providence a elle-même conduite d'une manière ſi marquée qu'Elle ſemble ſommer les Souverains d'y coopérer avec elle*; ſi l'on remarque, combien il eſt abſurde de ſe promettre pour prix de la Guerre une terre trop éloignée de l'Europe pour entrer dans ſes querelles & avoir à cet egard rien de commun avec elle, & des Peuples qui ſont trop puiſſans par eux-mêmes pour appartenir jamais à aucun des Souverains de l'Europe; ſi toutes ces vérités ſont bien ſenties, la raiſon invite à la Paix dont elle démontre la neceſſité; elle engage les Souverains à ſe déſiſter d'une Guerre qui ne doit rien terminer, à regarder la criſe actuelle comme une matière plus propre à exercer leurs Conſeils que leurs Armes, & enfin à ſe communiquer ſur cet objet ce que la prudence ſuggère à chacun d'eux.

Avant de s'occuper de la Paix & de concilier les intérêts mêlés de l'Europe & de l'Amérique, les Puiſſances maritimes doivent former un Congrès pour examiner les objets, ſur leſquels on peut dès

à

à préſent interdire tout acte d'hoſtilité, & les points qui pourront être la baſe d'un Traité, les parties eſſentielles du Syſtème qui ſe prepare & devenir les fondemens d'une Paix durable parmi les Nations de l'Océan Atlantique.

La raiſon & la bienfaiſance, toujours d'accord avec la vraie Politique ſur les intérêts & les droits des Souverains, ne feront-elles jamais la regle de leur conduite? Seront-elles ſans force pour les amener à un Congrès, leur faire ceſſer toutes hoſtilités, & mettre un terme à la Guerre, avant qu'elle ait cauſé plus de ravages & occaſionné plus de misère: Une telle révolution de la part des principaux Etats commerçants de l'Europe ne ſeroit dans l'ordre politique qu'une imitation de ce qui s'eſt fait dans des tems plus reculés entre les Villes de la Ligue Anſéatique: Alors elle avoit moins d'objets: La criſe actuelle en impoſe la néceſſité: Si l'on veut des exemples plus récens, Henry le Grand & la Reine Elizabeth, auſſi habiles Politiques qu'on ait pu l'être depuis eux, ont donné le modèle du Conſeil général qui peut être convoqué; il s'agit ici non d'un Syſtème de Loix pour l'Europe entière, mais ſeulement des conditions, auxquelles l'Amérique & l'Europe doivent commercer: Tout autre intérêt politique y eſt étranger.

Les Puiſſances, qui l'auront compoſé, ſeroient garantes à l'avenir des Guerres, que le Commerce feroit naitre: L'incertitude actuelle du Droit des

Gens

Gens sur l'usage de la Mer rend leur concours indispensable : Tout est oublié ; il n'existe plus de principes, plus de règles, plus de loix. Les Nations semblent à cet égard être retombées dans les siècles de barbarie, & la Mer être encore en proie à la piraterie. Même en Guerre l'Europe ne peut pas demeurer sans Traités & sans Loix.

Les objets sur lesquels il faudra essentiellement délibérer seront : " I. Jusqu'à quel point il con-„ vient à toutes les Nations d'établir le *Mare li-*„ *berum*, d'après les principes de l'équité & du „ Droit des Gens. II. Jusqu'à quel point la Sou-„ veraineté sur les Bayes & sur les Ports permet-„ tra d'accéder à cette Convention comme à une „ Loi, qui fera partie du Droit des Nations. „ III. Jusqu'à quel point on peut rendre univer-„ sel le *Jus navigandi.*" Ce sera le moment de délibérer sur la *Libertas universalis commercio-rum*, sur la liberté des Ports & celle des marchés ; ensuite sur les droits qui y seront payés ; enfin sur l'avantage qu'on pourroit trouver à les affranchir insensiblement, pour remplacer cette espèce d'Impôts par l'Accise & sous les formes, dont on se sert pour taxer immédiatement le consommateur. Ce changement, dans les pays qui l'adopteroient, rendroit libres tous les Ports, avantage infiniment précieux aux yeux de quiconque s'occupe du bien-être de son Pays. Il s'agira encore de déterminer la nature & l'étenduë du Com-

merce, qu'on accordera à l'Amérique: Et enfin les Puiſſances maritimes ſeront dans le cas de faire reſpectivement de nouveaux Tarifs.

Voilà tout ce qu'on peut raiſonnablement exiger: *Il n'eſt au pouvoir de l'Humanité que de préparer & agir: Le ſuccès eſt l'ouvrage d'une main plus puiſſante.* SULLY Liv. XXX.

Mahomed Reza Khân.

I.

THAT it was the declared policy of the Company, on the acquiſition of the Duannee of Bengal, to continue the country government, under the inſpection of the Reſident at the Nabob's Durbar in the firſt inſtance, and that of the Preſident and Council in the laſt; and for that purpoſe they did ſtipulate to aſſign, for the ſupport of the dignity of the Nabob, an annual allowance from the revenues, equal to four hundred pounds a year.

II.

That, during the country government, the principal active perſon in the adminiſtration of affairs, for rank, and for reputation of probity, and of knowledge in the revenues and the laws, was Mahomed Reza Khân, who, beſides large landed property, was poſſeſſed of offices, whoſe emoluments amounted nearly, if not altogether, to one hundred thouſand pounds a year.

III.

That the Company's ſervants, in the beginning, were not converſant in the affairs of the revenue, and ſtood in need of natives of integrity and experience to act in the management thereof. On that ground, as well as in regard to the rank which Mahomed Reza Khân held in the country, and the confidence of the people in him, they, the Preſident and Council, did inform the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 30th of Sept. 1765, that "as Mahomed Reza Khân's ſhort adminiſtration was irreproachable, they determined to continue him in a ſhare of the authority;" and this information was not given lightly, but was founded

upon an enquiry into his conduct, and a minute examination of charges made against him by his rivals in the Nabob's Court; they having insinuated to the Nabob, that a design was formed for deposing him, and placing Mahomed Reza on his throne; but, on examination, the President and Council declare, that "he had so openly and candidly accounted *for every* "*rupee* disbursed from the Treasury, that they could "not, without injury to his character, and injustice "to his conduct, during his short administration, re- "fuse continuing him in a share of the government."

IV.

That the Company had reason to be satisfied with the arrangement made, so far as it regarded him; the President and Council having informed them in the following year, in their letter of the 9th of December 1766, that "the *large* increase of the revenue must, "in a great measure, be ascribed to Mr. Sykes's as- "siduity, and to *Mahomed Reza Khân's profound know-* "*ledge in the finances.*"

V.

That the then President and Council, finding it necessary to make several reforms in the administration, were principally aided in the same by the suggestion, advice, and assistance of the said Mahomed Reza Khân; and, in their letter to the Court of Directors of the 24th of June 1767, they state their resolution of reducing the emoluments of office, which before had arisen from a variety of presents, and other perquisites, to fixed allowances; and they state the merits of Mahomed Reza Khân therein, as well as the importance, dignity, and responsibility of his station, in the following manner:

"Mahomed Reza Khân has now, *of himself, with* "*great delicacy of honour*, represented to us the evil "consequences that must ensue from the continuance "of this practice; since, by suffering the principal "officers of the government to depend for the support

"of

" of their dignity on the precarious fund of perquiſites,
" they in a manner oblige them to purſue oppreſſive
" and corrupt meaſures, equally injurious to the coun-
" try and the company; and they accordingly aſſigned
" twelve lack of rupees for the maintenance and ſup-
" port of the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khân, and two
" other principal perſons, who held in their hands
" the moſt important employments of that govern-
" ment, having regard to their elevated ſtations, and
" to the expediency of ſupporting them in all the ſhew
" and parade requiſite to keep up the authority and
" influence of their reſpective offices, as they are all
" men of weight and conſideration in the country, who
" held places of great truſt and profit under the for-
" mer government. We further propoſe, by this act
" of generoſity, to engage their cordial ſervices, and
" confirm them ſteady in our intereſts, ſince they can-
" not hope, from the moſt ſucceſsful ambition, to riſe
" to greater advantages by any chance or revolution of
" affairs. At the ſame time it was reaſonable we
" ſhould not loſe ſight of Mahomed Reza Khân's paſt
" ſervices; he has purſued the Company's intereſt with
" ſteadineſs and diligence; his abilities qualify him to
" perform the moſt important ſervices. The un-
" avoidable charges of his particular ſituation are
" great; in dignity he ſtands ſecond to the Nabob
" only;—and as he engages to increaſe the revenues,
" without injuſtice or oppreſſion, to more than the
" amount of his ſalary, *and to relinquiſh thoſe advantages,*
" *to the amount of eight lacks of rupees per annum,* which
" he heretofore enjoyed, we thought it proper, in the
" diſtribution of ſalaries, to conſider Mahomed Reza
" Khân in a light ſuperior to the other Miniſters. We
" have only to obſerve farther, that great and enor-
" mous as the ſum muſt appear, which we have al-
" lotted for the ſupport of the Miniſters of the govern-
" ment, we will not heſitate to pronounce that it is
" neceſſary and reaſonable, and will appear ſo, on the
" conſideration of the power which men employed
" on theſe important ſervices have, either to ob-
" ſtruct or promote the public good, unleſs their

" integrity be confirmed by the ties of gratitude and " intereſt."

VI.

That the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khân continued, with the ſame diligence, ſpirit, and fidelity, to execute the truſt repoſed in him, which comprehended a large proportion of the weight of government, and particularly of the collections; and his attachment to the intereſt of the Company, and his extenſive knowledge, was again, in the courſe of the year 1767, fully acknowledged, and ſtated to the Court of Directors; and it farther appears, that by an inceſſant application to buſineſs, his health was conſiderably impaired, which gave occaſion, in the year following, that is, in Feb. 1768, to a freſh acknowledgment of his ſervices, in theſe terms: " We muſt, in juſtice to Mahomed " Reza Khân, expreſs the high ſenſe we entertain of " his abilities, and of the indefatigable attention he " has ſhewn in the execution of the important truſt " repoſed in him; and we cannot but lament the pro- " ſpect of loſing his ſervices, from the preſent declin- " ing ſtate of his health."

VII.

That as, in the increaſe of the revenue, the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khân was employed as a perſon likely to improve the ſame without detriment to the people, ſo, when the ſtate of any province ſeemed to require a remiſſion, he was employed as a perſon diſpoſed to the relief of the people without fraud to the revenue; and this was expreſſed by the Preſident and Council as follows, with relation to the remiſſions granted in the province of Bahar: " That the general knowledge of " Mahomed Reza Khân, in all matters relative to the " Duannee revenues, induced us to conſent to ſuch " deductions being made, from the general ſtate of " that province at the laſt Poonah, as may be deemed " irrecoverable, or ſuch as may procure an immediate " relief

" relief and encouragement to the Ryots in the future " cultivation of their lands."

VIII.

That the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khân, in the execution of the ſaid great and important truſts and powers, was not ſo much as ſuſpected of an ambitious or encroaching ſpirit, which might make him dangerous to the Company's, then recent, authority, or which might render his precedence injurious to the conſideration due to his colleagues in office; but on the contrary, it appears that a plan having been adopted for dividing the adminiſtration, in order to remove the Nabob's jealouſies, the ſame was in danger of being ſubverted by the ambition " of two of his colleagues, and the " *exceſſive moderation of Mahomed Reza Khân.*" And for a remedy of the inconveniencies, which might ariſe from the exceſs of an accommodating temper, though attended with irreproachable integrity, the Preſident and Council did ſend one of their own members, as their deputy to the Nabob of Bengal, at his capital of Maxadavad; and this meaſure appears to have been adopted for the ſupport of Mahomed Reza Khân, in conſequence of an enquiry made, and advice given by Lord Clive, in his letter of the 3d of July 1765; in which letter, he expreſſes himſelf of the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khân as follows: " It is with pleaſure I can " acquaint you, that the *more I ſee of Mahomed Reza* " *Khân, the ſtronger is my conviction of his honour and* " *moderation*; but that, at the ſame time, I cannot help " obſerving, that either from timidity, or an erroneous principle, he is too ready to ſubmit to encroachments upon that proportion of power that has been " allotted him."

IX.

That the Nabob Jaffier Ali Khan dying in February 1765, Mahomed Reza Khân was appointed guardian to his children, and adminiſtrator of his office, or regent,

regent, which appointment the Court of Directors did approve. But the party oppoſite to Mahomed Reza Khân having continued to cabal againſt him, ſundy accuſations were framed, relative to oppreſſion at the time of the famine, and for a balance due during his employment of collector of the revenues; upon which the Directors did order him to be deprived of his office, and a ſtrict enquiry to be made into his conduct.

X.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings, then lately appointed to the Preſidency, did, on the 1ſt of April, and on the 24th of September, 1772, write letters to the Court of Directors, informing them, that on the very next day after he had received (as he aſſerts) their private orders, "addreſſed to himſelf alone," and not to the Board, he did diſpatch, by expreſs meſſengers, his orders to Mr. Middleton, the Reſident at the Nabob's Court at Muxadavad, in a public character and truſt with the Nabob, to arreſt in his capital and at his Court, and without any previous notice given of any charge, his principal Miniſter, the aforeſaid Mahomed Reza Khân, and to bring him down to Calcutta; and he did carefully conceal his ſaid proceedings from the knowledge of the Board, on pretext of his not being acquainted with their diſpoſitions, and the influence which he thought that the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khân had amongſt them.

XI.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings, at the time he gave his orders as aforeſaid, for arreſting the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khân, did not take any meaſures to compel the appearance of any other perſons as witneſſes, declaring it as his opinion, "that there would be little need "of violence to obtain ſuch intelligence, as they "could give, againſt their former maſter, when his au- "thority is taken from him;" but he did afterwards, in excuſe for the long detention and impriſonment of the

the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khan, without any proofs having been obtained of his guilt, or meaſures taken to bring him to a trial, aſſure the Directors, in direct contradiction to his former declaration, " that the in-
" fluence of Mahomed Reza Khan ſtill prevailed
" generally throughout the country, in the Nabob's
" houſehold, and at the capital, and was ſcarcely af-
" fected by his preſent diſgrace;"——and the ſaid Haſtings, doth confeſs, he had uſed his utmoſt endeavours " to break that influence, by re-
" moving his dependants, and putting the direction
" of all the affairs that had been committed to his
" care into the hands of the *moſt powerful or active*
" *of his enemies*; that he depended on the activity of
" their hatred to Mahomed Reza Khan, incited by the
" expectation of rewards, for inveſtigating the con-
" duct of the latter; that with this the inſtitution of
" the new Duannee coincided, and that the ſame prin-
" ciple had guided him in the choice of Munny Be-
" gum and Rajah Gourdaſs, the former for the chief
" adminiſtration, the latter (the ſon of Nundcomar,
" and a mere inſtrument in the hands of his father)
" for the Duannee of the Nabob's houſehold, both
" the *declared enemies* of Mahomed Reza Khan."

XII.

That although it might be true that enemies will become the moſt active proſecutors, and as ſuch may, though under much guard and many precautions, be uſed even as witneſſes; and that it ought not to be an exception, ſuppoſing their character and capacity otherwiſe good, to the appointing them to power; yet to advance perſons to power, on the ground not of their honour and integrity, which might have produced the enmity of bad men, but merely for the enmity itſelf, without any reference whatſoever to a laudable cauſe, and even with a declared ill opinion of the morals of one of the party, ſuch as was actually delivered in the ſaid letter, by him the ſaid Haſtings, of Nundcomar (and which, time has ſhewn, he might

alſo

alſo on good ground have conceived of others) was, in the circumſtances of a criminal enquiry, a motive highly diſgraceful to the honour of Government, and deſtructive of impartial juſtice, by holding out the greateſt of all poſſible temptation to falſe accuſation, to corrupt and factious conſpiracies, to perjury, and to every ſpecies of injuſtice and oppreſſion.

XIII.

That in conſequence of the aforeſaid motives, and others pretended, which were by no means a ſufficient juſtification to the ſaid Warren Haſtings, he did appoint the woman aforeſaid, called Munny Begum, who had been of the loweſt and moſt diſcreditable order in ſociety,* according to the ideas prevalent in India, but from whom he received ſeveral ſums of money, to be guardian to the Nabob in preference to his own mother, *and to adminiſter the affairs of the Government* in the place of the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khan, the ſecond Muſſulman in rank after the Nabob, and the firſt in knowledge, gravity, weight, and character, among the Muſſulmen of that province. And in order to try every method, and to take every chance for his deſtruction, the ſaid Warren Haſtings did maliciouſly and oppreſſively keep him under confinement, for a part of the time, without any enquiry, and afterwards, with a ſlow and dilatory trial, for two years together.

XIV.

That notwithſtanding a total revolution in the power, in part avowedly made for his deſtruction, the perſons appointed for his trial did, on full enquiry, compleatly acquit the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khan of the criminal charges againſt him, on account of which he had been ſo long perſecuted and confined, and ſuffered much in mind, body, and fortune: and the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 3d of March 1775, teſtify their ſatisfaction in the conduct and reſult of the ſaid enquiry, and did direct the reſtoration of the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khan to liberty, and to the offices

* A Dancing Girl.

which

which he had lately held, which comprehended the management of the Nabob's houſehold, and the general ſuperintendency of the juſtice of Bengal; but according to the orders of the Court of Directors, his appointments were reduced to thirty thouſand pounds a year, or thereabouts, of which he did make grievous complaint, on account of the expences attendant on his ſtation, and the heavy debts which he had been obliged to contract during his unjuſt perſecution and impriſonment aforeſaid.

XV.

That on the removal of the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khan from the ſuperintendency of the criminal juſtice, and in conſequence of letting the province of Bengal in farm by the ſaid Warren Haſtings, ſeveral dangerous and miſchievous innovations were made by him, the ſaid Warren Haſtings, and the criminal juſtice of the country was almoſt wholly ſubverted, and great irregularities and diſorders did actually enſue.

XVI.

That the Council General, eſtabliſhed by Act of Parliament in the year 1773, did reſtore the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khan, with the conſent and approbation of the Nabob (but under a proteſt from the ſaid Warren Haſtings) to his liberty, and to his offices, according to the ſpirit of the orders given by the Court of Directors as aforeſaid; and the Court of Directors did approve of the ſaid appointment, and did aſſure the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khan of their favour and protection, as long as his conduct ſhould merit the ſame, in the following terms: "As the abilities of Maho-
"med Reza Khan have been ſufficiently manifeſted;
"as official experience qualifies him for ſo high a ſta-
"tion, in a more eminent degree than any other na-
"tive with whom the Company has been connected;
"and as no proofs of maladminiſtration have been
"eſtabliſhed againſt him, either during the ſtrict in-

" veſtigation of his conduct, or ſince his retirement; " we cannot under all circumſtances but approve your " recommendation of him to the Nabob, to conſti- " tute him his Naib. We are well pleaſed that he " has received that appointment, and authorize you to " aſſure him of our favour, ſo long as a firm attach- " ment to the intereſt of the Company, and a pro- " per diſcharge of the duties of his ſtation, ſhall " render him worthy of our protection." And the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khan did continue to execute the ſame, without any complaint whatſoever of malverſation or negligence, in any manner or degree, in his ſaid office.

XVII.

That in March 1778 the ſaid Warren Haſtings, under colour that the Nabob had compleated his twentieth year, and had deſired to be placed in the entire and uncontrouled management of his own affairs, and that Mahomed Reza Khan ſhould be removed from his office, and that Munny Begum his ſtepmomother, the dancing girl aforeſaid, " ſhould take on " herſelf the management of the Nizamut (the Go- " vernment and general ſuperintendency of criminal " juſtice) without the interference of any perſon " whatſoever;" and, notwithſtanding the contradictions in the pretended applications from the Nabob, with whoſe incapacity for all affairs he was well acquainted, did, in defiance of the orders of the Court of Directors, and without regard to the infamy of an arrangement, made for the evident and declared purpoſe of delivering not only the family with the Prince, but the government and juſtice of a great kingdom, into ſuch inſufficient, corrupt, and ſcandalous hands; and though he has declared his opinion, " that our " national character is concerned in the character " which the Nabob may obtain in the public opinion," on obtaining a majority in council, without any complaint, real or pretended, remove the ſaid Mahomed Reza from all his offices, and did partition his ſalary

as

as a ſpoil in the following manner:—To Munny Begum, the dancing girl aforeſaid, an additional allowance of ſeventy-two thouſand rupees [7,200l.] a year; to the Nabob's own mother, but half that ſum, that is to ſay, thirty-ſix thouſand rupees [3,600 l.] a year; to Rajah Gourdaſs, ſon of Nundcomar (whom he had deſcribed as a weak young man) ſeventy-two thouſand rupees [7,200 l.] a year, as controller of the houſehold; and to a magiſtrate called Sudder ul Hock, who, in real ſubſerviency to the ſaid Munny Begum, was nominally to act in the department of criminal juſtice, ſeventy-eight thouſand rupees [7,800 l.] a year; the total of which allowances exceeding the ſalary of Mahomed Reza Khan by eighteen thouſand rupees [1,800 l.] yearly, he did, for the corrupt and ſcandalous purpoſes aforeſaid, order the ſame to be made up from the Company's treaſury.

XVIII.

That Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, having moved that the execution of the aforeſaid arrangement, the whole expence of which, ordinary and extraordinary, was charged upon the Company's Treaſury, and therefore could not be even colourably diſpoſed of at the pretended will of the ſaid Nabob, might be ſuſpended until the pleaſure of the Court of Directors thereon ſhould be known; and the ſame being reſolved agreeably to law, by a majority of the Council then preſent, the ſaid Haſtings urging on violently the immediate execution of his corrupt project, and having obtained, by the return of Richard Barwell, Eſquire, a majority in Council, in his own caſting vote, did reſcind the aforeſaid reſolution, and did carry into immediate execution the aforeſaid moſt unwarrantable, miſchievous, and ſcandalous deſign.

XIX.

That the conſequences which might be expected from ſuch a plan of adminiſtration, did almoſt inſtant-

ly flow from it. For the perſon appointed to excute one of the offices which had been filled by Mahomed Reza Khân, did ſoon find that the Eunuchs of Munny Begum began to employ their power, with great ſuperiority and inſolence, in all the concerns of government, and the adminiſtration of juſtice, and did endeavour to diſpoſe of the offices relative to the ſame for their corrupt purpoſes, and to rob the Nabob's ſervants of their due allowances; and in his letter of the 1ſt September 1778, he ſent a complaint to the Board, ſtating, "That certain bad men had gained "an aſcendancy over the Nabob's temper, by whoſe "inſtigation he acts." And after complaining of the ſlights he received from the Nabob, he adds, "Thus "they cauſe the Nabob to treat me, ſometimes with "indignity, at others with kindneſs, juſt as they "think proper to adviſe him: their view is, that by "compelling me to diſpleaſure at moſt unworthy "treatment, they may force me either to relinquiſh "my ſtation, or to join with them, and act by their "advice, and appoint creatures of their recommendation to the different offices, from which they might "draw profit to themſelves."

XX.

That, in a ſubſequent letter to the Governor, the ſaid ſuperintendant of juſtice did inform him, the ſaid Warren Haſtings, of the audacious and corrupt manner in which, by violence, fraud, and forgery, the eunuchs of Munny Begum had abuſed the Nabob's name, to deprive the judicial and executory officers of juſtice of the ſalaries which they ought to have drawn from the Company's Treaſury, in the following words: —"The Begum's Miniſters, before my arrival, with "the advice of their counſellors, cauſed the Nabob "to ſign a Receipt, in conſequence of which they re- "ceived, at two different times, near 50,000 Rupees "[£. 5,000] in the name of the officers of the Adaw- "lut Fouſdary, &c. from the Company's Circars; "and having drawn up an account current *in the* "*manner*

" *manner they wiſhed*, they had got the Nabob to ſign " it, and ſent it to me." And in the ſame letter he aſſerts, " That theſe people had the Nabob entirely in " their power."

XXI.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings, upon this repreſentation, did, notwithſtanding his late pretended opinion of the fitneſs and the right of the Nabob to the ſole adminiſtration of his own affairs, authoratively forbid him from any interference therein, and ordered that the whole ſhould be left to the magiſtrate aforeſaid; to which the Nabob did, notwithſtanding his pretended independence, yield an immediate and unreſerved ſubmiſſion; for the ſaid Haſtings's order being given on the firſt of September at Calcutta, he received *an anſwer* from Muxadavad on the third, in the following terms :—" Agreeably to your pleaſure I " have relinquiſhed all concern with the affairs of the " Fouſdary and Adawlut, leaving the entire manage- " ment in Sudder ul Hock's hands." Which ſaid circumſtance, as well as many others, abundantly proves, that all the Nabob's actions were, in truth and fact, entirely governed by the influence of the ſaid Haſtings; and that however the ſaid Haſtings may have publicly diſcouraged the corrupt tranſactions of the ſaid Court, yet he did ſecretly uphold the authority and influence of Munny Begum, who did entirely direct, with his knowledge and countenance, all the proceedings therein. For

XXII.

That, on the 13th of the ſame month of September, he did receive a further complaint of the corrupt and fraudulent practices of the Chief Eunuch of the ſaid Munny Begum; and theſe corrupt practices did ſo continue and increaſe, that, on the 10th of October 1778, he was obliged to confeſs, in the ſtrongeſt terms, the pernicious conſequences of his before-recited

recited unwarrantable and illegal arrangements; for, in a letter of that date to the Nabob, he expreſſes himſelf as follows: "At your Excellency's requeſt, I ſent "Sudder ul Hock Khan to take on him the admi- "niſtration of the affairs of the Adawlut and Fouz- "dary, and hoped by that means not only to have "given ſatisfaction to your Excellency, but that, "through his abilities and experience, theſe affairs "would have been conducted in ſuch manner, as to "have ſecured the peace of the country, and the hap- "pineſs of the people; and it is with the greateſt "concern I learn, that this meaſure is ſo far from be- "ing attended with the expected advantages, that the "affairs, both of the Fouzdary and Adawlut, are in "the greateſt confuſion imaginable, and daily robbe- "ries and murders are perpetrated throughout the "country. This is evidently owing to the want of a "proper authority in the perſon appointed to ſuper- "intend them. I therefore addreſſed your Excellency "on the importance and delicacy of the affairs in "queſtion, and of the neceſſity of lodging full power "in the hands of the perſon choſen to adminiſter "them; in reply to which, your Excellency expreſſed "ſentiments coincident with mine: notwithſtanding "which, your dependants and people, actuated by "*ſelfiſh and avaritious views, have by their interference ſo* "*impeded the buſineſs, as to throw the whole country into* "*a ſtate of confuſion; from which nothing can retrieve it,* "*but an unlimited power lodged in the hands of the ſuper-* "*intendant.* I therefore requeſt that your Excellency "will give the ſtricteſt injunctions to all your depen- "dents, not to interfere in any manner with any mat- "ter relative to the affairs of the Adawlut and Fouz- "dary; and that you will yourſelf relinquiſh all in- "terference therein, and leave them entirely to the "management of Sudder ul Hock Khân: This is "abſolutely neceſſary, to reſtore the country to a ſtate "of tranquillity." And he concluded by again recommending the Nabob to withdraw all interference with the adminiſtrator aforeſaid; "otherwiſe a "meaſure, which I adopted at your Excellency's re- "queſt,

" queſt, and with a view to your ſatisfaction, and the " benefit of the country, will be attended with quite " contrary effects, and bring diſcredit on me."

XXIII.

That the ſaid Haſtings, in the letter aforeſaid, in which he ſo ſtrongly condemns the acts, and ſo clearly marks out the miſchievous effects, of the corrupt influence under which alone the Nabob acted, and under which alone, from his known incapacity, and his dependence on the perſon ſupported by the ſaid Haſtings, he could act, did propoſe to put all the offices of juſtice (which on another occaſion he had requeſted him to *permit* to remain in the hands which then held them) into his own diſpoſal; telling him, or rather the woman and eunuch who governed him, " that if his " Excellency has any plan for the management of the " affairs in future, be pleaſed to communicate it to " me, and every attention ſhall be paid to give your " Excellency ſatisfaction." By which means, not only particular parts, as before, but the whole ſyſtem of juſtice was to be afloat, and to be ſubject to the purpoſes of the aforeſaid corrupt cabal of women and eunuchs.

XXIV.

That the Court of Directors, on receiving an account of the above arrangements, and being well apprized of the ſpirit, intention, and probable effect of the ſame, did, in a clear, firm, and deciſive manner, expreſs their condemnation of the meaſure, and their rejection and reprobation of all the pretended grounds and reaſons on which the ſame was ſupported; marking diſtinctly his prevarication and contradictions in the ſame, and pointing to him their full conviction of the unworthy motives on which he had made ſo ſhameful an arrangement; telling him, in the 17th paragraph of their general letter, of the 4th of Feb. 1779, " The Nabob's letters of the 25th and 30th of Au-

" guſt,

" guſt, of the 3d of September, and 17th of Novem-
" ber, leave us no doubt of the *true* deſign of this
" *extraordinary* buſineſs being to *bring forward* Munny
" Begum, and again to inveſt her with improper
" power and influence, notwithſtanding our former
" declaration, that ſo *great* a part of the Nabob's al-
" lowance had been embezzled and miſapplied under
" her ſuperintendance."

XXV.

That in conſequence of the cenſure and condemnation of the unwarrantable meaſures of the ſaid Warren Haſtings by the Court of Directors, on the aforeſaid and other weighty, and ſubſtantial grounds, they did order and direct as follows, in the 20th paragraph of the general letter of the ſame date: " As we deem
" it for the welfare of the country, that the office of
" Naib Soubadar be for the preſent continued, and
" that this high office ſhould be filled by a perſon of
" wiſdom, experience, and of approved fidelity to
" the Company; and as we have no reaſon to alter the
" opinion given of Mahomed Reza Khan, in our let-
" ter of the 24th of December 1776; we poſitively
" direct, that you forthwith ſignify to the Nabob Mo-
" bareck ul Dowla our pleaſure, that Mahomed Reza
" Khan be immediately reſtored to the office of Naib
" Soubadar; and we further direct, that Mahomed
" Reza Khan be again aſſured of the continuance of
" our favour, ſo long as a firm attachment to the in-
" tereſt of the Company, and a proper diſcharge of
" the duties of his ſtation, ſhall render him worthy
" of our protection."

XXVI.

That the aforeſaid direction did convey in it ſuch evident and cogent reaſon, and was ſo far enforced by juſtice to individuals, and by regard to the peace and happineſs of the natives, as well as by the common decorum to be obſerved in all the tranſactions of Government, that the ſaid Haſtings ought to have yielded a chearful

a chearful obedience thereto, even if he had not been by a positive statute, and his relation of servant to the Company, bound to that just submission. Yet the said Hastings did, without denying or evading any one of the reasons assigned by the Court of Directors, or controverting the scandalous motives assigned by them for his conduct, contumaciously refuse obedience to the above positive order, on pretence that the Nabob, who, he had declared it on record "to be as visible "as the light of the Sun, is a mere pageant, and with-"out even the shadow of authority," did dissent from the same; and he did encourage the said Nabob, or rather the eunuchs, the corrupt ministers of Munny Begum, to oppose himself and themselves to the authority of the said Court of Directors; by which means the arrangement, three times either ratified or expressly ordered by them, was wholly defeated; the aforesaid corrupt system was continued; Mahomed Reza Khan was not restored to his office; and a lesson was taught to the natives of all ranks, that the declared approbation, the avowed sanction, and the decided authority of the Court of Directors, were wholly nugatory to their protection, against the corrupt influence of their servants.

XXVII.

That the said Warren Hastings, on a reconciliation with Mr. Francis, one of the Council General, who made it a condition thereof that certain of the Company's orders should be obeyed, and that Mahomed Reza Khan should be restored to his offices, did, a considerable time after, notwithstanding the pretended reluctance of the Nabob, and his pretended freedom, make, for his convenience in the said accommodation, the arrangement which he had unwarrantably and illegally refused to the orders of the Court of Directors; and did, of his own authority and that of the Board, restore Mahomed Reza Khan to his offices.

XXVIII.

That, ſoon after the departure of the ſaid Mr. Francis, he did again deprive the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khan of his ſaid offices, and did make ſeveral great changes in the conſtitution of the criminal juſtice in the ſaid country; and after having, under pretence of the Nabob's ſufficiency for the management of his own affairs, diſplaced, without any ſpecific charge, trial, or enquiry whatſoever, the ſaid Mahomed Reza Khan, he did ſubmit the ſaid Nabob to the entire direction, in all parts of his concerns, of a Reſident of his own nomination, Sir John Doyley, Bart. and did order an account of the moſt minute parts of his domeſtic oeconomy to be made out, and to be delivered to the ſaid Sir John Doyley, in the following words, contained in a paper by him intitled, INSTRUCTIONS from the Governor General to the Nabob Mobarek ul Dowla, reſpecting his conduct in the management of his affairs: "You will be pleaſed to direct your Mutta "Seddies to form an account of the fixed ſums of "your monthly expences, ſuch as ſervants wages in "the different departments, penſions, and other al-"lowances, as well as of the eſtimated amount of "variable expences, to be delivered to Sir John "Doyley, *for my inſpection.* I have given ſuch orders "to Sir John Doyley as will enable him to propoſe to "you ſuch reductions of the penſions and other allow-"ances, and ſuch a diſtribution of the variable ex-"pences, as ſhall be proportionable to the total ſum "of your monthly income; *and I muſt requeſt you will "confirm to it.*" And he did, in the ſubſequent articles of his ſaid inſtructions, order the whole management to be directed by Sir John Doyley, ſubject to his own directions, as aforeſaid; and did even direct what company he ſhould keep; and did throw reflections on ſome perſons, in places the neareſt to him, as of bad character and baſe origin—perſons whom he ſhould decline to name as ſuch, "unleſs he heard that "they ſtill availed themſelves of his goodneſs to retain

"*the*

" *the places* which they improperly hold near his per-
" ſon." And he did particularly order the ſaid Nabob not to admit any Engliſh, but ſuch as the ſaid Sir John Doyley ſhould approve, to his preſence; and did repeat the ſaid order in the following peremptory manmer: " You *muſt forbid any* perſons of *that nation* to " to be introduced into *your* preſence, without *his* in-
" troduction." And he did require his obedience in the following authoritative ſtyle: " I ſhall think " myſelf obliged to interfere *in another manner*, if you " neglect it."

XXIX.

That he, the ſaid Warren Haſtings, did inſult the captive condition of the ſaid Nabob, by informing him, in his imperious inſtructions aforeſaid, that this total, blind, and implicit obedience, in every reſpect whatſoever, to Sir John Doyley and himſelf perſonally, and without any reference to the Board, " was the very " *conditions* of the compliance of the Governor Ge-
" neral and Council with his late requiſition;" which requiſition was, that he ſhould enjoy *the free and uncontrouled* management of his own affairs. And though the ſaid captive did offer, as he the ſaid Haſtings himſelf admits, *four lacks* of his ſtipend, at that time reduced to ſixteen lacks, for *the free uſe of the remainder*, yet he did place him the ſaid Nabob in the ſtate of ſervitude in the ſaid inſtructions laid down, but a very ſhort time after he had aſſumed and uſed the ſaid Nabob's independent rights, as a ground for refuſing to obey the Company's orders; and although he has declared or pretended, on another occaſion, which he would have thought ſimilar, that any attempt to limit the houſehold expences of the Nabob of Oude, was an indignity " which no man living, however mean " his rank in life, or dependent his condition in it, " would permit to be exerciſed by any other, without " the want or forfeiture of every manly principle."

XXX.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings did order the ſaid ſtipend (which was to be diſtributed, in the minuteſt particular, according to the ſaid Haſtings's perſonal directions) to be paid monthly, not to any officer of the Nabob, but to the ſaid Reſident Sir John Doyley, And whereas the Governor General and Council did, on the appointment of Mahomed Reza Khan, according to their duty, inſtruct him, that "he do conform to the *orders* of the Company, which direct, "that an annual account of the Nabob's expences be "tranſmitted, through the Reſident at the Durbar, "for the inſpection of this *Board*,"—the ſaid Haſtings, in making his new eſtabliſhment in favour of his Reſident, did wholly omit the ſaid inſtruction, and did confine the ſaid communication to *himſelf* privately. And in fact it does not appear that any accounts whatſoever of the diſpoſition of the ſaid large ſum, exceeding 160,000l. ſterling a year, has been laid before the Board, or at leaſt that any ſuch account has been tranſmitted to the Court of Directors; and it is not fitting that any Britiſh ſervant of the Company ſhould have the management of any public money, much leſs of ſo great a ſum, without a public well-vouched account of the ſpecific expenditure thereof.

XXXI.

That the Court of Directors did, on the 17th May 1766, propoſe certain rules for regulating the correſpondence of the Reſident with the Nabob of Bengal, in which they did direct, as a principle for the ſaid regulations, as follows (paragraph 16th:) "We would "have his correſpondence to be carried on with the "*Select Committee* through the channel of the preſident; "he ſhould keep a diary of all his tranſactions. His "correſpondence with the natives *muſt be publicly conducted*; copies of *all* his letters, ſent and received, "be tranſmitted monthly to the preſidency, with duplicates and triplicates to be tranſmitted home in "our general packet by every ſhip."

XXXII. That

XXXII.

That the Preſident and Select Committee (Lord Clive being then Preſident) did approve of the whole ſubſtantial part of the ſaid regulation (the diary excepted;) and the principle, in all matters of account, ought to have been ſtrictly adhered to, whatever limitations may have been given to the office of Reſident. Yet he the ſaid Warren Haſtings, in defiance of the aforeſaid good rules, orders, and late precedent in conformity to the ſame, did not only withhold any order for the purpoſe, but, in order to carry on the buſineſs of the ſaid Durbar in a clandeſtine manner for his own purpoſes, did, as aforeſaid, exclude all Engliſh from an intercourſe with the the Nabob, who might carry complaints or repreſentations to the Board, or the Court of Directors, of his condition, or the conduct of the Reſident; and did further, to defeat all poſſible publicity, inſinuate to him, to give the preference to verbal communication above letters, in the words following, of the 9th article of his inſtructions to the Nabob: "Although I deſire to receive your "letters frequently, yet, as many matters will occur "which cannot be ſo *eaſily explained by letters as by con-* "*verſation*, I deſire that you will, on ſuch occaſions, "give your orders to him, reſpecting ſuch points as "you may deſire to have imparted to me; and I, "poſtponing every other concern, will give an im- "mediate and the moſt ſatisfactory reply concerning "them." Accordingly, no relation whatſoever has been received by the Court of Directors of the ſaid Nabob's affairs; nor any account of the money monthly paid, except from public fame, which reports that his affairs are in great diſorder, his ſervants unpaid, and many of them diſmiſſed, and all the Muſſulmen dependant on his family in a ſtate of indigence.

The

The MOGUL delivered up to the MAHRATTAS.

I.

THAT Shâ Aalum, the Prince, commonly called The Great Mogul, or, by eminence, *The King*, is, or lately was, in the poſſeſſion of the antient capital of Hindoſtan; and though without any conſiderable territory, and without a revenue ſufficient to maintain a moderate ſtate, he is ſtill much reſpected and conſidered; and the cuſtody of his perſon is eagerly ſought by many of the princes in India, on account of the uſe to be made of his title and authority; and it was for the intereſt of the Eaſt India Company that while, on one hand, no wars ſhall be entered into in ſupport of his pretenſions, on the other, no ſteps ſhould be taken which may tend to deliver him into the hands of any of the powerful ſtates of that country; but that he ſhould be treated with friendſhip, good faith, and reſpectful attention.

II.

That Warren Haſtings, in contradiction to this ſafe, juſt, and honourable policy, ſtrongly preſcribed and enforced by the orders of the Court of Directors, did (at a time when he was engaged in a negotiation, the declared purpoſe of which was to give peace to India) concur with the * Captain General of the Maratta State, called Madajee Scindia, † in hoſtile deſigns againſt the few remaining territories of that ſame

* Letter to Colonel Muir, Sept. 10, 1781.
† Appen. to Supplement 2d Report, No. 1.

Mogul

Mogul Emperor, by virtue of whose grant the Company actually possess the government, and enjoy the revenues of great provinces, and also against the possessions of a Mahommedan Chief called Nudjif Cawn, a person of much merit with the East India Company; in acknowledgment of which they had granted him a pension, included in the tribute due to the King, and, together with that tribute, taken from him by the said Warren Hastings, though expressly *guaranteed* to him by the Company. With both these powers the Company had been in friendship, and were actually at peace at the time of the said clandestine concurrence in a design against them; and the said Hastings hath since declared, that the right of one of them, namely, "the right of the Mogul Emperor to our assistance, "has been constantly acknowledged."

III.

That the said Warren Hastings, at the time of his treacherous concurrence in a design against a power, which he was himself of opinion we were bound to assist, and against whom there was no doubt he was bound neither to form nor to concur in any hostile attempt, did give a caution to Colonel Muir, to whom the negotiation aforesaid was entrusted on the part of the Company, against "inserting any thing in the "treaty which might *expressly* mark our *knowledge* of "his [the Maratta General's] views *or concurrence in* "*them.*" Which said transaction was full of duplicity and fraud; and the crime of the said Hastings therein is aggravated, by his having some years before withheld the tribute, which by treaty was solemnly agreed to be paid to the said king, on pretence that he had thrown himself, for the recovery of his city of Delhi, on the protection of the Marattas, whom the said Warren Hastings then called * *the natural enemies* of the Company, and the growth of whose power he then alledged to be highly dangerous to the interests of this kingdom in India.

* 24th October 1774.

IV. That

IV.

That after having concurred, in the manner before mentioned, in a design of the Marattas against the Mogul; and notwithstanding he the said Warren Hastings had formerly declared, "That with him [the "Mogul] our connection had been a long time sus- "pended, and *he wished never to see it renewed*, as it "had proved a fatal drain to the wealth of Bengal, "and the treasury of the Company, without yielding "one advantage or possible resource, even of remote "benefits, in return;" the said Warren Hastings did nevertheless, on or about the month of March 1783, with the privity and consent of the Members of the Board, but by no authoritative act, dispatch, as agents of him the Governor General only, and not as agents of the Governor General and Council, as they ought to have been, certain persons, among whom were Major Browne and Major Davy, to the Court of the king at Delhi, and did there enter into certain engagements with the said king, by the means of those agents, and did carry on certain private and dangerous intrigues for various purposes, particularly for making war in favour of the said king, against some powers or princes not precisely described, but which, as may be inferred from by subsequent correspondence, to be certain Mahommedan princes in the neighbourhood of Delhi, in amity with the Company, and some of them at that time in the actual service, and in the apparent confidence and favour of the said Mogul; and he did order Major Browne to offer to the Mogul King, to provide for the *entire* expence of *any* troops the Shâ [the said king] might require; and the proposal was accordingly accepted, with the conditions annexed; by which proposal, and acceptance thereof, the East India Company was placed in a situation of great and perplexing difficulty, since either they were to engage, at an unlimited *expence*, in new wars, contrary to their orders, contrary to their general declared policy, and contrary to the published resolutions of the House

House of Commons, and wholly incompatible with the state of their finances; or, to preserve peace, they must risk the imputation of a new violation of faith, by departing from an agreement made on the voluntary proposal of their own government; the agent of the said Hastings having declared, in his letter to the said Hastings, by him communicated to the Board, "That the business of assisting the Shâ [the "Mogul Emperor] can and *must* go on, if we wish "to be secure in India, or regarded as a nation of "faith and honour."

V.

That the said Warren Hastings did, on the 20th day of January 1784, send in circulation to the other Members of the Council, a letter to him from his agent, Major Browne, dated at Delhi on the 30th of December 1783, viz. that letter to which the foregoing references are made, in which the said Browne did directly press, and indirectly (though sufficiently and strongly) suggest several highly dangerous measures, for realizing the general offers and engagements of the said Warren Hastings;—proposing, that besides a proportion of field artillery, and a train of battering cannon for the purpose of sieges, six regiments of Sepoys in the Company's service should be transferred to that of the said king, and that certain other corps should also be raised for the said service in the English provinces and dependencies, to be immediately under the King's [the Mogul's] orders, and to be maintained by assignments of territorial revenue within the province of Oude, a dependent Member of the British Government, but with a caution against having any British officer with the same; the said Major Browne expressing his caution as followeth;—— "If any European officer *be* with this corps, a very "nice judgment indeed must direct the choice; for "scarce any are in the smallest degree *fit* for *such* em- "ploy, but much more likely to do harm than "good." And the letter aforesaid, by him entered on the Company's records, being without

any obſervation thereon, or any diſavowal of the matters of fact, or of the Councils ſo ſtrongly and authoritatively delivered therein, by the ſaid Warren Haſtings's agent, and without any mark of diſapprobation of any part of his plan, whether that of the aſſignment of territory belonging to the Company's allies for the maintenance of troops, which were to be by that plan put under the orders of a foreign independent power, or that of employing the ſaid troops without any Britiſh officer with them, or of his, the ſaid agent's, alarming obſervation, which, if not an implied cenſure on the nature of the ſervice in which Britiſh officers are ſuppoſed improper to be truſted, is a ſtrong reflection on the character of the Britiſh officers, which was to render them unfit to be employed in an honourable ſervice —the ſaid Warren Haſtings did thereby give a countenance to the ſaid unwarrantable and dangerous propoſals and reflections.

VI.

That, a conſiderable time before the production and circulation of Major Browne's letter, the ſaid Haſtings did enter a minute of conſultation, containing a propoſition ſimilar in the general intent to that in the ſaid letter contained, for aſſiſting the Mogul with a military force; but the other members of the Board did diſagree thereto, and being alarmed at the diſpoſition ſo ſtrongly ſhewn by the ſaid Haſtings, to engage in new wars, and dangerous foreign connections, and poſſibly having intelligence of the proceedings of his agent, did call upon him to produce his inſtructions to Major Browne; and he did on the 5th of October 1783, and not before, enter on the conſultations a certain paper, purporting to be the inſtructions which he had given to Major Browne the preceding March, the time of his, the ſaid Browne's, appointment; in which pretended inſtructions no direction whatſoever was given to the effect of his the ſaid Haſtings's minute of conſultation propounded; that

that is to say, no power was given in the said instructions to make a direct offer of military aid to the Mogul, or to form the arrangements stated by the said Browne, in his letter to the said Hastings, as having been made by the express authority of the said Hastings himself. But the said instructions contained nothing further on that subject, but a conditional direction, that in case a military force should be required for the Mogul's aid or protection, the Major is to know the service on which it is to be employed, and the resources from whence it is to be paid; and the instructions produced as his real instructions by the said Hastings, are so guarded, as to caution the said Browne against *taking any part in the intrigues of those who are about the King's person.* By which letters, instructions, and transactions, compared with each other, it appears that the said Warren Hastings, after six months delay in entering of (contrary to the Company's order) any instructions to the said Browne, did at last enter a false paper as the true, or that he did give other secret instructions, totally different from, and even opposite to his public ostensible instructions, thereby to deceive the Council, and to carry on, with less obstruction, dark and dangerous intrigues, contrary to the orders of the Court of Directors, to the true policy of this kingdom, and to the safety of the British possessions in the East.

VII.

That the said Letter from Major Browne was by the said Warren Hastings transmitted to the Court of Directors, without being accompanied by any part of the previous correspondence; by which wilful concealment the said Warren Hastings is guilty of an high and criminal disrespect to the Court of Directors, and of a most flagrant breach and violation of their orders, which he was bound by an Act of Parliamenet to obey.

VIII.

That the ſaid Haſtings having early in the year 1784 procured to himſelf a deputation to act in the upper provinces, the council, being well aware of his diſpoſition to engage in unwarrantable deſigns againſt the neighbouring ſtates, did expreſsly confine his powers, to the circumſtance of his actual reſidence within the company's provinces: but it appears that ways were found out by which he hoped to defeat the the precautions of the board, for the ſaid Warren Haſtings did write from Lucknow, the capital of the country of Oude, to the Court of Directors, a certain poſtſcript of a letter, dated the 4th of May 1784, in which he informs the court that the Son and Heir Apparent of the Great Mogul had taken refuge with him, and the Nabob of Oude; that he had a conference with that Prince on the 10th of the ſame month of May, "no perſon being either preſent or within "hearing" during the ſame, and that in the ſaid conference the Prince had informed him of the diſtreſſes of his father, and his wiſh for the relief of the King, and the reſtoration of the dominions of his houſe, as well as to reſcue him from the power of certain perſons not named, who degraded him into a mere inſtrument of their intereſted and ſordid deſigns; and that on a failure of his application to him, he would either return to his father or proceed to Calcutta, and thence to England; and that the ſaid Warren Haſtings did give him an anſwer to the following effect; "That our [the Britiſh] Government had juſt "obtained relief from a ſtate of univerſal warfare, "and required a term of repoſe; that our whole na- "tion was weary of war, and dreaded the renewal of "it, *and would be equally alarmed at any movement of* "*which it could not ſee the iſſue or progreſs, but which* "*might eventually tend to create new hoſtilities*; that he "came hither [to Lucknow] with a limited autho- "rity, and could not, if he choſe it, engage in a bu- "ſineſs of that nature, *without the concurrence of his* "*colleagues*

" *colleagues in office, who he believed would be averſe to it*; " that he would repreſent the ſame to the joint mem- " bers of his own Government, and wait their deter- " mination. In the mean time, he adviſed the Prince " to make advances to Madajee Scindia, both becauſe " our Government *was in intimate and ſworn connection* " with him, and becauſe he was the effectual head of " the Mahratta State; beſides that he, the ſaid Warren " Haſtings, feared his [Scindia's] taking the other ſide " of the queſtion, unleſs he was early prevented."

IX.

That in the ſtatement of this diſcourſe, there is much criminal reſerve towards the Court of Directors, it not appearing diſtinctly what the objects were, nor who the perſons concerned, nor what the ſide was which he apprehended the Mahrattas might take, if not prevented by his advances; and in the diſcourſe itſelf there were many particulars highly criminal; namely, for that in the ſaid converſation, in which he deſcribes himſelf as declining a compliance with the requeſt of the Prince, on account of the averſion (therein ſtrongly expreſſed) of his colleagues, of the company, and of the whole Britiſh nation, to engage in any meaſures which might even " *eventually lead to hoſtilities*" —he ſpoke to the Prince as if he had been entirely ignorant of the offers which but five months before had been made to the King his father, on the part of that very Government (whoſe repugnance to ſuch meaſures he then, for the firſt time choſe to profeſs, but which he always had known) through Major Browne, the company's repreſentative at the Court of Delhi, " to provide for the *entire* expence of *any* Troops " which the Shâ [the King] might require;" and that this was " what the Reſident had *always* pro- " poſed to the King, and his confidential Miniſters;" —the ſaid Browne further declaring, " That if in con- " ſequence of the ſaid propoſals, certain arrangements " for the Shâ's ſervice, by *troops*, were not immediately " ordered, in his opinion all our [Engliſh Govern- " ment's]

" ment's] *offers and promiſes* will be conſidered as falſe " and inſidious." This being the known ſtate of the buſineſs, as repreſented by the ſaid Haſtings's own agent, and this the public opinion of it, although, to impoſe on the ignorance of the Prince, with regard to the proceedings at his Father's Court, would have been unworthy in itſelf, yet he, the ſaid Warren Haſtings, could not hope to ſucceed in ſuch impoſition, as, in the poſtſcript aforeſaid, he repreſents the ſaid Prince [who was the King's eldeſt ſon, and thirty-ſix years of age] as a perſon of conſiderable qualifications, and perfectly acquainted with the tranſactions at his Father's Court, and as one who had long held the *principal* and moſt active part in the little that remained of the *adminiſtration* of *Shâ Allum*. And the ſaid Haſtings, conferring with a Prince ſo well inſtructed, without making the ſlighteſt alluſions to his ſaid poſitive and recent engagements, or without giving any explanation with regard to them, the ſaid Warren Haſtings muſt appear to the ſaid Prince, either as a perſon not only contracting engagements, but actually being the firſt mover and propoſer of them, without any authority from *his colleagues*, and againſt theirs and the general inclination of the Britiſh nation, and on that ground not to be truſted; or that he had uſed this plea of diſagreement between him and his Council as a pretence, ſet up without colour or decency, for a groſs violation of his own engagements; leaving the Princes and States of the Country no ſolid ground on which they can or ought to contract with the Company, to the utter deſtruction of all public confidence, and to the equal diſgrace of the national candour, integrity and wiſdom.

X.

That, in a letter dated from the ſame place, Lucknow, the 16th of the following June, 1784, the ſaid Warren Haſtings informs the Court of Directors, that Major Browne, their agent to the Mogul, had arrived there in the character alſo of agent from the Mogul, with

with two sets of instructions from two opposite parties in his Ministry, which instructions were directly contrary to each other; the first, which were the ostensible instructions, being to engage the said Hastings, in the Mogul's name, to enter into a treaty of mutual alliance with a chief of the country, then Minister to the said Mogul, called Afrasaib Khan; the second were from another principal person, called Mudjed al Dowla, also a Minister to the said Mogul, (but styled in the in the said letter *confidential*, for distinction) which were directly destructive of the former; and the said latter instructions to which it seems credence was to be given, were sent "under the most solemn adjurations of secre-"cy." The purpose of these latter and secret instructions were to require the Company's aid in freeing the Mogul from the oppressions of his servants, namely from the opressions of the said *Affrasaib*, between whom and the Company Major Browne (at once agent to that Company, and to two opposite factions in the Mogul's Court) accepted a power to make a treaty of mutual alliance, under the sanction of his sovereign; and it does not appear that he, Warren Hastings, did discountenance the double dealing and fradulent agencies of his and the Company's Minister at that Court; or did disavow any particular in the letter from him the said Browne, of the 30th of Dec. 1783, stating the offers made on his part to the Mogul, so contradictory to his late declarations to the heir apparant of that monarch, or did give any reprimand to the said Browne, or did shew any mark of displeasure against him, as having acted without orders, but did again send him, with renewed confidence, to the Court aforesaid.

XI.

That the said Warren Hastings, still pursuing his said evil designs, did apply to the Council for discretionary powers relative to the intrigues and factions in the Mogul's Court, giving assurances of his resolution not to proceed against their sense: But the said Council, being fully aware of his disposition and having Major Browne's

Browne's letter, recorded by himself, the said Warren Hastings, before them, did refuse to grant the said discretionary powers; but on the contrary, did exhort him "most sedulously and cautiously to avoid, in his "correspondence with the different Princes in India, whatever may commit, or be strained into an "interpretation of committing, the Company, either "as to their army or treasure;" observing, "that the "Company's orders are positive against their interference in the objects of dispute between the country "powers."

XII.

That in order to subvert the plain and natural interpretation given by the Council to the orders of the Court of Directors, and to justify his dangerous intrigues, the said Warren Hastings, in his letter of the 16th June 1784 to the said Court, did, in a most insolent and contemptuous manner, endeavour to persuade them of their ignorance of the true sense of their own orders, and to limit their prohibition of interference with the disputes of the country powers, to such country powers as are *permanent*; expressing himself as follows: the "faction which now surrounds the throne [the Mogul's "throne] is widely different from the idea which your "commands are intended to convey by the expressions "to which you have generally applied them of *country powers*, to which that of *permanency is a necessary* "*adjunct*; and which may be more properly compared to a splendid bubble, which the slightest breath "of opposition may dissipate, with every trace of its "existence." By which construction the said Hastings did endeavour to persuade the Court of Directors, that they meant to confine their prohibition of sinister intrigues to those powers only who could not be easily hurt by them, and whose strength was such that their resentment of such clandestine interference was to be dreaded; but that where the powers were weak and fragile such intrigues might be allowed.

XIII. That

XIII.

That the ſaid Haſtings, further to perſuade the Court of Directors to involve themſelves in the affairs of the Mogul, and to reconcile this meaſure with his former conduct, and declared opinions did write to them to the following effect; that "at that former "period, to which the ancient policy with regard to "the Mogul applied, the King's authority was ſuffici- "ently reſpected [which he knew not to be true, hav- "ing himſelf declared, in his minute of the 25th "of October 1774, "That he remained at Delhi, "the ancient capital of the empire, a *mere cypher* in the "adminiſtration of it"] to maintain itſelf againſt com- "mon viciſſitudes. That he would not have adviſed "interference, if the King himſelf retained the exerciſe "of it, *however feeble*, in his own hands. That if it "[the Mogul's authority] is ſuffered to receive its "final extinction, it is impoſſible to foreſee *what power* "*may ariſe out of its ruins*, or what events may be "linked in the ſame chain of revolution with it: "But your intereſts *may* ſuffer by it—your reputation "*certainly will*, as his right to our aſſiſtance has *been* "*conſtantly acknowledged*, and by a train of conſe- "quences, to which our government has, not inten- "tionally, given birth; but moſt eſpecially by the "movements which *its influence, by too near an ap-* "*proach*, has excited, it has unfortunately become the "efficient inſtrument of a great portion of the King's "preſent diſtreſſes and dangers;" intimating (as well as the ſtudied obſcurity of his expreſſions will permit any thing to be diſcerned) that his own late intrigues had been among the cauſes of the diſtreſſes and dangers, which by new intrigues he did pretend to remove: And he did conclude this part of his letter with ſome looſe general expreſſions of his caution not to affect the Company's intereſts or revenues by any meaſures he might at that time take.

XIV.

That the principle, so far as the same hath been directly avowed, of the said proceedings at the Mogul's Court, was as altogether irrational, and the pretended object as impracticable, as the means taken in pursuit of it were fraudulent and dishonourable, namely, the restoration of the Mogul in some degree to the dignity of his situation, and to his free agency in the conduct of his affairs. For the said Hastings, at the very time in which he did with the greatest apparent earnestness urge the purpose which he pretended to have in view with regard to the dignity and liberty of the Mogul Emperor, did represent him as a person wholly disqualified, and even indisposed to take any active part whatsoever in the conduct of his own affairs; and that any attempt for that purpose would be utterly impracticable: And this he hath stated to the Court of Directors as a matter of public notoriety, in his said letter of the 16th of June 1784, in the following emphatical and decisive terms.

" *You need not be told* the character of the King, " whose inertness, and the habit of long suffering, has " debased his dignity and the fortunes of his house *be-* " *yond the power of retrieving either the one or the other.* " Whilst his personal repose is undisturbed, he will " *prefer* to live in the *meanest state of indigence*, under " the rule of men whose views are bounded by avarice " and the power which they derive from his authority, " than commit any share of it to his own sons, though " his affection for them is boundless in every other " respect; from a natural jealousy, founded on the " experience of a very different combination of those " circumstances which once served as a temptation and " example of unlawful ambition in the Princes of the " royal line. His Ministers, from a policy more rea- " sonable, have constantly employed every means of " influence to confirm this disposition, and to prevent " his sons from having any share in the distribution of " affairs, so as to have established a complete usurpa-

" tion

" tion of the royal prerogative under its own ſanction " and patronage."

XV.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings having given this opinion of the Sovereign for whoſe freedom he pretended ſo anxious a concern, did deſcribe the miniſter, with whom he had long acted in concurrence, and from whom he had juſt received the extraordinary ſecret embaſſy aforeſaid, for the purpoſe of effecting the deliverance of his maſter the Mogul from the uſurpations of *his miniſters*, as follows;—" The firſt miniſter, Mudjud " ul Dowla, is *totally* deficient in every military quali- " ty; conceited of his own ſuperior talents; and formed " to the practice of *that crooked policy, which generally* " *defeats its own purpoſe*, but ſincerely attached to his " maſter." The reality of the ſaid attachment was not only improbable but altogether uſeleſs; as the ſaid miniſter was the only one among the principal perſons about the King, who (beſides the total want of all military and civil ability) poſſeſſed no territories, troops, or other means of ſerving and ſupporting him; but was himſelf ſolely upheld by his influence over his maſter; neither doth the ſaid Haſtings free him any more than the perſons more deficient, who were to be deſtroyed, from a diſpoſition to alienate the King from an attention to his affairs, and from all confidence in his own family, but on the contrary, he brings him forward as the very firſt among the inſtances he adduces to exemplify the practices of the Miniſters againſt their Sovereign and his children.

XVI.

That the ſaid Waren Haſtings, recommending in general terms, and yet condemning in detail, every part of his own pretended plan, as impracticable in itſelf, and as undertaken in favour of perſons all of whom he deſcribes as incapable, and the principal as indiſpoſed to avail himſelf thereof, muſt have had ſome other motives for this long, intricate, dark, and laborious pro-

ceeding with the Mogul, which must be sought in his actions, and the evident drift and tendency thereof, and in declarations which were brought out by him to serve other purposes, but which serve fully to explain his real intentions in this intrigue.

XVII.

That the other members of the Council General having abundantly certified their averseness to his intrigues, and even having shewn apprehensions of his going personally to the Mogul and Mahrattas, for the purpose of carrying on the same, the said Hastings was driven headlong to acts which did much more openly indicate the true nature and purpose of his machinations: For he at length recurred directly, and with little disguise to the Mahrattas, and did open an intrigue with them, although he was obliged to confess in his letter aforesaid, of the 16th June 1784, that the exception which he contended to be implied in the orders of the Court of Directors, forbidding the intermeddling in the disputes of "the country powers," namely that of "powers not "permanent," did by no means apply to the Mahrattas: For he informs the Court of Directors that he did, on the very first advice he received of the flight of the Mogul's son, write to Mr. James Anderson to apprize the Mahratta chief Scindia of that event; "for which, "as he was unprepared, he desired his [the said Scin-"dia's] advice for his conduct on the occasion of it." Which method of calling for the advice of a foreign power to regulate his political conduct, instead of being regulated therein by the advice of the British Council, and the standing orders of the Court of Directors, was a procedure highly criminal; and the crime is aggravated by his not communicating the said correspondence to the Council General, as by his duty he was bound to do; but it does abundantly prove his concert with the Mahrattas in all that related to his negociations in the Mogul Court, which were carried on agreeably to their advice, and in subserviency to their views and purposes.

XVIII. That

XVIII.

That in consequence of the cabal begun with the Mahrattas, the said Chief Scindia did send his "familiar and confidential Ministers" to him the said Hastings, being at Lucknow, with whom the said Hastings did hold several secret conferences, without any secretary or other assistant; and the said Hastings hath not conveyed to the Court of Directors any minutes thereof, but hath purposely involved even the general effect and tendency of these conferences in such obscurity, that it is no otherwise possible to perceive the drift and tendency of the same, but by the general scope of councils and acts relative to the politics of the Mogul and of the Mahrattas together, and by the final event of the whole, which is sufficiently visible. For

XIX.

That the said Hastings had declared, in his said letter of the 16th June, 1784, that the Mogul's right to our assistance had been constantly acknowledged; that the Mogul had been oppressed by the lesser Mahomedan Princes, in the character of his officers of state, and military commanders; and he did plainly intimate that the said Mogul ought to be relieved from that servitude. And he did, in giving an account to the Court of Directors of the conferences aforesaid, assure them that "his inclinations [the inclinations of the "Mahratta chief aforesaid] were not very dissimilar "from his own;" and that "neither in this, nor in "any other instance, would he suffer himself to be "drawn into measures which shall tend to weaken "their connexion, nor *in this even to oppose his* [the "said Chief's] *inclinations*;" the said Hastings well knowing, as in his letter to Colonel Muir of the he has confessed, that the inclinations of the said Scindia were to seize on the Mogul's territories, and that he himself did secretly concur therein, though he did not formally insert his concurrence in the treaty with the said Mahratta Chief. It is plain therefore that

that he did all along concur with the Mahrattas in their deſigns againſt the ſaid King and his Miniſters, under the treacherous pretence of ſupporting the authority of the former againſt the latter; and did contrive and effect the ruin of them all:—For, firſt, he did give evil and fraudulent counſel to the heir apparent of the Mogul "to make advances to the "Mahrattas," when he well knew, and had expreſsly concurred in, the deſigns of that ſtate againſt his father's [the Mogul's] dominions; and farther to engage and entrap the ſaid Prince, did aſſert that "our go-"vernment," [meaning the Britiſh government] "was "in intimate and ſworn connexion with Madajee "Scindia," when no alliance offenſive or defenſive appears to exiſt between the ſaid Scindia and the Eaſt India Company, nor can exiſt, otherwiſe than in virtue of ſome ſecret agreement between him the ſaid Scindia and Warren Haſtings, entered into by the latter without the knowledge of his colleagues, and the government, and never communicated to the Court of Directors: And, ſecondly, he did, in order to further the deſigns of the Mahrattas, contrive and effect the ruin of the ſaid Mogul and his authority, by ſetting on foot, through the aforeſaid Major Browne, ſundry perplexed and intricate negociations, contrary to public faith, and to the honour of the Britiſh nation; by which he did exceedingly encreaſe the confuſion and diſorders of the Mogul's Court, expoſing the ſaid Mogul to new indignities, inſults, and diſtreſſes, and almoſt all of the northern parts of India to great and ruinous convulſions, until three out of four of the principal chieftains, ſome of them poſſeſſing the territories lately belonging to Nudjiff Cawn, and maintaining among them eighty thouſand troops of horſe and foot, and ſome of which chiefs were the Miniſters aforeſaid, being cut off by their mutual diſſenſions, and the fort of Delhi being at length delivered to the Mahrattas, the ſaid Scindia became the uncontrouled ruler of the royal army; and the perſon of the Mogul, with the uſe of all his pretenſions and claims, fell into the hands of a nation already too powerful, together with

with an extenſive territory, which entirely covers the Company's poſſeſſions and dependencies on one ſide, and particularly thoſe of the Nabob of Oude.

XX.

That the circumſtances of theſe countries did, in the opinion of the ſaid Warren Haſtings himſelf, ſufficiently indicate to him the neceſſity of not aggrandizing any power whatſoever on their borders, he having, in the aforeſaid letter of the 16th June, given a deliberate opinion of the ſituation of Oude, in the words following: "That whilſt we are at peace with the powers "of Europe it is only in this quarter that your poſ-"ſeſſions, under the government of Bengal, are vul-"nerable." And he did farther in the ſaid letter ſtate, that, "if things had continued as they had been to "that time, with a divided government," [viz. the Company's and the Vizier's, which government he had himſelf eſtabliſhed, and under which it ever muſt in a great degree remain, whilſt the ſaid country continues in a ſtate of dependence] "the *ſlighteſt* ſhock from a "foreign hand, or even an *accidental internal commotion*, "might have thrown the whole into confuſion, and "produced the moſt fatal conſequences." In this perilous ſituation he made the above-recited ſacrifices to the ambition of the Mahrattas, and did all along ſo actively countenance and forward their proceedings, and with ſo full a ſenſe of their effect, that in his minute of the 24th December 1784 he has declared, "that in the countries which border on the dominions "of the Nabob Vizier, or on that quarter of our own, "in effect *there is no other power*." And he did further admit, that the preſence of the Mahratta Chief aforeſaid, ſo near the borders of the Nabob's dominions, was no cauſe of ſuſpicion; for, "that it is the effect "*of his own ſolicitation*, and is *ſo far* the effect of an "act of that government."

XXI. That

XXI.

That in further purſuit of the ſame pernicious deſign, he the ſaid Warren Haſtings did enter into an agreement to withdraw a very great body of the Britiſh troops out of the Nabob's dominions; aſſerting, however truly, yet in direct contradiction to his own declarations, that "this government [meaning the "Britiſh government] has not any right to force de-"fence with its maintenance upon him" [the Nabob]; and he did thus not only avowedly aggrandize the Mahratta State, and weaken the defence upon the frontier, but did as avowedly detain their Captain General in force on that very frontier; notwithſtanding he was well apprized, that they had deſigns againſt thoſe dependant territories of Oude, which they had with great difficulty been perſuaded even in appearance to include in the treaty of peace; and that they have never renounced their claims upon certain large and valuable portions of them, and have ſhewn evident ſigns of their intentions, on the firſt opportunity, of aſſerting and enforcing them. And, finally, the ſaid Warren Haſtings, in contradiction to ſundry declarations of his own, concerning the neceſſity of curbing the power of the Mahrattas, and to the principle of ſundry meaſures undertaken by himſelf profeſſedly for that purpoſe, and to the ſenſe of the Houſe of Commons, expreſſed in their reſolution of 28th May 1782, againſt any meaſures that tended to unite the dangerous powers of the Mahratta empire under one active command, has endeavoured to perſuade the Company, that "while Scindia lives, every acceſſion of territory "obtained by him will be an advantage to this [the "Britiſh] government;" which, if it was true as reſpecting the perſonal diſpoſitions of Scindia, which there is no reaſon to believe, yet it was highly criminal to eſtabliſh a power in the Mahrattas, which muſt ſurvive the man in confidence of whoſe perſonal diſpoſitions a power more than perſonal was given, and which may hereafter fall into hands diſpoſed to make a more hoſtile uſe of it.

XXII. That

XXII.

That in conſequence of all the before-recited intrigues, the Mogul Emperor being in the hands of the Mahrattas, he the ſaid Mogul has been obliged to declare the head of the Mahratta State to be Vicegerent of the Mogul Empire, an authority which ſuperſedes that of Vizier, and has thereby conſolidated in the Mahratta State all the powers acknowledged to be of legal authority in India; in conſequence of which they have acquired, and have actually already attempted to uſe, the ſaid claims of general ſuperiority againſt the Company itſelf; the Mahrattas claiming a right in themſelves to a fourth part of the revenues of all the provinces in the Company's poſſeſſion, and claiming in right of the Mogul the tribute due to him; by which actings and doings the ſaid Haſtings has to the beſt of his power brought the Britiſh provinces in India into a dependence on the Mahratta State; and in order to add to the aforeſaid enormous claims a proportioned force, he did never ceaſe, during his ſtay in India, to contrive the means for its encreaſe: For it is of public notoriety, that one great object of the Mahratta policy is to unite under their dominion the nation or religious ſect of the Seiks, who being a people abounding with ſoldiers, and poſſeſſing large territories, would extend the Mahratta power over the whole of the vaſt countries to the north weſt of India.

XXIII.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings, farther to augment the power of the ſaid Mahrattas, and to endanger the ſafety of the Britiſh poſſeſſions, having eſtabliſhed in force the ſaid Mahrattas on the frontier, as afore recited, and finding the Council General averſe in that ſituation to the withdrawing the Britiſh forces therefrom, and for diſbanding them to the extent required by the ſaid Haſtings, did in a minute of the 4th December 1784, after ſtating a ſuppoſition, that, con-

trary to his opinion, the ſaid troops ſhould not be reduced, propoſe to employ them under the command of the Mogul's Son, then under the influence of the Mahrattas, in a war againſt the aforeſaid people or religious ſect called Seiks defending the ſame on the following principles: "I feel the ſenſe of an obligation "impoſed on me by the ſuppoſition I have made to "ſtate a mode of rendering the detachment of uſe in "its preſcribed ſtation, and of affording the *appearance* "of a cauſe for its retention."

XXIV.

That the ſaid Haſtings did admit, that there was no preſent danger to the Company's poſſeſſions from that nation, which could juſtify him in ſuch a war, as he had declared that the Mahrattas were the *only power* that bordered on the Company's poſſeſſions and thoſe of the Vizier; but he did aſſign, as a reaſon for going to war with them, their military and enthuſiaſtic ſpirit; the hardineſs of their natural conſtitution; the dangers which might ariſe from them in ſome future time; if they ſhould ever happen to be united under one head, they exiſting at preſent in a ſtate little different from anarchy; and he did predict great danger from them and at no very remote period, "if this "people be permitted to grow into maturity with-"out interruption." And though he doth pretend, that the ſolicitations of the heir apparent of the Mogul, who he ſays did repeatedly and earneſtly ſolicit him to obtain the permiſſion to uſe the Company's troops for the purpoſe aforeſaid, had weight with him; yet he doth declare, as he expreſſes himſelf in the minute aforeſaid, that "a *ſtronger impulſe*, ariſing from the "hope of *blaſting the growth* of a generation whoſe "ſtrength *might* become fatal to our own, ſtrongly "pleaded in my mind for ſupporting his wiſhes."

XXV. That

XXV.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings, after forcibly recommending the plan aforeſaid, did ſtate ſtrong objections, that did, "in his judgment, outweigh the "advantages which might ariſe from a compliance "with it." Yet the ſaid Haſtings, being determined to purſue his ſcheme for aggrandizing, at any rate, the Mahratta power, in whoſe adult growth, and the recent effects of it, he could ſee no danger, did purſue the deſign of war againſt a nation or ſect of religion in its infancy, from whom he had received no injury, and in whoſe preſent ſtate of government he did not apprehend any miſchief whatſoever: And finding the Council fixed and determined on not diſbanding the frontier regiments, and thinking that therein he had found an advantage, he did ground thereon the following propoſition.

"If the expence [of the frontier troops] is to be "continued, it may be ſurely better continued for "ſome uſeful purpoſe, than to keep up the parade "of a great military corps, deſigned merely to lie "inactive in its quarters. On this ground therefore, "and on the ſuppoſition premiſed, I revert to my "original ſentiments in favour of the Prince's plan; "but as this will require ſome qualification in the "execution of it, I will ſtate my recommendation of "it in the terms of a propoſition, viz. That if it ſhall "be the reſolution of the Board to continue the de-"tachment now under the command of Colonel Sir "John Cumming at Furruckabad; and if the Prince "Mirza Jehander Shah ſhall apply, *with the authority "of the King and the concurrence of Madajee Scindia*, for "the aſſiſtance of an Engliſh military force to act in "conjunction with him, to expel the Sics from the "territories of which they have lately poſſeſſed them-"ſelves in the neighbourhood of Delhi, it may be "granted, and ſuch a portion of the ſaid detachment "allotted to that ſervice as ſhall be hereafter judged "adequate to it."

XXVI.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings did, in the ſaid propoſal, endeavour to circumvent and over-reach the Council General, by converting an apparent and literal compliance with their reſolution into a real and ſubſtantial oppoſition to and diſappointment thereof. For his firſt propoſal was to withdraw the Company's troops from the Vizier's country, on the pretence of relieving him from the burthen of that eſtabliſhment, but in reality with a view of facilitating the Mahratta pretenſions on that province, which would then be deprived of the means of defence. And when the Council rejected the ſaid propoſal, on the expreſs ground of danger to the province, by withdrawing from the Mahrattas the reſtraint of our troops, the ſaid Haſtings, finding his firſt ſcheme in favour of the Mahrattas, againſt the provinces dependant on the Company, defeated, by the refuſal of the Council to concur in the ſaid meaſure of withdrawing the troops, did then endeavour to obtain the ſame purpoſe in a different way; and inſtead of leaving the troops, according to the intention and policy of the Council, as a check to the ambition and progreſs of the Mahrattas, he propoſed to employ them in the actual furtherance of thoſe ſchemes of aggrandizement, of which his colleagues were jealous, and which it was the object of their reſolution to counteract.

XXVII.

That in the whole of the letters, negociations, propoſals, and projects of the ſaid Warren Haſtings, relative to the Mogul, he did appear to purſue but one object, namely, the aggrandizement of the lately hoſtile and always dangerous power of the Mahrattas; and did purſue the ſame by means highly diſhonourable to the Britiſh character for honour, juſtice, candour, plain dealing, moderation, and humanity.

No. XIX.

LIBEL ON THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

I.

THAT Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, was, during the whole of the year 1783, a ſervant of the Eaſt India Company, and was bound by the duties of that relation, not only to yield obedience to the orders of the Court of Directors, but to give to the whole of their ſervice an example of ſubmiſſion, reverence, and reſpect to their authority: And that if they ſhould, in the courſe of their duty, call in queſtion any part of his conduct, he was bound to conduct his defence with temper and decency; and while his conduct was under their conſideration, it was not allowable to print and publiſh any of his letters to them, without their conſent firſt had and obtained; and he was bound by the ſame principles of duty, enforced by ſtill more cogent reaſons, to obſerve, in a paper intended for publication, great modeſty and moderation, and to treat the ſaid Court of Directors, his lawful maſters, with reſpect.

II.

That the ſaid Warren Haſting did print and publiſh, or cauſed to be printed and publiſhed, at Calcutta in Bengal, the narrative of his tranſactions at Benares, * in a letter written at that place, without leave had of of the Court of Directors, in order to pre-occupy the judgment of the ſervants in that ſettlement, and to gain from them a factious countenance and ſupport, previous to the judgment and opinion of the Court of Directors, his lawful ſuperiors.

* See Mr. Haſtings' Narrative of the Inſurrection at Benares, printed for J. Debrett.

III. That

III.

That the Court of Directors, having come to certain resolutions of fact relative to the engagements subsisting between them and the Rajah of Benares, and the manner in which the same had been fulfilled on the part of the Rajah, did, in the Fifth Resolution, which was partly a Resolution of opinion, declare as follows: "That it appears to this Court, that the "conduct of the Governor General towards the Ra-"jah, whilst he was at Benares, was improper; and "that the imprisonment of his person, thereby dis-"gracing him in the eyes of his subjects, and others, "was unwarrantable and highly impolitic, and may "tend to weaken the confidence which the native "princes of India ought to have in the justice and "moderation of the Company's Government."

IV.

That the said Resolutions being transmitted to the said Warren Hastings, he, the said Warren Hastings, did write, and cause to be printed and published, a certain false, insolent, malicious, and seditious libel, purporting to be a letter from him, the said Warren Hastings, to the Court of Directors, dated Fort William, 20th March 1783, "calculated [as the Direc-"tors truly affirm] to bring contempt, as well as an "odium, on the Court of Directors for their conduct "on that occasion;" and the said libel had a direct tendency to excite a spirit of disobedience to the lawful government of this nation in India, through all ranks of their service.

V.

That he, the said Warren Hastings, among other insolent and contumacious charges and aspersions on the Court of Directors, did address them in the printed letter aforesaid, as follows:—"I deny that Rajah "Cheit Sing was a native prince of India. Cheit Sing "is

" is the ſon of a collector of the revenue of that pro-
" vince, which his arts, and the misfortunes of his
" maſter, enabled him to convert to a permanent and
" hereditary poſſeſſion. This man, whom *you have thus*
" *ranked among the princes* of India, will be aſtoniſhed,
" when he hears it, at an elevation ſo unlooked for;
" nor leſs at the independent rights which *your* com-
" mands have aſſigned him; rights which are ſo *foreign*
" *to his conceptions, that I doubt whether he will know in*
" *what language to aſſert them*; *unleſs* the example which
" *you have thought it conſiſtent with juſtice, however op-*
" *poſite to policy, to ſhew, of becoming his advocates againſt*
" *your own intereſts, ſhould inſpire any of your own ſervants*
" *to be his adviſers and inſtructors.*" And he did fur-
ther, to bring into contempt the authority of the Com-
pany, and to excite a reſiſtance to their lawful orders,
frame a ſuppoſition, that the Court of Directors had
intended the reſtoration of the Rajah of Benares; and
on that ground did preſume, in the ſaid libel, to
calumniate, in diſreſpectful and contumelious terms,
the policy of the Court of Directors, as well as the
perſon whom he did conceive to be the object of their
protection, as followeth:—" Of the conſequences of
" ſuch a policy, I forbear to ſpeak. *Moſt happily, the*
" *wretch whoſe hopes may be excited by the appearances in*
" *his favour, is ill qualified to avail himſelf of them,* and
" the *force which is ſtationed in the province of Benares*
" *is ſufficient to ſuppreſs any ſymptoms of internal ſedition*;
" but it cannot fail to create diſtruſt and ſuſpenſe in
" the minds both of the rulers and of the people, and
" ſuch a ſtate is always productive of diſorder. But it
" is not in this partial conſideration that I dread the
" effects of your commands, it is in your proclaimed
" indiſpoſition againſt the firſt executive member of
" your firſt government in India. I almoſt ſhudder at
" the reflection of what might have happened, had
" theſe denunciations againſt your own miniſter, in
" favour of a man univerſally conſidered, in this part
" of the world, as juſtly attainted for his crimes, the
" murderer of your ſervants and ſoldiers, and the
" rebel

" rebel to your authority, arrived two months " earlier."

VI.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings did alſo preſume to cenſure and aſperſe the Court of Directors for the moderate terms in which they had expreſſed their diſpleaſure againſt him, as putting him under the neceſſity of ſtating in his defence a ſtrong accuſation againſt himſelf; and as implying in the ſaid Court a conſciouſneſs that he was not guilty of the offences charged upon him, being, as he aſſerts, in the reſolutions of the Court of Directors, " arraigned and pre-judged " of a *violation of national faith, in acts of ſuch complicat-* " *ed aggravation*, that, *if they were true*, no puniſh- " ment *SHORT OF DEATH* could atone for the " injury which the intereſt and credit of the public " had ſuſtained in them:" And he did therefore cenſure the ſaid Court, for applying no ſtronger, or more criminating epithets, than thoſe of " improper, " unwarrantable, and highly impolitic," to an offence ſo by them charged, and by him deſcribed. And though it be true, that the expreſſions aforeſaid are much too reſerved for the purpoſe of duly characteriſing the offences of the ſaid Haſting, yet was it in *him* moſt indecent, to libel the Court of Directors for the ſame; and his implication, from the tenderneſs of the epithets and deſcriptions aforeſaid uſed towards him, was not only indecent, but ungrounded, malicious, and ſcandalous; he having himſelf highly, though truly, aggravated " the charge of the injuries done " by him to the Rajah of Benares," in order to bring the ſaid Directors into contempt and ſuſpicion; the paragraphs in the ſaid libel being as follows: " Here " I muſt crave leave to ſay, that the terms 'impro- " per, unwarrantable, and highly impolitic,' are " much too gentle, as deductions from ſuch pre- " miſes; and as every reader of the latter will obvi- " ouſly feel, as he reads, the deductions which ine- " vitably belong to them, I will add that the ſtrict per-

" formance

" formance of ſolemn engagements on one part, fol-
" lowed by acts directly ſubverſive of them, and by
" total diſpoſſeſſion, on the other, ſtamps on the per-
" petrators of the latter the guilt of the greateſt poſ-
" ſible violation of faith and juſtice."—" There is
" an appearance of tenderneſs in this deviation from
" plain conſtruction, of which, however meant, I
" have a right to complain; becauſe it impoſes on
" me the neceſſity of framing the terms of the accuſa-
" tion againſt myſelf, which you have only not made,
" but have ſtated the leading arguments to it ſo ſtrong-
" ly, that no one who reads theſe can avoid making it,
" *or not know it to have been intended.*"

VII.

That the ſaid Haſtings, being well aware that his own declarations did contain the cleareſt condemnation of his own conduct from his own pen, did, in the ſaid libel, attempt to overturn, fruſtrate, and render of none effect, all the proofs to be given of prevarication, contradiction, and of oppoſition of action to principle, which can be uſed againſt men in public truſt, and did contend that the ſame could not be uſed againſt him; and as if falſe aſſertions could be juſtified by factious motives, he did endeavour to do away the authority of his own *deliberate*, *recorded* declarations, entered by him *in writing* on the Council books of the preſidency; for, after aſſerting, *but not attempting to prove*, that his declarations were conſiſtent with his conduct, he writes in the ſaid libel as follows: For
" were it otherwiſe, they were not to be made the
" rules of my conduct; and God forbid that every
" expreſſion dictated by the impulſe of preſent emer-
" gency, and unpremeditately uttered in the heat of
" party contention, ſhould impoſe upon me the obli-
" gation of a fixed principle, and be applied to every
" variable occaſion."

VIII.

That the ſaid Haſtings, in order to draw the lawful dependence of the ſervants of the Company from the Court of Directors, to a factious dependence on himſelf; did, in the libel aforeſaid, treat the acts and appointments of their undoubted authority, when exerciſed in oppoſition to his arbitrary will, as ruinous to their affairs, in the following terms: "It is as well "known to the Indian world, as to the Court of En- "gliſh proprietors, that the firſt declaratory inſtru- "ments of the diſſolution of my influence, in the "year 1774, were Mr. John Briſtow and Mr. Fran- "c's Fowke: By your ancient and known conſtitution, "the Governor has been ever held forth, and under- "ſtood to poſſeſs the oſtenſible powers of Govern- "ment; all the correſpondence with foreign princes "is conducted in his name; and every perſon reſident "with them for the management of your political con- "cerns, is underſtood to be *more eſpecially his* repre- "ſentative, and of *his* choice—and ſuch ought to be "the rule; for how otherwiſe can they truſt an agent, "nominated againſt the will of *his* principal? When "the ſtate of this adminiſtration was ſuch as ſeemed "to *admit of* the appointment of Mr. Briſtow to the "reſidency of Lucknow, without *much* diminution "of *my own* influence, I gladly ſeized the occaſion to "ſhew my readineſs to ſubmit to your commands: "I propoſed his nomination; he was nominated, "and declared to *be the agent of my own choice.* Even "this effect of my caution *is defeated by your abſolute "command for his re-appointment independent of me, and "with the ſuppoſition that I ſhould be adverſe to it.*—I am "now wholly deprived of my official powers, both "in the Province of Oude, and in the Zemindarry of "Benares."

IX.

That, further to emancipate others and himſelf from due obedience to the Court of Directors, he did, in the

the libel aforesaid, enhance his services; which, without specification or proof, he did suppose in the said libel to be important and valuable, by representing them as done under their displeasure; and doth attribute his not having done more, to their opposition, as followeth :—" It is now a complete period of eleven " years since I first received the first nominal charge of " your affairs; in the course of it I have *invariably* " had to contend, not with ordinary difficulties, but " such as most *unnaturally* arose *from the opposition of* " *those very powers from which I primarily derived my au-* " *thority, and which were required for the support it.* " My exertions, though applied to an unvaried and " consistent line of action, have been occasional and " desultory; yet I please myself with the hope, that " in the annals of your dominion, which shall be writ- " ten after the extinction of recent prejudices, this " term of its administration will appear not the least " conducive to the interests of the Company, nor the " least reflective of the honour of the British name; " and allow me to suggest the instructive reflection of " *what good might have been done, and what evil prevent-* " *ed, had due support been given to that administration* " *which has performed such eminent and substantial services* " *without it.*"

And the said Hastings, farther to render the authority of the said Court perfectly comtemptible, doth, in a strain of exultation for his having escaped out of a measure, in which by his guilt he had involved the Company in a ruinous war, and out of which it had escaped by a sacrifice of almost all the territories before acquired (from that enemy which he had made) either by war, or former treaties, and by the abandoning the Company's Allies to their mercy; attribute the said supposed services to his acting in such a manner as had on former occasions excited their displeasure, in the following words :

" Pardon, honourable Sirs, this digressive exulta- " tion; I cannot suppress the pride which I feel in

" this ſucceſsful atchievement of a meaſure ſo fortu-
" nate for your intereſts, and the national honour;
" for that pride is the ſource of my zeal, ſo frequently
" exerted in your ſupport, and never more happily
" than in thoſe inſtances *in which I have departed from*
" *the preſcribed and beaten path of action, and aſſumed a*
" *reſponſibility which has too frequently drawn on me the*
" *moſt pointed effects of your diſpleaſure.* But however I
" may yield to my private feelings, in thus enlarging
" on the ſubject, my motive in introducing it was
" immediately connected with its context, and was to
" contraſt *the actual ſtate of your political affairs, derived*
" *from a happier influence, with that which might have*
" *attended an earlier diſſolution of it :*" And he did value himſelf upon " the *patience* and temper with which he " had ſubmitted to all the indignities which have been " heaped upon him [meaning by the ſaid Court of " Directors] in this long ſervice:" And he did inſolently attribute to an unuſual ſtrain of zeal for their ſervice, that he "*perſevered* in the VIOLENT MAINTENANCE OF HIS OFFICE."

X.

That in order further to excite the ſpirit of diſobedience in the Company's Servants, to the lawful authority ſet over them, he the ſaid Warren Haſtings did treat contemptuouſly and ironically the ſuppoſed diſpoſition of the Company's ſervants to obey the orders of the Court of Directors, in the words following: " The recall of Mr. Markham, who was known to be " the public agent of my own nomination at Benares, " and the re-appointment of Mr. Francis Fowke, by " your order, contained in the ſame letter, would place " it [the reſtoration of Cheit Sing] beyond a doubt. " *This order has been obeyed; and whenever you ſhall be* " *pleaſed to order the reſtoration of Cheit Sing, I will* " *venture to promiſe the ſame ready and exact ſubmiſſion in* " *the other members of the Council :*" And he did, in the poſtſcript of the ſaid letter, and as on recollection, endeavour to make a reparation of honour to his ſaid colleagues,

colleagues, as if his expreſſions aforeſaid had ariſen from animoſity to them, as follows: "Upon a careful reviſal of what I have written, I fear that an expreſſion which I have uſed, reſpecting the probable conduct of the Board, in the event of orders being received for the reſtoration of Cheit Sing, may be conſtrued as intimating a ſenſe of diſſatisfaction, applied to tranſactions already paſt.—It is not my intention to complain of any one."

XI.

That the ſaid Haſtings, in the acts of injury aforeſaid to the Rajah of Benares, did aſſume and arrogate to himſelf an illegal authority therein, and did maintain that the acts done in conſequence of that meaſure were not revocable by any ſubſequent authority, in the following words: "If you ſhould proceed to order the reſtoration of Cheit Sing to the Zemindarry, from which, *by the powers which I legally poſſeſſed*, and conceive myſelf legally *bound to aſſert* againſt any *ſubſequent authority to the contrary*, derived from the *ſame common ſource*, he was diſpoſſeſſed for crimes of the greateſt enormity, and your Council ſhall reſolve to execute the order, I will inſtantly give up my ſtation, and the ſervice."

XII.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings did attempt to juſtify his publication of the ſaid libellous letter, to and againſt the Court of Directors, by aſſerting therein, that theſe reſolutions [meaning the reſolutions of the Court of Directors, relative to the Rajah of Benares] "were *either* publiſhed, or *intended* for publication;" evidently proving, that he did take this unwarrantable courſe without any ſufficient aſſurance that the ground and motive by him aſſigned, had any exiſtence.

No. XX.

MARATTA WAR, and PEACE.

I.

THAT by an Act, paſſed in 1773, it was expreſsly ordered and provided, "That it ſhould not be "lawful for any Preſident and Council of Madras, "Bombay, or Bencoolen, for the time being, to make "any orders for commencing hoſtilities, or declaring "or making war, againſt any Indian princes or "powers, or for negociating or concluding any treaty "of peace, or other treaty, with any ſuch Indian "princes or powers, without the conſent and appro-"bation of the Governor General and Council firſt "had and obtained, except in ſuch caſes of *imminent* "*neceſſity* as would render it dangerous to poſtpone "ſuch hoſtilities or treaties until the orders from the "Governor General and Council might arrive."—That nevertheleſs the Preſident and Council of Bombay did, in December 1774, without the conſent and approbation of the Governor General and Council of Fort William, and in the midſt of profound peace, commence an unjuſt and unprovoked war againſt the Maratta Government; did conclude a treaty with a certain perſon, a fugitive from that government, and proſcribed by it, named Ragonaut Row, or Ragoba; and did, under various baſe and treacherous pretences, invade and conquer the iſland of Salſette, belonging to the Maratta Government.

II. That

II.

That Warren Haſtings, on the firſt advices received in Bengal of the above tranſactions, did condemn the ſame in the ſtrongeſt terms; declaring that (*a*) "the "meaſures adopted by the preſidency of Bombay had "a tendency to a very extenſive and indefinite ſcene "of troubles; and that their conduct was unſeaſon-"able, impolitic, unjuſt, and unauthorized."—And the Governor General and Council, in order to put a ſtop to the ſaid unjuſt hoſtilities, did appoint an Ambaſſador to the Peſhwa, or Chief of the Maratta State, reſident at Poona; and the ſaid Ambaſſador did, after a long negociation, conclude a definitive treaty of peace with the ſaid Peſhwa, (*b*) on terms highly honourable and beneficial to the Eaſt India Company, who, by the ſaid treaty, obtained from the Marattas a ceſſion of conſiderable tracts of country, the Matatta ſhare of the city of Broach, twelve lacks of rupees for the expences of the ſaid unjuſt war, and particularly the iſland of Salſette, of which the Preſidency of Bombay had poſſeſſed themſelves by ſurprize and treachery; that in return for theſe extraordinary conceſſions, the articles principally inſiſted on by the Marattas, (*c*) with a view to their own future tranquillity and internal quiet, were, that *no aſſiſtance ſhould be given to any ſubject or ſervant of the Peſhwa that ſhould cauſe diſturbances, or rebellion, in the Maratta dominions*, and particularly, that the Engliſh *ſhould not aſſiſt Ragonaut Row*, (*d*) to whom the Marattas agreed to allow five lacks of Rupees a year, or a Jaghire to that amount, and that he ſhould reſide at Benares; that nevertheleſs, the Preſidency of Bombay did receive and keep Ragonaut Row at Bombay, did furniſh him with a conſiderable eſtabliſhment, and continue to carry on ſecret intrigues and negociations

(*a*) 31ſt May 1775. App. to 5th Rep. Com. of Secrecy, No. 68.
(*b*) Ditto, No. 116. 1ſt March 1776.
(*c*) App. to 6th Rep. No. 11.
(*d*) No. 11.

with

with him, thereby giving juſt ground of jealouſy and diſtruſt to the Maratta State: That the late Colonel John Upton, by whom the treaty of Poorunder was negociated and concluded, did declare to the Governor General and Council, "That while Ragonaut "Row reſides at Bombay, in expectation of being "ſupported, the Miniſters can place no confidence in "the Council there; which muſt now be productive "of the greateſt inconveniencies, and perhaps, in the "end, of fatal conſequences." (*e*) That the ſaid Warren Haſtings, concurring with his Council, which then conſiſted of Sir John Clavering, Richard Barwell, and Philip Francis, Eſquires, did, on the 18th of Auguſt 1777, declare to the Preſidency of Bombay, (*f*) that "he could ſee no reaſon to doubt that the "preſence of Ragoba at Bombay would continue to "be an *inſuperable bar* to the completion of the treaty "concluded with the Maratta Government, nor could "any ſincere cordiality and good underſtanding be "eſtabliſhed with them, as long as he ſhould appear "to derive encouragement and ſupport from the Engliſh."

III.

That Sir John Clavering died ſoon after, and that the late Edward Wheler, Eſquire, ſucceeded to a ſeat in the Supreme Council. That, on the 29th of January 1778, the Governor General and Council received a letter from the Preſidency of Bombay, dated 12th December 1777, in which they declared, "That "they had agreed to give encouragement to a *party* "formed in Ragoba's favour, and flattered themſelves "they ſhould meet with the hearty concurrence of the "Governor General and Council in the meaſures they "might be obliged to purſue in conſequence." That the *party* ſo deſcribed was ſaid to conſiſt of four principal perſons in the Maratta State, on whoſe part

(*e*) App. to 6th Report, 31ſt July 1777.
(*f*) Do. No. 12.

ſome

ſome overtures had been made to Mr. William Lewis, the Reſident of Bombay, at Poona, *for the aſſiſtance of the Company to bring Ragoba to Poona.* That the ſaid Warren Haſtings, immediately on the receipt of the preceding advices, did propoſe and carry it in Council, *(g)* by means of his caſting voice, and againſt the remonſtrances, arguments, and ſolemn proteſt of two members of the Supreme Council, that the *ſanction* of that Government ſhould be given to the plan which the Preſident and Council of Bombay had agreed to form with the Maratta Government; and alſo, that a ſupply of money (to the amount of ten lacks of rupees) ſhould be immediately granted to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, *for the ſupport of their engagements above mentioned*; and alſo, that a military force ſhould be ſent to the Preſidency of Bombay.

IV.

That, in defence of theſe Reſolutions, the ſaid Warren Haſtings did falſely pretend and affirm, *(h)* "that the "Reſolution of the Preſidency of Bombay was formed on ſuch a caſe of *imminent neceſſity*, as would have "rendered it dangerous to poſtpone the execution of "it, until the orders from the Governor General and "Council might arrive; and that the ſaid Preſidency "of Bombay *were warranted, by the treaty of Poorunder*, "*(i)* to join in a plan for conducting Ragonaut Row to "Poona, on the application of the ruling part of the "Maratta Staate;" whereas the main object of the ſaid treaty, on the part of the Marattas, and to obtain which they made many important conceſſions to the India Company, was, that the Engliſh ſhould withdraw their forces, and give no aſſiſtance to Ragoba, and that he ſhould be excluded for ever from any ſhare in their Government, being a perſon * *univerſally held in abhor-*

(g) No. 27. 2d February 1778.
(h) No. 29.
(i) No. 27.
* Vide, Mr. Watherſtone's Letter of 24th Dec. 1778. No. 170.

rence in the Maratta empire; and if it had been true (inſtead of being, as it was, notoriouſly falſe) that the *ruling part* of the adminiſtration of the Maratta State ſolicited the return of Ragonaut Row to Poona, his return, in that caſe, might have been effected by acts of their own, without the interpoſition of the Engliſh power, and without our interference in their affairs. That it was the ſpecial duty of the ſaid Warren Haſtings, derived from a ſpecial truſt repoſed in him, and power committed to him by Parliament, to have reſtrained, as by law he had authority to do, the ſubordinate Preſidency of Bombay from entering into hoſtilities with the Marattas, or from making engagements, the manifeſt tendency of which was to enter into thoſe hoſtilities, and to have put a ſtop to them, if any ſuch had been begun. That he was bound by the duty of his office to preſerve the faith of the Britiſh Government, pledged in the treaty of Poorunder, inviolate and ſacred, as well as by the ſpecial orders and inſtructions of the Eaſt India Company, (*k*) *to fix his attention to the preſervation of peace throughout India*; all which important duties the ſaid Warren Haſtings did wilfully violate, in giving the *ſanction* of the Governor General and Council to the dangerous, faithleſs, and ill-concerted projects of the Preſident and Council of Bombay, hereinbefore mentioned, from which the ſubſequent Maratta war, with all the expence, diſtreſs, and diſgraces which have attended it, took their commencement; and that the ſaid Warren Haſtings therefore is ſpecially and principally anſwerable for the ſaid war, and for all the conſequences thereof.

V.

That in a letter, dated the 20th of January 1778, (*l*) the Preſident and Council of Bombay informed the Governor General and Council, that, in conſequence of later intelligence received from Poona, they had

(*k*) 31ſt March 177
(*l*) No. 34.

immediately

immediately resolved that nothing further could be done, unless Saccaram Baboo, the principal in the late treaty [of Poorunder] *joined in making a formal application to them.* But no such application was ever made by that person. And the said Warren Hastings, finding that all this pretended ground for engaging in an invasion of the Mahratta Government had totally failed, did then pretend to give credit to, and to be greatly alarmed by the suggestions of the President and Council of Bomby, that the Mahrattas were negociating with the French, and had agreed to give them the Port of Choul, on the Malabar Coast, (*m*) and did affirm that the French *had obtained possession of that Port:* all which suggestions and assertions were false; and, if they had been true, would have furnished no just occasion for attacking either the Mahrattas or the French, with both of whom the British nation was then at peace. (*n*)

VI.

That the said Warren Hastings did then propose and carry the following resolution, in Council, against the protest of two Members thereof, that, "For the "purpose of granting you [the Presidency of Bom-"bay] the most effectual support in our power, we "have resolved to assemble a strong military force "near Calpee, the commanding officer of which is "to be ordered to march, by the most practicable "route, to Bombay, or to such other place as future "occurrences, and your directions to him, may ren-"der it expedient." And with respect to the *steps* said to be taking *by the French to obtain a settlement on the Malabar coast*, the said Warren Hastings did declare to the Presidency of Bombay, (*o*) "that it was the "opinion of the Governor General and Council that "no time ought to be lost in forming and carrying "into execution such measures as might most effec-"tually tend to frustrate such dangerous designs:"—

(*m*) No. 35, 41. (*n*) 23d Feb. 1778. No. 35. (*o*) No. 35.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings therefore, inſtead of fixing his attention to the preſervation of peace throughout India, as it was his duty to have done, did continue to abet, encourage, and ſupport the dangerous projects of the Preſidency of Bombay, and did thereby manifeſt a determined intention to diſturb the peace of India, by the unfortunate ſucceſs of which intention, and by the continued efforts of the ſaid Haſtings, the greateſt part of India has been for ſeveral years involved in a bloody and calamitous war.

VII.

That both the Court of Directors and Court of Proprietors did ſpecially inſtruct the ſaid Warren Haſtings, in all his meaſures, (*p*) "to make the ſafety and "proſperity of Bengal his principal object," and did heavily cenſure the ſaid Warren Haſtings for having employed their troops at a great diſtance from Bengal, in a war againſt the Rohillas, which the Houſe of Commons have pronounced to be *iniquitous* (*q*) and did on that occaſion expreſsly declare, "That they diſap-"proved of all ſuch diſtant expeditions, as might "eventually carry their forces to any ſituation too "remote to admit of their ſpeedy and ſafe return to "the protection of their own provinces, in caſe of "emergency." That the ſaid Warren Haſtings nevertheleſs ordered a detachment from the Bengal army to croſs the Jumna, and to proceed acroſs the peninſula, by a circuitous route, through the diamond country of Bundle Cund, and through the dominions of the Rajah of Berar, ſituated in the center of Hindoſtan, and did thereby ſtrip the provinces ſubject to the government of Fort William of a conſiderable part of their eſtabliſhed defence, and did thereby diſobey the general inſtructions, and poſitive orders of the Court of Directors (given upon occaſion of a crime of the ſame nature committed by the ſaid Haſtings) and was guilty of a high crime and miſdemeanor.

(*p*) 31ſt March 1774. (*q*) 28th May 1782. 15th Dec. 1775.

VIII. That

VIII.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings, having taken the meaſures hereinbefore deſcribed for ſupporting thoſe of the Preſidency of Bombay, did, on the 23d of March 1778, "inveſt the ſaid Preſidency with authority to "form a new alliance with Ragoba, and to engage "with him in *any* ſcheme which they ſhould deem ex- "pedient and ſafe for retrieving his affairs." (*r*) That the ſaid Haſtings was then in poſſeſſion of a letter from the Court of Directors, dated the 4th of July 1777, containing a poſitive order to the Preſidency of Bombay, in the following words: (*s*) "Though "that treaty [meaning the treaty of Poorundur] is not, "upon the whole, ſo agreeable to us as we could wiſh, "ſtill we are reſolved ſtrictly to adhere to it on our "parts. You muſt therefore be particularly vigilant, "while Ragoba is with you, to prevent him from "forming any plan againſt what is called the miniſte- "rial party at Poona; and we hereby poſitively order "you not to engage with him in any ſcheme whatever "in retrieving his affairs, without the conſent of the "Governor General and Council, or the Court of Di- "rectors." That the ſaid Ragoba neither did or could form any plan for his Reſtoration, but what was and muſt be againſt the miniſterial party at Poona, who held and exerciſed the regency of that ſtate in the infancy of the Peſhwa; and that, ſuppoſing him to have formed any other *ſcheme*, in conjunction with Bombay, *for retrieving his affairs*, the ſaid Haſtings, in giving a previous *general* authority to the Preſidency of Bombay to engage with Ragoba in *any* ſcheme for that purpoſe, without knowing what ſuch ſcheme might be, and thereby relinquiſhing and transferring to the diſcretion of a ſubordinate government, that ſuperintendance and controul over all meaſures tending to create or provoke a war, which the law had excluſively veſted in the Governor General and Council, was guilty of a high crime and miſdemeanor.

(*r*) No. 39. (*s*) Do. Parag. 65.

IX. That

IX.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings, having firſt declared that the meaſures taken by him were for the ſupport of the engagements made by the Preſidency of Bombay, in favour of Ragoba, did afterwards, when it appeared that thoſe negotiations were *entirely laid aſide*, declare (*t*) that his apprehenſion of the conſequence of a pretended *intrigue* between the Mahrattas and the French, (*u*) *was the ſole motives of all the late meaſures taken for the ſupport of the Preſidency of Bombay*; but that neither of the preceding declarations contained the true motives and objects of the ſaid Haſtings, whoſe real purpoſe, as it appeared ſo much after, (*x*) was to make uſe of the ſuperiority of the Britiſh power in India, to carry on offenſive wars, and to purſue ſchemes of conqueſt, impolitic and unjuſt in their deſign, ill-concerted in the execution, and which, as the Houſe has reſolved, (*y*) *have brought great calamities on India, and enormous expences on the Eaſt India Company.*

X.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings, on the 22d of June 1778, made the following declaration in Council: (*z*) "Much leſs can I agree that, with ſuch ſuperior advantages, as we poſſeſs over every power that dare oppoſe us, we ſhould act *merely on the defenſive.* On the contrary, if it be really true that the Britiſh arms and influence have ſuffered ſo ſevere a check in the weſtern world, it is more incumbent on thoſe, who are charged with the intereſts of Great Britain in the Eaſt, *to exert themſelves for the retrieval of the national loſs.* We have the means in our power, and, if they are not fruſtrated by our own diſſentions, I truſt that the event of this expedition will yield every advantage, *for the attainment of which it was undertaken.*" That, in purſuance of the principles avowed in the pre-

(*t*) 2d Feb. 1778. (*u*) No. 43. (*x*) 23d May 1778. No. 39.
(*y*) 28th May 1782. (*z*) No. 64.

ceding

ceding declaration, the ſaid Warren Haſtings, on the 9th of July 1778, (*a*) did propoſe, and carry it in Council, that an embaſſy ſhould be ſent from Bengal to Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar, falſely aſſerting, that the ſaid Rajah "was, by intereſt and incli-"nation, likely to join in an alliance with the Britiſh "Government; and ſuggeſting that two advantages "might be offered to him, as the inducements to it; "Firſt, the ſupport of his pretenſions to the ſovereign "power [viz. of the Maratta Empire;] Second, the "recovery of the captives made in his dominions by "Nizam Ally."

XI.

That the ſaid Haſtings, having already given full authority to the Preſidency of Bombay to engage the Britiſh faith to Ragonaut Row, to ſupport him in *his* Pretenſions to the government or to the regency of the Maratta empire, was guilty of a high crime and miſdeameanor, in propoſing to engage the ſame Britiſh faith to ſupport the pretenſions of another competitor for the ſame object; and that in offering to aſſiſt the Rajah of Berar to recover the captures made on his dominions by the Nizam, the ſaid Haſting did endeavour, as far as depended on him, to engage the Britiſh nation in a moſt unjuſt and utterly unprovoked war againſt the ſaid Nizam, between whom and the Eaſt India Company a treaty of peace and friendſhip did then ſubſiſt, unviolated on his part; notwithſtanding the ſaid Haſtings well knew that it made part of the Eaſt India Company's fundamental policy to ſupport that Prince againſt the Marattas, and to (*b*) *conſider him as one of the few remaining chiefs who were yet capable of coping with the Mahrattas*, and that it was the Company's *true intereſt to preſerve a good underſtanding with him.*

XII.

That, by holding out ſuch offers to the Rajah of Berar, the ſaid Haſtings profeſſed to hope that the Rajah *would ardently catch at the objects preſented to his am-*

(*a*) No. 68. (*b*) Gen. Letter, 30th June 1769.

bition; (*c*) and although the said Hastings did about this time lay it down as a maxim, that *there is always a greater advantage in receiving solicitations than in making advances*, (*d*) he nevertheless declared to the said Rajah, that *in the whole of his conduct he had departed from the common line of policy, and had made advances where others, in his situation*, (*e*) *would have waited for solicitation*; that the said unjust and dangerous projects did not take effect, because the Rajah of Berar refused to join or be concerned therein; yet so earnest was the said Hastings for the execution of those projects, that, in a subsequent letter (*f*) he daringly and treacherously assured the Rajah, "that, "if he had accepted of the terms offered him by Co- "lonel Goddard, and concluded a treaty with the Go- "vernment of Bengal upon them, he should have "held the obligation of it superior to that of any en- "gagement formed by the Government of Bombay, and "should have thought it his duty to maintain it, &c. "against every consideration, *even of the most valuable* "*interests and safety of the English possessions entrusted to his* "*charge*."

XIII.

That all the offers of the said Hastings were rejected with slight and contempt by the Rajah of Berar; but the same being discovered and generally known throughout India, did fill the chief of the Princes and States of India with a general suspicion and distrust of the ambitious designs and treacherous principles of the British Government; and with an universal hatred of the British nation; that the said Princes and States were thereby so thoroughly convinced of the necessity of uniting amongst themselves to oppose a power which kept no faith with any of them, and equally threatened them all, that, renouncing all former enmities against each other, they united in a common confederacy against the English; viz. the Peshwa, as representative of the

(*c*) 23d Nov. 1778. No. 153. (*d*) 7th Oct. 1778. No. 144.
(*e*) 23d Nov. 1778. No. 153. (*f*) 9th Feb. 1779. No. 173.

Mahratta

Maratta State, and Moodajee Booſla, the Rajah of Berar, that is, the principal Hindoo powers of India, on one ſide; and Hyder Ally, and the Nizam of the Decan, that is, the principal Mahomedan powers of India, on the other; and that in conſequence of this confederacy Hyder Ally invaded, over-ran, and ruined the Carnatic; and that Moodajee Booſla, inſtead *of ardently catching at the objects preſented to his ambition* by the ſaid Haſtings, ſent an army to the frontiers of Bengal; which army the ſaid Warren Haſtings was at length forced to buy off with twenty-ſix lacks of rupees, or £. 300,000 ſterling (*g*) after a ſeries of negociations with the Maratta Chiefs who commanded that army, founded and conducted on principles ſo diſhonourable to the Britiſh name and character, that the Secret Committee of the Houſe of Commons, (*h*) by whom the reſt of the proceedings in that buſineſs was reported to the Houſe, (*i*) *have, upon due conſideration, thought it proper to leave out the letter of inſtructions to Mr. Anderſon*, viz. thoſe given by the ſaid Warren Haſtings to the repreſentative of the Britiſh Government; and concerning which the ſaid Committee have reported in the following terms: (*k*) "The ſchemes of policy by which "the Governor General ſeems to have dictated the in- "ſtructions he gave to Mr. Anderſon [the gentleman "deputed] will alſo appear in this document, as well "reſpecting the particular ſucceſſion to the Rauje, as "alſo the mode of accommodating the demand of *Chout*, "the eſtabliſhment of which was apparently the great "aim of Moodajee's political manœuvres, while the "Governor General's wiſh to defeat it was avowedly "more intent on the removal of a nominal diſgrace, "than on the anxiety and reſolution to be freed from "an expenſive, if an unavoidable incumbrance."

XIV.

That while the ſaid Warren Haſtings was endeavouring to perſuade the Rajah of Berar to engage with

(*g*) 6th Report, Page 120. (*h*) January and Feb. 1781.
(*i*) No. 365. (*k*) 6th Report, Page 119.

him in a ſcheme to place the ſaid Rajah at the head of the Mahratta Empire, the Preſidency of Bombay, by virtue of the powers ſpecially veſted in them for that purpoſe by the ſaid Haſtings, did really engage with Ragonaut Row, the other competitor for the ſame object, and ſent a great part of their military force eſtabliſhed for the defence of Bombay, on an expidition with Ragonaut Row, (*l*) to invade the dominions of the Peſhwa and to take Poona, the capital thereof; that this Army being ſurrounded and overpowered by the Mahrattas was obliged to capitulate; (*m*) and then, through the moderation of the Mahrattas, was permitted to return quietly, but *very diſgracefully*, to Bombay.

XV.

That ſuppoſing the ſaid Warren Haſtings could have been juſtified in abandoning the project of reinſtating Ragonaut Row, which he at firſt authorized, and promiſed to ſupport, and in preferring a ſcheme to place the Rajah of Berar at the head of the Mahratta Empire, he was bound by his duty, as well as in juſtice to the Preſidency of Bombay, to give that Preſidency timely notice of ſuch his intention, and to have reſtrained them poſitively from reſuming their own project: that, on the contrary, the ſaid Warren Haſtings did, on the 17th of Auguſt 1778, (*n*) again *authorize* the ſaid Preſidency "to aſſiſt Ragoba with a military force to conduct him to Poona, and to eſtabliſh him in the regency there;" and, ſo far from communicating his change of plan to Bombay, did keep it concealed from that Preſidency; inſomuch that even ſo late as the 19th of Febuary 1779, William Hornby, then Governor of Bombay, declared in Council his total ignorance of the ſchemes of the ſaid Haſtings, in the following terms; (*o*) "the ſchemes of the Governor General and Council, "with regard to the Rajah of Berar, *being yet unknown*

(*l*) November 1778. (*m*) 16 January 1779. App. 130.
(*n*) Ditto 85. (*o*) App. 134.

"to

" *to us*, it is impoſſible for us to found any meaſures " on them; yet I cannot help now obſerving, that if, " as has been conjectured, the gentlemen of that Pre- " ſidency have entertained thoughts of reſtoring in his " perſon, the ancient Rajah Government, the attempt " ſeems likely to be attended with no ſmall difficul- " ty."

XVI.

That whereas the ſaid Warren Haſtings did repeatedly affirm, that it was his intention to ſupport the plan formed by the Preſidency of Bombay in favour of Ragoba, and did repeatedly authorize and encourage them to purſue it, he did, nevertheleſs, at the ſame time, in his letters and declarations to the Peſhwa, to the Nizam, and to the Rajah of Berar, falſly and perfidiouſly affirm, (*p*) *that it never was nor is deſigned by the Engliſh chiefs to give ſupport to Ragonaut Row; that he*, Haſtings, *had no idea of ſupporting Ragonaut Row; and that the detatchment he had ſent to Bombay was ſolely to awe the French, without the leaſt deſign to aſſiſt Ragonaut Row:* that, ſuppoſing it to have been the ſole *profeſſed* intention of the ſaid Haſtings, in ſending an army acroſs India to protect Bombay againſt a French invaſion, even that pretence was falſe, and uſed only to cover the real deſign of the ſaid Haſtings; viz. To engage in projects of war and conqueſt with the Rajah of Berar. That on the 11th of October 1778, he informed the ſaid Rajah (*q*) " that the detatchment would ſoon arrive " in his territories, and depend on him Moodajee Boo- " ſla, for its ſubſequent operations:" that on the 7th of December 1778, (*r*) the ſaid Haſtings revoked the powers he had before given (*s*) to the Preſidency of Bombay, over the detatchment, declaring, that the event of Colonel Goddard's negociation with the Rajah of Berar *was likely to cauſe a very ſpeedy and eſſential change in*

(*p*) Vide Letter from Moodajee Booſla, dated 5th Dec. 1778. Appendix, No. 165.
(*q*) No. 145. (*r*) No. 157. (*s*) On the 15th of Nov.

the design and operations of the detatchment; and that, on the 4th of March 1779, (*t*) the said Hastings, immediately after receiving advice of the defeat of the Bombay army near Poona, and when Bombay, if at any time, particularly required to be protected against a French invasion, did declare in Council, that he *wished for the return of the detatchment to Berar, and dreaded to hear of its proceeding to the Malabar Coast*; and therefore, if the said Hastings did not think that Bombay was in danger of being attacked by the French, he was guilty of repeated falsehoods in affirming the contrary, for the purpose of covering a criminal design; or, if he thought that Bombay was immediately threatened with that danger, he then was guilty of treachery, in ordering an army, necessary on that supposition, to the immediate defence of Bombay, to halt in Berar, to depend on the Rajah of Berar for its subsequent operations, or on the *event of a negociation* with that Prince, which, as the said Hastings declared, *was likely to cause a very speedy and essential change in the design and operations of the detatchment*; and finally in declaring that *he dreaded to hear of the said detatchment's proceeding to the Malabar coast*, whither he ought to have ordered it to proceed without delay, if, as he has solemnly affirmed, it was true that *he had been told, by the highest authority, that a powerful armament had been prepared in France, the first object of which was an attack upon Bombay; and that he knew, with moral certainty, that all the powers of the adjacent continent were ready to join the invasion.*

XVII.

That through the whole of these transactions, the said Warren Hastings has been guilty of continued falsehood, fraud, contradiction, and duplicity, highly dishonourable to the character of the British nation; that in consequence of the unjust and ill-concerted schemes of the said Hastings, the British arms, heretofore respected in India, have suffered repeated dis-

(*t*) No. 182. (*u*) 12 October 1778, No. 146.

graces,

graces, and great calamities have been thereby brought upon India; and that the ſaid Warren Haſtings, as well in exciting and promoting the late unprovoked and unjuſtifiable war againſt the Mahrattas, as in the conduct thereof, has been guilty of ſundry high crimes and miſdemeanors.

XVIII.

That by the definitive treaty of peace concluded with the Mahrattas at Poorunder on the 1ſt of March 1776, (x) the Marattas gave up all right and title to the iſland of Salſette, unjuſtly taken from them by the Preſidency of Bombay; did alſo give up to the Engliſh Company for every all right and title to their entire ſhares of the city and Pergunna of Broach; did alſo give for ever to the Engliſh Company a country of three lacks of rupees revenue, near to Broach; and did alſo agree to pay to the Company twelve lacks of rupees, in part of the expences of the Engliſh army; and that the terms of the ſaid treaty (y) *were honourable and advantageous to the India Company.*

XIX.

That Warren Haſtings having broken the ſaid treaty, and forced the Marattas into another war, by a repeated invaſion of their country, and having conducted that war in the manner herein-before deſcribed, did, on the 17th of May 1782, by the agency of Mr. David Anderſon, conclude another treaty of perpetual friendſhip and alliance with the Marattas, by which the ſaid Haſtings agreed to deliver up to them all the countries, places, cities, and forts, particularly the iſland of Baſſein (taken from the Peſhwa, during the war) and to relinquiſh all claim to the country of three lacks of rupees, ceded to the Company by the treaty of Poorunder: And the ſaid Warren Haſtings did alſo, at the ſame time, by a private and ſeparate agreement, deliver

(x) Ap. to 5th Rep. Secret Committee. No. 116.
(y) Reſolution of the Houſe of Commons. 28 May 1782.

up

up to Madajee Scindia the whole of the city of Broach; that is, not only the ſhare in the ſaid city which the India Company acquired by the treaty of Poorunder, but the other ſhare thereof, which the India Company poſſeſſed for ſeveral years before that treaty; and that, among the reaſons aſſigned by Mr. David Anderſon for totally ſtripping the Preſidency of Bombay of all their poſſeſſions on the Malabar Coaſt, he has declared that (z) "from the general tenor of "the *reſt* of the treaty, the ſettlement of Bombay "would be in future put on ſuch a footing, that it "might well become a queſtion whether the poſſeſſion "of an inconſiderable territory, without forts, would "not be attended with more loſs than advantage, as "it muſt neceſſarily occaſion conſiderable expence, "muſt require troops for its defence, and might pro-"bably in the end lead, as Scindia apprehended, to "a renewal of war."

XX.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings having in this manner put an end to a war commenced by him without provocation, and continued by him without neceſſity, and having for that purpoſe made ſo many ſacrifices to the Marattas, in points of eſſential intereſt to the India Company, did conſent and agree to other articles utterly diſhonourable to the Britiſh name and character, having ſacrificed or abandoned every one of the native princes, who by *his* ſolicitations and promiſes had been engaged to take part with us in the war; and that he did ſo without neceſſity, ſince it appears that Scindia, the Maratta Chief who concluded the treaty, *in every part of his conduct manifeſted a hearty deſire of eſtabliſhing a peace* with us; and that this was the diſpoſition of all the parties in the Maratta confederacy, who were only kept together by a general dread of their common enemy, the Engliſh, and who only waited for a ceſſation of hoſtilities with us to return to their habitual and permanent enmity againſt each other.

(z) 17 May 1780.

XXI. That

XXI.

That the Governor General and Council, in their letter of 31ſt Auguſt 1781, made the following declaration to the Court of Directors: "The Mahrattas have "demanded the ſacrifice of the perſon of Ragonaut "Row, the ſurrender of the fort and territories of "Ahmedabad, and of the fortreſs of Gualior, *which* "*are not ours to give, and which we could not wreſt from* "*the proprietors, without the greateſt violation of public* "*faith.* No ſtate of affairs, in our opinions, could "warrant our acquieſcence to ſuch requiſition; and "we are morally certain, that had we yielded to them, "ſuch a conſciouſneſs of the ſtate of our affairs would "have been implied, as would have produced an "effect the very reverſe from that for which it was "intended, by raiſing the preſumption of the enemy "to exact yet more *ignominious* terms, or perhaps their "refuſal to accept of any; nor, in our opinion, would "they have failed to excite in others the ſame belief, "and the conſequent deciſion of all parties againſt us, "as the natural conſequences of our decline." That the ſaid Haſtings himſelf, in his inſtructions to Mr. David Anderſon, after authorizing him to reſtore *all* that we had conquered during the war, expreſsly "*ex-*"*cepted* Ahmedabad, and the territory conquered for "Futty Sing Gwicowar." That nevertheleſs the ſaid Haſtings, in the peace concluded by him, has yielded to every one of the conditions reprobated in the preceding declarations, as *ignominious*, and incompatible with public faith.

XXII.

That the ſaid Warren Haſtings did abandon the Rana of Gohud, in the manner already charged; and that the ſaid Rana has not only loſt the Fort of Gualior, but all his own country, and is himſelf a priſoner.—

XXIII. That

XXIII.

That the said Hastings did not interpose to obtain any terms in favour of the Nabob of Bopaul, who was (*a*) *with great reason desirous of concealing from the Mahrattas the attachment he had borne to the English government*; the said Nabob having a just dread of the danger of being exposed to the resentment of the Mahrattas, and no dependence on the faith and protection of the English.

XXIV.

That by the 9th article of the treaty with Futty Sing, it was stipulated, that when a negociation for peace should take place, his interest should be primarily considered; and that Mr. David Anderson, the Minister and representative of the Governor General and Council, did declare to Scindia, that it was indispensably incumbent on us to support Futty Sing's rights. That nevertheless every acquisition made for or by the said Futty Sing, during the war, particularly *the fort and territories of Ahmedabad*, were given up by the said Hastings: That Futty Sing was replaced under the subjection of the Peshwa (whose resentment he had provoked by taking part with us in the war) and under an obligation to pay a tribute, not specified, to the Peshwa, and to perform such services, and to be subject to such obedience, *as had long been established and customary*; and that, no limit being fixed to such tribute or services, the said Futty Sing has been left wholly at the mercy of the Mahrattas.

XXV.

That with respect to Ragoba, the said Hastings, in his instructions to Mr. Anderson, dated 4th November 1781, contented himself with saying, "we cannot "*totally* abandon the interests of Ragonaut Row. Endeavour to obtain for him an adequate provision."—

(*a*) Anderson's letter of 26th January 1782.

That

That Mr. Anderſon declared to Madajee Scindia, (*b*) "that as we had given Ragoba protection as an independent prince, and not brought him into our "ſettlement as a priſoner, we could not *in honour* pretend to impoſe the *ſmalleſt* reſtraint on his will, and "he muſt be at liberty to go wherever he pleaſed; "that it muſt reſt with Scindia himſelf to prevail on "him to reſide in his country; all that we could do "was to *agree*, after a reaſonable time, *to withdraw "our protection from him, and not to inſiſt on the payment "of the ſtipend to him*, as Scindia had propoſed, unleſs "on the condition of his reſiding in ſome part of "Scindia's territories."

XXVI.

That, notwithſtanding all the preceding declarations, and in violation of the public faith repeatedly pledged to Ragoba, he was totally abandoned by the ſaid Haſtings in the treaty, no proviſion whatever being made even for his ſubſiſtence, but on a condition to which he could not ſubmit, without the certain loſs of his liberty, and probable hazard of his life; namely, *that he ſhould voluntarily, and of his own accord, repair to Scindia, and quietly reſide with him.* That ſuch treacherous deſertion of the ſaid Ragoba is not capable of being juſtified by any plea of neceſſity; but that in fact no ſuch neceſſity exiſted; ſince it appears that the Nizam, who, of all the contracting parties in the confederacy, was perſonally moſt hoſtile to Ragoba, did himſelf (*c*) *propoſe that Ragoba might have an option given him* of reſiding within the Company's territories.

XXVII.

That the plan of negociating a peace with the Mahrattas, by application to Scindia, and through his mediation, was earneſtly recommended to the ſaid

(*b*) Anderſon's letter of 24th February 1782.
(*c*) Vide Mr. Holland's letter of 1ſt Nov. 1782, to the Governor General and Council.

Haſtings by the Preſidency of Bombay, ſo early as in February 1779, who ſtated clearly to him the reaſons why ſuch application ought to be made to Scindia, in preference to any other of the Mahratta chiefs, and why it would probably be ſucceſsful; the truth and juſtice of which reaſons were fully evinced in the iſſue, when the ſaid Haſtings, after incurring, by two years delay, all the loſſes and diſtreſſes of a calamitous war, did actually purſue that very plan with much leſs effect or advantage than might have been obtained at the time the advice was given. That he neglected the advice of the Preſidency of Bombay, and retarded the peace, as well as made its conditions worſe, from an obſtinate attachment to his project of an alliance offenſive and defenſive with the Raja of Berar, the object of which was rather a new war, than a termination of the war then exiſting againſt the Peſhwa.

XXVIII.

That the ſaid Haſtings did farther embarraſs and retard the concluſion of a peace, by employing different Miniſters at the Courts of the ſeveral confederate powers, whom he ſeverally empowered to treat and negociate a peace.—That theſe Miniſters not acting in concert, not knowing the extent of each others commiſſions, and having no inſtructions to communicate their reſpective proceedings to each other, did in effect counteract their ſeveral negociations.—That this want of concert and of ſimplicity, and the myſtery and intricacy in the mode of conducting the negociation on our part, was complained of by our Miniſters as embarraſſing and diſconcerting to us, (*d*) while it was advantageous to the adverſe party, who were thereby furniſhed with opportunity and pretence for delay, when it ſuited their purpoſe; and enabled to play off one ſet of negociators againſt another: That it alſo created jealouſy and diſtruſt in the various contending parties, with whom we were treating at the ſame time, and to

(*d*) Vide Captain Watherſtone's letter of 20th January 1782. Mr. Anderſon's letter of 13th February 1782.

whom

whom we were obliged to make contradictory profeſſions, while it betrayed and expoſed to them all our own eagerneſs and impatience for peace; raiſing thereby the general claims and pretenſions of the enemy.

XXIX.

That while Dalhouſie Watherſton, Eſquire, was treating at Poonah, and David Anderſon, Eſquire, in Scindia's camp, with ſeparate powers applied to the ſame object, the miniſter at Poonah informed the ſaid Watherſton, that he had received propoſals for peace from the Nabob of Arcot, with the approbation of Sir Eyre Coote; that he returned other propoſals to the ſaid Nabob of Arcot, who had aſſured him (the miniſter) that thoſe propoſals *would be acceded to, and that Mr. Macpherſon would ſet out for Bengal, after which orders ſhould be immediately diſpatched from the Honourable the Governor General and Council to the effect he wiſhed.* That the ſaid Nabob "had promiſed to obtain and for-"ward to him the expected *orders from Bengal in fifteen* "*days, and that* he was therefore every inſtant in ex-"pectation of their arrival; and obſerved that, when "General Goddard propoſed to ſend a confidential "perſon to Poonah, he conceived that thoſe orders "muſt have actually reached him:" That therefore the treaty, formally concluded by David Anderſon, was in effect and ſubſtance the ſame with that offered, and in reality concluded by the Nabob of Arcot, with the exception only of Salſette, which the Nabob of Arcot had agreed to reſtore to the Marattas.

XXX.

That the intention of the ſaid Warren Haſtings, in preſſing for a peace with the Marattas, on terms ſo diſhonourable, and by meaſures ſo raſh and ill-concerted, was not to reſtore and eſtabliſh a general peace throughout India, but to engage the India Company in a new war againſt Hyder Ally, and to make the Marattas parties therein. That the eagerneſs and paſſion with

which the ſaid Haſtings purſued this object, laid him open to the Marattas, who depended thereon for obtaining whatever they ſhould demand from us.—That in order to carry the point of an offenſive alliance againſt Hyder Ally, the ſaid Haſtings expoſed the negociation for peace with the Marattas to many difficulties and delays. That the Marattas were bound by a clear and recent engagement, which Hyder had never violated in any article, to make no peace with us which ſhould not include him; that they pleaded the ſacred nature of this obligation in anſwer to all our requiſitions on this head, while the ſaid Haſtings, ſtill importunate for his favourite point, ſuggeſted to them various means of reconciling a ſubſtantial breach of their engagement with a formal obſervance of it, and taught them how they might at once be parties in a peace with Hyder Ally, and in an offenſive alliance for immediate hoſtility againſt him. That theſe leſſons of public duplicity and artifice, and theſe devices of eſtenſible faith and real treachery, could have no effect but to degrade the national character, and to inſpire the Marattas themſelves, with whom we were in treaty, with a diſtruſt in our ſincerity and good faith.

XXXI.

That the object of this fraudulent policy, (viz. the utter deſtruction of Hyder Ally, and a partition of his dominions) was neither wiſe in itſelf, or authorized by the orders and inſtructions of the Company to their ſervants; that it was incompatible with the treaty of peace, in which Hyder Ally was included, and contrary to the repeated and beſt underſtood injunctions of the Company; being in the firſt place a bargain for a new war, and in the next, aiming at an extenſion of our territory by conqueſt. That the beſt and ſoundeſt political opinions, on the relations of theſe ſtates, have always repreſented our great ſecurity againſt the power of the Marattas to depend on its being balanced by that of Hyder Ally; and the Myſore country is ſo placed as a barrier between the Carnatic and the Marattas,

rattas, as to make it our interest rather to r
and repair that barrier, than to level and
That the said treaty of partition does expre
be *eventual* with regard to the making and k
peace; but through the whole course of the
tings's proceeding, he did endeavour to prev
peace with the Sultan or Nabob of Mysore, I
Saheb, and did for a long time endeavour to fru
all the methods which could have rendered
said treaty of conquest and partition wholly unn
cessary.

XXXII.

That the Marattas having taken no effectual step to oblige Hyder Ally to make good the conditions for which they had engaged in his behalf, and the war continuing to be carried on in the Carnatic by Tippoo Sultan, son and successor to Hyder Ally, the Presidency of Fort St. George undertook, upon their own authority, to open a negociation with the said Tippoo; (*e*) which measure, though indispensably necessary, the said Hastings utterly disapproved and discountenanced, expressly denying that there was any ground or motive for entering into any direct or separate treaty with Tippoo; and not consenting to or authorizing any negociation for such treaty, until after a cessation of hostilities had been brought about with him by the Presidency of Fort St. George, in August 1773, and the ministers of Tippoo had been received and treated with by that Presidency, and commissioners, in return, actually sent by the said Presidency to the Court of Poonah; which late and reluctant consent and authority were extorted from him, the said Hastings, in consequence of the acknowledgment of his agent at the Court of Madajee Scindia (upon whom the said Warren Hastings had depended for enforcing the clauses of the Maratta treaty) of the precariousness of such dependence, and of the necessity of that direct and se-

(*e*) Letter to Fort St. George, 24th March 1783.

parate

which eaty with Tippoo, ſo long and ſo lately repro-
open to the Warren Haſtings, notwithſtanding the
taining and intreaties of the Preſidency of Fort
in orde as well as the known diſtreſſes and critical
gainſt the Company's affairs.
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XXXIII.

an at, though the ſaid Warren Haſtings did at
l5th give inſtructions for negociating and making
ice with Tippoo; expreſsly adding, that thoſe in-
ructions extended to *all* the points which ocurred to *him or them* as capable of being agitated or gained upon the occaſion—though the ſaid inſtructions were ſent after the ſaid commiſſioners by the Preſidency of Fort St. George, with direction to obey them;—tho' not only the ſaid inſtructions were obeyed, but advantages gained which did not occur to the ſaid Warren Haſtings;—though the ſaid peace formed a contraſt with the Maratta peace, in neither ceding any territory poſſeſſed by the Company before the war, or delivering up any dependant or ally to the vengeance of his adverſaries, but providing for the reſtoration of all the countries that had been taken from the Company and their allies;—though the Supreme Council of Calcutta, forming the legal Government of Bengal in the abſence of the ſaid Warren Haſtings, ratified the ſaid treaty: Yet the ſaid Warren Haſtings, then abſent from the ſeat of government, and out of the province of Bengal, and forming no legal or integral part of the government during ſuch abſence, did, after ſuch ratification, uſurp the power of acting as a part of ſuch government (as if actually ſitting in council with the other members of the ſame) in the conſideration and unqualified cenſure of the terms of the ſaid peace.

XXXIV.

That the Nabob of Arcot, with whom the ſaid Haſtings did keep up an unwarrantable, clandeſtine correſ-

correſpondence, without any communication w
Preſidency of Madras, wrote a letter of c
dated the 27th of March 1784, againſt the J
of that place, without any communication
the ſaid Preſidency, the ſaid complaint bein
to the ſaid Warren Haſtings, the ſubſtanc
complaint was, that he (the Nabob) hac
made a party to the late treaty: And a
intereſt had been ſufficiently provided for
treaty, the ſaid Warren Haſtings did ſign a de
on the 23d of May, at Lucknow, forming the
a new article, and making a new party to the treaty,
after it had been, by all parties (the Supreme Council
of Calcutta included) completed and ratified, and did
tranſmit the ſaid new ſtipulation to the Preſidency at
Calcutta, ſolely for the purpoſes, and at the inſtigation
of the Nabob of Arcot; and the ſaid declaration
was made without any previous communication with
the Preſidency aforeſaid, and in conſequence thereof
orders were ſent by the Council at Calcutta to the Pre-
ſidendy of Fort St. George, *under the ſevereſt threats in caſe of diſobedience*; which orders, whatever were their
purport, would, as an undue aſſumption of, and par-
ticipation in, the government from which he was ab-
ſent, become a high miſdemeanor; but, being to the
purport of opening the ſaid treaty, after its ſolemn ra-
tification, and propoſing a new clauſe and a new party
to the ſame, was alſo an aggravation of ſuch miſde-
meanor, as it tended to convey to the Indian powers
an idea of the unſteadineſs of the councils and deter-
minations of the Britiſh Government, and to take away
all reliance on its engagements, and as, above all, it
expoſed the affairs of the nation and the Company to
the hazard of ſeeing renewed all the calamities of war,
from whence, by the concluſion of the treaty, they had
emerged, and upon a pretence ſo weak as that of pro-
poſing the Nabob of Arcot to be a party to the ſame
—though he had not been made a party by the ſaid
Warren Haſtings in the Maratta treaty, which profeſ-
ſed to be for the relief of the Cranatic;—though he
was not a party to the former treaty with Hyder, alſo
relative

which [illegible] the Carnatic;—though it was not certain
open to [illegible] the treaty were once opened, and that even
taining [illegible] uld then consent to that Nabob's being a
in orde[illegible] ner he, (the said Nabob) would agree to
gainst [illegible] f the same, and consequently whether the
ciatio[illegible] once opened, could afterwards be conclud-
ar[illegible] rtainty, of which he, the said Hastings,
[illegible] learned to be aware, having already once
an[illegible] at, th[illegible]ointed by the said Nabob's refusing to ac-
[illegible]th giv[illegible] treaty which he, the said Warren Hastings
[illegible]ce wit[illegible] him with the Dutch about a year before.
[illegible]ruction

XXXV.

That the said Warren Hastings having broken a solemn and honourable treaty of peace, by an unjust and unprovoked war; having neglected to conclude that war, when he might have done it without loss of honour to the nation; having plotted and contrived, as far as depended on him, to engage the India Company in another war, as soon as the former should be concluded; and having at last put an end to a most unjust war against the Marattas by a most ignominious peace with them, in which he sacrificed objects essential to the interests, and submitted to conditions utterly incompatible with the honour of this nation, and with his own declared sense of the dishonourable nature of those conditions; and having endeavoured to open anew the treaty concluded with Tippoo Sultan, through the means of the Presidency of Fort St. George, upon principles of justice and honour, and which established peace in India; and thereby exposing the British possessions there to the renewal of the dangers and calamities of war—has, by these several acts, been guilty of sundry high crimes and misdemeanors.

No. XXI.

CORRESPONDEN

I.

THAT by an Act of the 13th Year of H. . . . ſent Majeſty, intituled, "An Act for eſtabliſhing "certain regulations for the better management of "the affairs of the Eaſt India Company, as well in "India as in Europe." * "The Governor General "and Council are required and directed to pay due "obedience to all ſuch orders as they ſhall receive "from the Court of Directors of the ſaid United "Company, and to correſpond from time to time, "and conſtantly and diligently tranſmit to the ſaid "Court, an exact particular of all advices or intelli-"gence, and of all tranſactions and matters whatſo-"ever that ſhall come to their knowledge, relating to "the government, commerce, revenues, or intereſt "of the ſaid United Company."

II.

That in conſequence of the above-recited Act, the Court of Directors, in their general inſtructions of the 29th March 1774, to the Governor General and Council, did direct, † "That the correſpondence with "the princes or country powers in India, ſhould be "carried on through the Governor General only; but "that all letters to be ſent by him ſhould be firſt "approved in Council, and that he ſhould lay before "the Council, at their next meeting, all letters re-

* Cap. 63. Sec. 9. †A p. 9. 1 Rep. No. 1. Par. 2.

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AUTHENTIC COPY

OF THE

DEFENCE MADE BY WARREN HASTINGS, Eſq.

At the Bar of the Houſe of Commons, on Monday the 1ſt of May, 1786; to the Charges brought by the Right Hon. EDMUND BURKE.

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